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1. Introduction 
1.1 Setting the stage 
On January 18, 2005, a large production hall in the French town of Blagnac was the decor of the 
official presentation of the Airbus A380. More than 15 years after Airbus made its first steps in 
developing the biggest passenger jet airliner the world had seen, the plane was revealed to numerous 
dignitaries and journalists after a grand ceremony (Clark, 2006). With a height of 24 meters, a wing 
span of nearly 80 meters and an overall length of almost 73 meters, this newly born giant made a 
stunning impression on all attendants. An aspect that might be even more impressive than the 
plane’s size, yet invisible to the audience, was that the A380 was the first plane that contained a 
considerable amount of a new material in its primary structure: Glass Laminated Aluminium 
Reinforced Epoxy, or GLARE (Vlot, 2001). The implementation of this product marked the start 
of the take-off of a material that, amongst other applications, solved several of the challenges the 
airplane industry had faced ever since the first aluminium aircraft went airborne (Vlot, Vogelesang, 
& de Vries, 1999; Vogelesang & Gunnink, 1986). 
 An interesting aspect of the development of GLARE is that, when reconstructing the 
history of its development, it is impossible to pinpoint one single actor to which its developmental 
success can be attributed. Instead, the development of the fibre-metal laminates that resulted in the 
large-scale use of GLARE in the A380 has been referred to by one of the key players involved as 
a typical example of a successful co-operation between science and industry (Vogelesang, 2001). 
As from the first moment that Anthony Fokker envisioned the use of laminated structures in 
aircrafts in the 1920s (Vlot, 2001), several research and development consortia have been formed 
around the material and its precursors, involving players from industry (e.g. AKZO, Alcoa, 3M, 
Boeing, Bombardier), research institutes (e.g. Delft University of Technology and the Dutch 
Aerospace Laboratory) as well as governmental organizations (e.g. the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs) (Berends, van Burg, & van Raaij, 2011; Vlot, 2001). 
 More generally, the importance of collaboration between science and industry in the 
generation of technological innovation such as GLARE has been often underlined (Freeman, 1991; 
Grant, 1996; Meeus, Oerlemans, & Hage, 2001; von Hippel, 1988). Take, for example, the 
following quote of an associate professor of Eindhoven University of Technology who together 
with several partners from industry and an energy research centre, developed a power electronic 
converter that integrates sustainable energy sources with existing energy delivery systems: “The good 
thing about this consortium is that, as a researcher, one can surrender to scientific curiosity while at the same time 
the user committee keeps you level-headed. That combination has proven to be a very fruitful one” (STW, 2009, p. 
86). Or consider the following quote by the head of a package applications department of a Dutch 
industrial steel company who together with several large industrial partners and a full professor of 
applied physics from the University of Groningen, participated in a consortium that focused on 
improving industrial protective coatings: “Our research department holds just a small percentage of all 
knowledge available in the world. The rest of this knowledge must come from our external network. We can’t afford 
to conduct all the research that is needed to suit our products to the requirements of the customer ourselves. That is 
one of the reasons why participating in consortia is so helpful. This involvement helps to develop applications in an 
early stage” (STW, 2010, p. 9). Both quotes illustrate the synergetic effect of collaboration for 
innovation. 
 The importance of collaboration between science and industry is not only illustrated by the 
experiences of individual actors involved. On the societal level as well, many “grand challenges” 
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are faced. Such challenges are barriers that require the coordinated and sustained effort by multiple 
stakeholders for their removal. Removing such barriers helps solving an important societal problem 
with a high global impact (Coenen, Hansen, & Rekers, 2015; George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & 
Tihanyi, 2016). Hence, grand challenges shape the joint goals, and guide the actions of a broad 
stakeholders’ community (Coenen, Benneworth, & Truffer, 2012; Eisenhardt, Graebner, & 
Sonenshein, 2016), and have become an established theme for policy makers across the world. For 
example, about 43% (€31 billion) of the budget that is available for the EU research programme 
Horizon 2020 is reserved for collaborative projects that address societal challenges, such as 
improving health and well-being for all, realizing the transition to a reliable, sustainable and 
competitive energy system, or the protection of citizens, society and economy as well as 
infrastructures and services (McGrath et al., 2014; Rhisiart & Carabias, 2013). Although evidently 
not the all-encompassing solution to any of today’s challenges, the creation and adoption of more 
effective and appropriate technologies is generally considered as a necessary ingredient for 
addressing at least some of them (Foray, Mowery, & Nelson, 2012). Hence, governmental 
stimulation of the formation of linkages between industry, knowledge institutes and governments 
is one of the key elements in addressing such challenges. 
 In this dissertation we delve deeper into the question how research and development 
(R&D) collaboration between science and industry can best be organized, at both the consortium 
level and the network level. The consortium level refers to the combination of organizations that 
pool resources with the aim of carrying out research and development activities. The network level 
refers to the network of consortia that emerges because of organizations being involved in multiple 
consortia simultaneously. This multiple involvement leads to joint member ties between consortia. 
Although the existing academic literature underlines the importance of networks for innovation, 
there is considerable debate as to the question which ways of organizing R&D consortia and 
consortium networks are most effective, and when. In the next sections of this dissertation, this 
issue will be further elaborated on (section 1.2), which will result in a research question (section 
1.3). We then will outline the contributions of this dissertation (section 1.4), which is followed by 
a description of our research approach (section 1.5) and the layout of this dissertation (section 1.6). 
1.2 Research problem 
Our focus in this dissertation will be on a specific form of organizing joint innovation: R&D 
consortia. Basic R&D -activities devoted to increasing scientific or technical knowledge and 
applying that knowledge in the creation of new and improved products or processes (Hagedoorn, 
2002)- is seen as the first step towards the development of new technologies (de Man & Duysters, 
2005). As illustrated by the examples in the first paragraph of this chapter, in early stages of 
technological development, collaboration between industrial and academic actors is of key 
importance. As we will see, however, the network effects that come with such collaboration at both 
the level of consortia as well as the network level are not fully understood yet. 
 Multi-partner consortia such as R&D consortia are a prevalent form of pooling resources, 
as they are considered to have the potential to influence a host of outcomes beyond what their 
individual members could achieve on their own (Koschmann, Kuhn, & Pfarrer, 2012). A 
considerable yet scattered body of literature on multi-partner consortia has emerged in the past 
decades. This literature focuses on a variety of consortium types, addressing topics such as 
prevalence (Vaara, Kleymann, & Seristo, 2004), dynamics with respect to consortium formation, 
collaboration and termination (Bakker, 2016; Berends et al., 2011; Davis, 2016; Heidl, Steensma, & 
Phelps, 2014; Hwang & Burgers, 1997; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Zhang, Gupta, & Hallen, 2016), issues 
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related to consortium governance, management and strategy (Cummings & Kiesler, 2007; de Man 
& Roijakkers, 2009; Gil, 2007; Jones, Hesterly, Fladmoe-Lindquist, & Borgatti, 1998; Li, Eden, 
Hitt, Ireland, & Garrett, 2012; McCarter, Mahoney, & Northcraft, 2011; Postrel, 2002; Zeng & 
Chen, 2003) as well as consortium outcomes (Cummings & Kiesler, 2007; Tiwana, 2008) and 
effectiveness (García-Canal, Valdés-Llaneza, & Ariño, 2003; Hoffmann & Schlosser, 2001). More 
conceptual work has developed a variety of typologies (Biggart & Delbridge, 2004; Das & Teng, 
2002) and -based on a problematization of the production of joint action- developed models for 
enhancing the value-creating capacity of consortia (Koschmann et al., 2012; Monge et al., 1998). 
We approach the question as to the organization of R&D consortia from two perspectives: the 
perspective of the consortium manager and the innovation policy perspective. 
 From the perspective of the consortium manager, one of the aspects that is not explicitly 
considered in the current academic debate regarding the management of R&D consortia is that 
consortium members are often involved in multiple research collaborations simultaneously. As a 
result, R&D consortia are embedded in a larger collaborative network, and delineating to what 
extent this network affects the innovative outcomes of a consortium is important: scholars have 
often stressed that in addition to building internal capabilities, actively managing the external 
network by an organization becomes a crucial issue for effective innovation management and 
network orchestration (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Manning, 2017; Reger, 2003; Tanskanen et al., 
2017). The issue at stake here is control: whereas a consortium leader can control which direct ties 
to other consortia are forged, it is usually much harder to control the establishment of ties between 
its partner consortia ties, ties between the partners of these partners, and so on (Vanhaverbeke, 
Gilsing, Beerkens, & Duysters, 2009). Hence, knowing to what extent this network affects the 
innovative outcomes of a consortium forms the basis for devising strategies for either capitalizing 
on or mitigating such network effects for by consortium managers. 
 Yet, the phenomenon of multi-partner consortium network embeddedness is understudied. 
For example, even though a host of authors have linked network position and structure to nodal 
outcomes (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass, Galaskiewicz, & Greve, 2004; Schilling & Phelps, 2007), 
alliance researchers deal rather pragmatically with collaborations in which more than two partners 
are involved, by either excluding such multi-partner collaborations from the analyses (Hu, 
McNamara, & Piaskowska, 2017; Kavusan, Noorderhaven, & Duysters, 2016; Wassmer & 
Dussauge, 2012), or by analytically separating these collaborations into multiple dyadic relations 
(Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2013). Consequently, although research on antecedents of 
organizational innovation has considered a wide array of both features at the level of the 
organization (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Damanpour, 1991) and the level of the network in which 
such an organization is embedded (Meeus, Oerlemans, & Kenis, 2008; Pittaway, Robertson, Munir, 
Denyer, & Neely, 2004), it is not clear to what extent these insights are applicable to networked 
R&D consortia. In addition, an ongoing concern that is voiced by researchers on organizational 
networks is that the “nestedness” of phenomena should be considered more often (Lusher, 
Koskinen, & Robins, 2013). For example, Brass et al. (2004) have argued that organizational 
performance depends on features that can be specified at multiple levels, for example 
organizational features but also network features. However, even though insights in the relative 
effects of aspects specified at different levels of analysis are important for focusing network 
management efforts, capturing such multilevel effects has shown to be elusive for researchers 
(Contractor, Wasserman, & Faust, 2006; Zappa & Lomi, 2015). 
 We seek to contribute to this debate in two related ways. First, we focus on the relative 
effect of the complete consortium network structure compared to consortium-level features on the 
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innovative outcomes of R&D consortia. Although such a comparison explicitly recognizes the 
nestedness of organizational phenomena, only few studies have considered such relative effects to 
date (Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). Second, we will compare the effect on 
innovative outcomes of the brokerage position a consortium has in the complete network structure 
with the effect on innovative outcomes of the level of closure of the consortium’s ego network. 
With respect to both effects, we are especially interested in the role of time, to tease out which 
network position is most salient for generating innovative outcomes, and when such a position 
during the innovation process is most beneficial for generating such outcomes. 
 From the innovation policy perspective, government has an important role in the formation 
and subsequent dynamics of interorganizational networks geared towards technological 
development (Peterman, Kourula, & Levitt, 2014). Similar to the consortium manager, the issue at 
stake here is control: for the effective spending of public resources, one wants to organize 
innovation networks as optimally as possible. However, for policy agencies, the focus is on 
outcomes at the system level rather than on outcomes of individual consortia. The reason for this 
is that most innovation policies build on two assumptions: the first assumption is that 
organizational innovation is rarely an outcome generated by one single organization. Instead, 
conditions of the system in which organizations innovate (e.g. linkages with customers and 
suppliers as well as the broader institutional and infrastructural context) are considered to be 
decisive in organizational innovation (Edquist, 1997; Kuhlmann, 2001; Smith, 2000). The second 
assumption is that because of the very nature of innovation, failures in the innovation system would 
occur if innovation would be left completely to the market. One of the failures identified is that of 
network failure. Such network failure refers to problems in the interaction among actors, leading 
to an inadequate amount of links and a low quality of these links (Coenen et al., 2015; Klein 
Woolthuis, Lankhuizen, & Gilsing, 2005; Smith, 2000). Hence, policy measures to avoid such 
market and network failures are needed that -amongst other measures- facilitate the formation and 
sustenance of research and development consortia involving industrial organizations as well as 
academic partners in the innovation system for this system to deliver innovative results. 
 Research considering network outcomes at the system level, however, has predominantly 
focused on public sector networks (Turrini, Cristofoli, Frosini, & Nasi, 2009). Prevalent models in 
this research field explain network outcomes as a function of network structural organization and 
network contextual factors (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). Although this 
work has generated a sizeable body of knowledge, the role of network structure in generating 
consortium network-level innovative outcomes has been relatively absent in the existing literature 
(Turrini et al., 2009). Hence, despite the underlined importance of public funding of R&D 
collaboration (Defazio, Lockett, & Wright, 2009; Hellsmark, Frishammar, Söderholm, & 
Ylinenpää, 2016; Thorelli, 1986), the question regarding efficient network structures for generating 
innovation at the network-level merits further investigation (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Klerkx & 
Aarts, 2013; McDermott, Corredoira, & Kruse, 2009; Peterman et al., 2014; Provan & Lemaire, 
2012; Sydow & Windeler, 1998; Turner, Michelet, & Courtial, 1990). In this context, a question 
that is especially salient is the question to what extent innovation policy aimed at the formation and 
development of networks of R&D consortia should be homogeneous or heterogeneous. Scholars 
have, for example, acknowledged that the most appropriate type of instrument aimed at stimulating 
innovation and technological change depends on sectoral patterns of production and use of 
innovations (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016; Pavitt, 1984). Although the organization of innovative 
activities within sectors is often times assumed to be rather homogeneous within sectors, profound 
differences with respect to this organization have been detected across fields (Audretsch, 1997; 
 
- 13 - 
Gort & Klepper, 1982; Lechevalier, Nishimura, & Storz, 2014; Leiponen & Drejer, 2007; Luo, 
2003; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996; Pavitt, 1984). Hence, we expect that technology field dynamics 
influence dynamics in technological field networks, and if so, the implication is that policy measures 
should be tailored to specific developmental features of such technology field networks, instead of 
treating each technological field in the same way. The literature on the formation and development 
of interorganizational networks in the field of innovation, however, does not offer a solid hold for 
describing and comparing the dynamics of technological networks across sectors: studies that 
provide insight in interorganizational network dynamics consider limited time frames (and 
consequently a limited number of networks), often do not account for the set of nodes amongst 
which ties can be forged and tend to focus on the life sciences field only (e.g. Gay and Dousset 
(2005); Orsenigo, Pammolli, and Riccaboni (2001); Powell, White, Koput, and Owen‐Smith 
(2005)). 
 We seek to contribute to knowledge regarding the dynamics and innovativeness of 
complete consortium networks in two related ways. First, we will focus on the question if 
differences exist in the dynamics of different technology field networks. The insights obtained with 
this study (Chapter 4), in turn, will be used in a second study in which we focus on predicting 
network-level innovative outcomes using network structural features, as well as features of the 
network population and the stability of the underlying technology field (Chapter 5). Similar to our 
approach regarding consortium-level outcomes, we are especially interested in the role of time, for 
example to detect differences in the developmental pace of networks, as well as time lags between 
network structure and the generation of network-level innovative performance. 
1.3 Research question 
As the title of this dissertation suggests, R&D consortia can be managed to a certain extent by both 
consortium managers and policy makers. Consortium managers can manage several inputs to the 
consortium, such as selecting the most suitable partners, setting up a clear collaboration structure 
and organizing a filing system that allows for sharing knowledge embedded in documents such as 
minutes, research reports and white papers. Policy makers can actively stimulate R&D 
collaboration at the country level, for example by setting up funding schemes that stimulate joint 
innovation, bringing potential collaboration partners together and organizing conferences. Yet, the 
actions of both policy makers and consortium managers in forming and collaborating in R&D 
consortia involve higher order effects that are beyond the control of both: even though it is possible 
to select one’s partners, for example, choosing the partners of one’s partners is beyond one’s 
control. This second order network, as well as the overall network -including its volatility over 
time- that emerges from the aggregate of partner selection decisions of all consortium managers, 
however, can affect the outcomes of individual R&D consortia as well as the innovative outcomes 
of the nation as a whole (Provan & Milward, 1995; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Uzzi, 1997). Hence, 
with respect to these higher order effects that result in inputs to R&D consortia and consortium 
networks that are beyond the control of consortium managers and policy makers, both muddle 
through: one can only hope for the best with respect to the impact such inputs have on the 
innovative performance of R&D consortia and consortium networks (Lindblom, 1959). 
 With this dissertation we want to make both consortium managers and policy makers more 
aware of the networks they become embedded in or create through setting up R&D consortia, as 
well as the effect such networks have on the generation of innovative outcomes. This helps 
managing one’s position in these networks as well as the structure of complete networks. For this, 
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however, a more in-depth insight in the effects of these networks is needed. To create this insight, 
the following related research questions have been formulated: 
1) To what extent does R&D consortium network structure affect innovative outcomes? 
2) To what extent does the network position of R&D consortia affect innovative outcomes? 
3) To what extent do network dynamics and technology field dynamics moderate the relationships explored in 
research question 1 and 2? 
Hence, the focus in this dissertation is on the generation of innovative outcomes at both the level 
of the consortium and the consortium network level. At the consortium level, we explain outcomes 
by considering the effects of consortium features, consortium network positional features and 
features of the complete consortium network. At the network level, we explain outcomes by 
considering features of the complete consortium network. At both levels, we consider the role of 
time by either considering the development of the network position of a consortium over time, or 
the dynamics of the complete consortium network. 
1.4 Research contributions 
In addition to the contributions of each individual chapter, we distinguish three main overarching 
contributions of this dissertation. First, we focus on the R&D consortium as a distinct form of 
organizing. As explained in section 1.2, multi-partner alliances in general are often simplified or 
ignored in research that considers the effect of an organization’s network position on the 
generation of innovative outcomes. Recent studies that have emerged on the phenomenon of R&D 
consortia, however, explicitly acknowledge that such consortia can be considered an organizational 
form in itself. For example, Sydow, Windeler, Schubert, and Möllering (2012) consider R&D 
consortia as “locales of collective agency” which should be consciously organized and managed in 
order to effectively govern the jointly created pool of resources. As explained in section 1.2, 
research on the effectiveness of complete networks has mostly considered public sector networks, 
yet the idea of focusing on the effectiveness of such networks can also be fruitfully applied to 
studying publicly funded consortium networks: such networks form as the result of the idea that 
collaboration stimulates innovation. Considering to what extent such networks deliver such 
innovative outcomes can be considered a litmus test for the fruitfulness of applying that idea. By 
focusing on many consortia as well as consortium networks, our study seeks to increase our 
knowledge about the general relation between networks and innovation. 
 Second, this dissertation addresses recent calls for more multi-level research in network 
studies (Contractor et al., 2006; Zappa & Lomi, 2015) in several ways. First, at the consortium level 
we consider antecedents of consortium innovative performance at both the consortium-level and 
the network-level. In addition, we consider the relative effects of the ego network position of a 
consortium with the position of this consortium in the complete network. Second, at the level of 
the network we consider these networks as being embedded in different technology fields. We 
propose that different technology fields have a different effect on the dynamics of such networks, 
as well as their effectiveness. By considering antecedents of innovation at different levels, we 
provide insight in the relative importance of antecedents at each level which allows for more 
targeted network management by both consortium managers as policy makers. 
 Our third contribution is that, although often a call for the specification of time in 
organizational research has been made (Albert & Bell, 2002; Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, & 
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Tushman, 2001; George & Jones, 2000; Kavanagh & Araujo, 1995; Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 
1999), studies that incorporate the role of time in the relation between networks and innovation 
are scarce. Scholars have suggested that ties between actors and therefore simultaneously networks 
change over time. Consequently, the impact of certain network positions and structures on 
innovative outcomes might also change over time. Ahuja, Soda, and Zaheer (2012) illustrate this 
using structural hole theory, which posits that actors that bridge a structural hole have an advantage 
compared to actors who do not bridge such a structural hole (Burt, 1992). The moment one takes 
into account network dynamics, however, it could happen that structural holes disappear over time, 
and with that the advantages associated with such holes (Buskens & van de Rijt, 2008). Hence, the 
salience of such network effects depends on for example the extent to which a network is subject 
to structural and population dynamics (Ahuja et al., 2012). In addition, time must pass for 
relationships to develop, strengthen and deepen. It therefore can be expected that not all network 
effects are present instantly but need some time before becoming manifest. Lastly, several authors 
have suggested different knowledge gestation times for different technology fields (Gilbert & 
Campbell, 2015; Park & Zhou, 2005; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005), industries (Becker & Lillemark, 
2006; Fabrizio & Thomas, 2012; Hameri, 1996; Henisz & Macher, 2004; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 
2005; Nishimura & Okada, 2014; Spithoven, Frantzen, & Clarysse, 2010), and types of innovative 
activity (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2014; Flammer & Bansal, 2017; Maine, Probert, & Ashby, 
2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Prettner & Werner, 2016; Souder, 1983). By considering the 
role of time in the general relation between networks and innovation we provide more insight in 
the timing of network effects at both the consortium and the network level. 
1.5 Research approach and data collection 
Answering our research questions requires the inclusion of as many consortia and consortium 
networks in our study as possible. We do dare to say that we do have a unique data-repository 
available that does cater for our purposes. Each chapter in this dissertation applies a quantitative 
research approach, while drawing on a dataset that contains secondary data on 1,928 Dutch R&D 
consortia, starting somewhere between 1981-2004. 
 After the post-WWII economic expansion, the economic downturn in the 1970s, with less 
financial resources for technological innovation, forced Dutch policy makers to think about how 
to create synergies between industry and universities, while preventing a technology push, and how 
to facilitate a demand driven innovation approach. Driven by in particular a remark made by one 
of the individuals involved (“We all know what useful research is: useful research is research that others need”), 
the decision was made that funding needed to take place based on an equal weighting of academic 
excellence and user interest (STW, 2005, 2016). This exercise coalesced with the growing concern 
of the Ministry of Economic affairs that there was too little interaction between academia and 
industry (resulting in the so-called “knowledge paradox” where, despite the country’s strong 
science base, firms display a relatively weak R&D performance (Tijssen & van Wijk, 1999)). As a 
result, a technology foundation was established with the aim of prioritization of research funding 
for the technical sciences, and enhancing knowledge transfer between industry and excellent 
technical-scientific research. The assumption that has driven this foundation throughout the years 
is that even though generating innovative outcomes by any research focusing on R&D is inherently 
uncertain, collaboration between multiple agents increases the chance of succes. 
 Ever since its inception, the foundation has granted research funds to a broad variety of 
consortia, focusing on technologies such as improved donor organs, cleaner waste water, lighter 
airplanes (the foundation supported several consortia that were focused on the development of 
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GLARE), more reliable bridges, better treatment of heart attacks, faster communication and more 
efficient solar panels (STW, 2016). Two requirement for eligibility of project funding are: (1) the 
research institution that applies for the consortium and the foundation jointly own the research 
results and (2) potential users of the research results have to demonstrate their commitment 
upfront by participating in a user committee. These committee members can originate from 
industry, but public organizations and other research institutions are likely participants as well. The 
minimum amount of meetings committee members should have is twice a year, but usually contacts 
take place outside these meetings (STW, 2016). Knowledge transfer with the purpose of mutual 
allignment, steering of the research project and in the end knowledge valorization is key during all 
these interactions. 
 The approach of this funding organization is a clear reflection of the von Hippel-agenda, 
in which a prominent role in the process of R&D and innovation is reserved for users (von Hippel, 
1988). The benefit of doing so is twofold: for researchers, involving users is a test of the viability 
of their research programme, and for industrial participants it is a relatively accessible way to keep 
up to date with the most recent scientific developments. The funding programme is one of the few 
programmes in the Netherlands that organizes research in this way (Velzing, 2013), and as indicated 
earlier, leads to network formation: joint membership by consortium participants in multiple 
consortia simultaneously leads to the forging of joint member ties between consortia and with that, 
the emergence of consortium networks. 
 The foundation is held accountable for providing consortium funds, and has to issue an 
annual publicly available report in which consortia that were funded 5 and 10 years ago are 
evaluated. In total, we used the information drawn from 23 annual reports to build our dataset. For 
the purpose of this introductory chapter, it would go too far to share specific details regarding the 
design of this dataset, as well as the decisions made while constructing it. Instead, we decided to 
report this in appendices to each empirical chapter in this dissertation. In each appendix, the focus 
will be on one of the key topics regarding the construction of this dataset, especially in the context 
of interorganizational network studies. The topics that we will cover in this light are (1) data sources 
and database construction (Chapter 2), (2) node specification (Chapter 3), (3) tie and network 
specification (Chapter 4) and (4) network boundary specification (Chapter 5). 
1.6 Dissertation layout 
Subsequent empirical chapters focus on the research questions formulated in this introductory 
chapter. In Chapter 2, we explain the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by R&D 
consortia. Our research question in this chapter is twofold, and reads as follows: to what extent do 
the level of geographical proximity and technological diversity of consortium members as well as 
the level of network integration influence the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes of an 
R&D consortium, and to what extent is the relation between geographical proximity and 
technological diversity and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes 
moderated by the level of network integration? We consider consortium-level features (i.e. 
geographical proximity and technological diversity) and features of the network in which consortia 
are embedded (i.e. network integration). The goal of this chapter is to provide levers for the design 
of R&D consortia and the design of consortium networks. In the literature on R&D consortia the 
focus hitherto has been mainly on either establishing R&D consortia as a new phenomenon of 
interest, or on motivations of members to enter, stay or leave an R&D consortium, as well as the 
effect of participating in R&D consortia on the performance of these members. We consider the 
R&D consortium in Chapter 2 as an organizational form in its own capacity and propose that the 
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innovative outcomes of consortia are partly determined by aspects that are in the control of the 
consortium managers (consortium-level features), and partly determined by aspects that are not in 
the control of consortium managers yet can be steered by managing the overall network (network-
level features). 
 A key insight in the literature on inter-organizational networks and innovation is that the 
network position of an organization influences its innovative outcomes. Yet, there is mixed 
evidence regarding the exact nature of this relation. Chapter 3 offers a model to decompose this 
relation by disentangling the temporality and topological effects of network position on outcomes 
along two dimensions. First, we make a distinction between the position of an R&D consortium 
in the local network (i.e. a consortium’s ego network) and its position in the global network (i.e. 
the full consortium network). Second, we map both the local and global network position of R&D 
consortia over time. By investigating the effect of a consortium’s network position on its likelihood 
of generating innovative outcomes across time and network order, we answer the research 
questions to what extent the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia are affected by a consortium’s 
position in the local and global network, and to what extent said relationship is moderated by time. 
Our goal with this chapter is to provide insights for consortium managers regarding the relation 
between network positional dynamics of R&D consortia and the generation of innovative 
outcomes. The insights generated in this chapter complement the insights obtained in Chapter 2: 
whereas Chapter 2 provides levers for the design of R&D consortia, the insights in Chapter 3 
suggest which layers of a consortium’s network are important, and when. This enables consortium 
managers to develop a targeted strategy regarding the joint member ties of a consortium and its 
resulting network position. 
 Whereas the focus in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is on the R&D consortium, our attention in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 moves to the level of the complete network. We explore the validity of 
one important starting point of existing innovation policy: network formation and development 
need to be stimulated regardless of differences in the organization of innovative activities within 
sectors and the subsequent differences in the pace and nature with which these networks develop. 
Chapter 4 addresses the issue whether technology field networks are homogeneous in their 
development. We do indeed find that field network development is rather heterogeneous. Focusing 
on consortium networks, where nodes are consortia and ties are joint member links between these 
consortia, we develop a descriptive state change model that uses node entry, stayers, node exit, 
network degree centralization and density as key parameters for describing network change. The 
resulting insight in the predictability with which field networks develop and the duration of 
different developmental stages is needed to develop are more targeted and differentiated approach 
towards steering such networks. 
 The insights regarding the developmental nature of different technology field networks are 
used as one of the inputs for Chapter 5. In this chapter, we answer the research questions to what 
extent network innovative performance is explained by node entry, stayers, node exit and network 
integration and to what extent the relation between said predictors and network innovative 
performance is moderated by the level of technology field stability. In this chapter, we suggest that 
networks between R&D consortia are worth organizing themselves, and we offer several levers for 
policy regarding the top-down management of such networks by public funding agencies. 
 Based on the findings in each of these empirical chapters, we will formulate an answer to 
the overarching research question in Chapter 6 and consider the implications of our findings in a 
broader academic and practical context.  
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2. The Structural Context of Innovation in Government-
sponsored R&D Consortia: Effects of Network and 
Consortium Features1 
Abstract 
Existing research on organizational innovation has yielded many insights in possible antecedents, 
both at the organizational and the network level. Yet, what the antecedents of innovation are in 
multi-partner R&D consortia is a question that is still open to further exploration, especially when 
it concerns the role of the complete consortium network structure in the relationship between 
consortium features and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. This 
chapter addresses this question. Based on an analysis of 1,263 Dutch R&D consortia over the time 
frame 1989-2004, we test hypotheses regarding the role of network integration, geographical 
proximity between consortium members and their technological diversity, and the likelihood of a 
consortium generating innovative outcomes. Our results suggest that consortia embedded in 
networks that are characterized by mutual awareness of consortium members of what members in 
other consortia are doing (i.e. density-based network integration), are more likely to generate 
innovative outcomes compared to consortia in networks characterized by other types of 
integration. In addition, we find that especially in this condition of density-based network 
integration, an inverted U-shaped pattern exists between a consortium’s level of technological 
diversity and the likelihood of this consortium generating innovative outcomes. Next to shedding 
light on the question regarding predictors of the innovativeness of R&D consortia, our study results 
have important implications for both top-down and bottom-up management of consortium 
networks and R&D consortia. 
2.1 Introduction 
The past four decades have been marked by a burgeoning academic interest in interorganizational 
relationships (IORs) (Cropper, Ebers, Huxham, & Ring, 2009). Combining the flexibility of 
markets with the predictability of hierarchies (Powell, 1990; Thorelli, 1986), IORs are formed by 
organizations to gain benefits such as access to critical resources (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), 
overcoming competency limitations (Mitchell & Singh, 1996) or support of innovative activities 
(Teece, 1992). Consequently, IORs are considered to be a critical determinant of organizational 
survival and growth, which has sparked the growth of a considerable body of research (Oliver, 
1990; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). 
 Being manifested in simple dyadic arrangements initially, IORs have evolved over time into 
more complex structures that include multiple partners (Das & Teng, 2002; Zeng & Chen, 2003). 
These collaborations often do not only involve firms, but also include universities, research centres 
and governmental bodies (Kale & Singh, 2009; Mindruta, 2013). In comparison with dyadic 
relationships, collaborations involving three or more partners differ, for example because the 
interests of individual members can be suppressed for the interests of the majority of members 
(Krackhardt, 1999), social exchange mechanisms are based on different logics (Das & Teng, 2002), 
or individual members can, at times, let their self-interest prevail over the common interest (Zeng 
& Chen, 2003). This can have a profound impact on the dynamics of collaboration and requires a 
much more complex governance structure (Lavie, Lechner, & Singh, 2007). Hence, even though 
                                                 
1 A previous version of this chapter was presented at the DRUID17 Conference (New York, June 2017). 
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both dyadic and multi-partner collaborations tend to have the same value creation logic, the design 
and management of the latter is often more complicated (Das & Teng, 2002). 
 Research and development (R&D) consortia are marked examples of such multi-partner 
collaborations (Das & Teng, 2002). Their conduciveness to knowledge transfer, problem solving 
and joint learning through collaboration among firms and research institutions make them a 
common form of organizing, especially in fields characterized by knowledge production and 
technological development (Fonti, Maoret, & Whitbred, 2015; Foray et al., 2012; Sydow et al., 
2012). The earliest attempt to form an R&D consortium has been credited to Josiah Wedgewood, 
who tried to bring together a group of Staffordshire potters around 1775. As an illustration of the 
complexities of designing and managing multi-partner collaborations, this consortium failed 
because of disagreements on priorities and financing (Alic, 1990). Even though R&D consortia 
were formed already in the 18th century, scholarly interest came to fruition no earlier than the 1980s. 
This resulted in the accumulation of three distinct bodies of knowledge on the topic: the first body 
of research focused at establishing R&D consortia as a new phenomenon, the second focuses on 
consortium members and the third considers R&D consortia as an organizational form in its own 
capacity. 
 As from the late 1980s, the focus was on establishing and justifying the R&D consortium 
as a new phenomenon. Back then, the R&D consortium was considered a relatively new form of 
organization. In the U.S., for example, joint R&D between organizations was illegal throughout 
most of the 20th century. Due to increased competition from foreign markets, however, the 
National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) was established in 1984, which legalized conducting 
joint R&D activities between firms (Evan & Olk, 1990; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). In Europe, the 
design of industrial research policy used to follow the American example, where the success of 
large firms was believed to result from taking advantage of multinational markets and economies 
of scale (Watkins, 1991). However, the success of cooperative industrial research in Japan 
motivated Europe to switch its policy in such a way that this mode of collaboration was emulated 
(Sakakibara, 1997; Watkins, 1991). 
 The subsequent wave of consortium formation (Adler, 2001) invited various researchers to 
perform descriptive studies with a clear geographical scope, such as Europe (Watkins, 1991), Japan 
(Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Odagiri, Nakamura, & Shibuya, 1997), and later also Taiwan (Mathews, 
2002). The main objective was to describe the prevalence of R&D consortia, as well as to provide 
insight in their key descriptives. Also, comparisons between countries were made, especially 
between the United States and Japan (Ham, Linden, & Appleyard, 1998; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). 
Mostly based on case studies, these papers focused on motivations for consortium formation (Ham 
et al., 1998; Mathews, 2002; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988), modes of organization, goal setting and 
managerial challenges (Corey, 1997; Evan & Olk, 1990; Ham et al., 1998; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988) 
and the (dis)advantages of a governmental role in the formation of these consortia (Odagiri et al., 
1997; Watkins, 1991). 
 Scholarly attention shifted from establishing the consortium as a new organizational 
phenomenon to a focus on consortium members as from the late 1990s. Studies conducted in this 
realm were explanatory instead of descriptive: questions as to the motivations of member 
organizations to enter (Sakakibara, 2002), stay, or leave (Olk & Young, 1997) consortia became 
relevant to answer for both policy makers (do these consortia attract suitable members?) and 
consortium managers (how to deal with variation in composition over time, especially in relation 
to consortium performance?). Also addressed in this context were questions about the process of 
 
- 21 - 
consortium formation by its members, and predictors for member involvement levels (Doz, Olk, 
& Ring, 2000; Fonti et al., 2015). A distinct topic in relation to studying consortia at the member-
level was that of knowledge spill-overs: do spill-overs -as a core function of R&D consortia- 
actually occur (Watanabe, Kishioka, & Nagamatsu, 2004), and what are the antecedents of 
successful knowledge spill-overs between consortium members (Lin, Fang, Fang, & Tsai, 2009)? 
Lastly, the effects of consortium participation on the performance of individual members has been 
a topic of interest, both in the short (Sakakibara, 1997) and the long (Kaiser & Kuhn, 2012) run. 
 Only recently, the field has moved to a consideration of R&D consortia as an organizational 
form in its own capacity. This field has yet to come to full fruition, as only few scholars have 
addressed the topic, but the common theme that holds the field together is that of generating 
innovative outcomes by a collectivity of organizations. Contrary to research that has provided 
insight in the benefits for individual members of being member of an R&D consortium 
(Sakakibara, 1997), the key question here is how to organize R&D consortia in such a way that they 
are conducive to generating innovation at the collective level. In one of the early works in this 
realm, Browning, Beyer, and Shetler (1995) sought to derive understanding of factors that give rise 
or impede cooperative relations among actors in the SEMATECH consortium. They found that 
three sets of social conditions enabled the development and sustained viability of such 
relationships: early disorder and ambiguity, emergence of a moral community, and structuring of 
activities. Based on a case-study in the Dutch context, Roelofsen, Boon, Kloet, and Broerse (2011), 
for example, present an approach for facilitating and analysing learning processes in R&D 
consortia. In the view of these authors, R&D consortia can only develop technologies that meet 
social needs if the inputs of different stakeholders are adequately addressed. In another case-study, 
Allarakhia and Walsh (2012) present a model that aids our understanding of the way consortium 
members organize themselves in order to effectively govern the jointly created pool of resources. 
Only when consortia are managed effectively, the preconditions for generating innovative 
outcomes are set. The most clear example of work that considers R&D consortia as an 
organizational form is the study conducted by Sydow et al. (2012). This work considers R&D 
consortia as “locales of collective agency”. Using a longitudinal, industry-based study, the authors 
aim at capturing how this collective agency extends existing and creates new technological paths in 
the field of semiconductor manufacturing. The underlying goal of this path extension and creation 
is to enable the innovative activities by consortia with the goal to generate innovation. 
 Although scholarly work conducted on R&D consortia hitherto has shed light on the 
different aspects related to their functioning, there is yet a considerable amount of work to be done 
before we can fully grasp the complexities of organizing R&D consortia in such a way that they are 
conducive to innovation. We seek to contribute to this debate by focusing on the moderating role 
of the complete consortium network (i.e. the structure of the full network rather than network 
position) in the relation between the geographical proximity of consortium members and their 
technological diversity on the one hand, and the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating 
innovation on the other. In short, this paper attempts to predict the innovative outcomes of R&D 
consortia by proposing that these consortia are positioned in a technology landscape. Network 
structural organization determines to what extent search in this landscape is guided. Not only does 
network structure directly affect the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative 
outcomes, it also moderates the relation between geographical proximity and technological 
diversity of consortium members on the one hand, and the likelihood of generating innovative 
outcomes by the consortium on the other. 
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In contemporary organizational research, questions regarding the antecedents of innovation have 
been explored by and large, taking into account organizational (Damanpour, 1991) as well as 
networking (Meeus et al., 2008; Pittaway et al., 2004) antecedents. Yet, in as far as this work 
considers relational antecedents, the focus is mostly on dyadic collaborations rather than multi-
partner collaborations. Consequently, despite the insights provided by the three studies described 
earlier, the limited availability of studies and their mainly case-based approach make that existing 
insights in the generation of innovative outcomes by R&D consortia are difficult to generalize. In 
addition, an ongoing debate in the field of organization studies revolves around investigating the 
relative effect of organization and network features on the generation of organizational outcomes 
(Ibarra, Kilduff, & Tsai, 2005). This debate is driven by the reality that many organizational 
phenomena are nested (Lusher et al., 2013). As an example, the performance of individual 
organizations depends on both features at the organizational level and features of their complete 
collaboration networks at the industry level (Brass et al., 2004; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Yet, 
capturing multi-level effects has shown to be elusive for network researchers (Zappa & Lomi, 
2015), who have been criticized for transforming multi-level data to a single level of analysis 
(Contractor et al., 2006). Hence, the current state of the literature is that only a few studies have 
taken into account both organizational and complete network antecedents2 in explaining 
organizational innovation (see Schilling and Phelps (2007) and Uzzi and Spiro (2005) for examples). 
Consequently, not much is known about whether features of this complete network affect R&D 
consortia. 
 We aim to address these two issues in this chapter. By combining insights from the literature 
on whole networks, university-industry interaction, new product development teams and alliance 
portfolios, we aim to provide managers of R&D consortia with an insight in the antecedents of the 
likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes. In predicting this likelihood, 
we are especially interested in the extent to which different types of network integration moderate 
the relationship between geographical proximity of members and their technological diversity on 
the one hand, and the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes on the other. Given the path-
dependence of technological development (Dosi, 1982), we suggest that R&D consortia are 
positioned in a technology landscape. All conceivable positions in such a technology landscape, 
regardless of whether they are realized, can be interpreted as accumulated bodies of knowledge that 
prescribe the technological (im)possibilities and viable future research directions. We conceptualize 
network integration as a network-level feature that guides search in this landscape: the clearer the 
overall picture that consortium members have of this landscape, the more likely this consortium is 
to effectively search the space of possible solutions, and with that generate innovative outcomes. 
 Networks channel the flow of information and knowledge among actors (Podolny, 2001). 
The concept of network integration reflects the mutual awareness among different consortium 
members of what members in other consortia are doing, and the extent to which the consortium 
network is characterized by a limited amount of common thematic foci. Thus, depending on the 
type of network integration, consortia embedded in these networks are guided in their search 
through the technology landscape. In addition to the complete network-level concept of network 
integration, members within R&D consortia need to be able to communicate knowledge 
effectively, and to create an innovative climate conducive to knowledge recombination. These 
elements are embodied in the concepts of geographical proximity and technological diversity, and 
are expected to create a process in which research findings and proposed implementations go 
                                                 
2 With this term, we refer to network-level properties, such as density and centralization rather than network positions 
of individual nodes, such as centrality or structural equivalence. 
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through a maze of tests in order to determine whether they can be implemented in a technological 
innovation (Drazin & Schoonhoven, 1996). We propose that these aspects directly affect the 
likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes, but that the extent to which this is the 
case depends on the extent that network integration allows for guided search in the technology 
landscape. Hence, network integration either amplifies or diminishes knowledge transfer and 
recombination at the consortium-level. 
 The empirical value of our theoretical ideas is assessed by performing a multi-level analysis 
of 1,263 R&D consortia, each of which started in the Netherlands in the time frame 1989-2004. 
These consortia received governmental funding, based on the philosophy that even though 
generating innovative outcomes by any research project that focuses on R&D is inherently 
uncertain, chances of success are increased when technology developers and potential users of the 
technology are brought together as early as possible in the developmental process. The consortia 
studied are dispersed across 7 different technology fields. Through determining consortium 
networks based on joint member ties within technology fields, we operationalize our concept of 
network integration. In turn, we estimate multilevel binary logistic regression models that predict 
the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes as a function of network 
integration, geographical proximity and technological diversity. In addition, cross-level interactions 
between network integration and consortium-level features are included. Our results suggest that 
consortia embedded in networks characterized by mutual awareness of what members in other 
consortia are doing are more likely to generate innovative outcomes. In addition, even though our 
findings are opposite to what we expected, we find that especially in the condition of density-based 
network integration, an inverted-U shaped pattern exists between the level of technological 
diversity and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
 This study advances our understanding of innovation in R&D consortia in two important 
ways. First, by including both the consortium and the complete network-level of analysis in our 
model, we take on the challenge to improve the explanation of innovative outcomes in the context 
of multi-partner collaborations as a function of both nodal and complete network features. As 
indicated earlier, an abundance of previous studies has addressed questions related to antecedents 
of innovation using organizational (Damanpour, 1991) as well as networking (Meeus et al., 2008; 
Pittaway et al., 2004) antecedents. Studies that combine both dimensions, especially when it 
concerns complete network features, are rare. By combining both levels of analysis, we show that 
complete network structures matter for consortium innovation and provide insight in the 
comparative effects of features specified at both levels. Hence, not only being embedded in 
networks is important, also the complete network effect matters for the likelihood a consortium 
will generate innovative outcomes. Second, by employing a large dataset on R&D consortia across 
multiple technology fields, we aim to increase the generalizability of knowledge about antecedents 
of innovation in R&D consortia. 
 In addition to these theoretical contributions, our study offers useful insights for both 
policy makers focussing at stimulating consortium formation, and consortium managers. A useful 
distinction that can be made here is that between top-down and bottom-up management 
(Kozlowski, Chao, Grand, Braun, & Kuljanin, 2013) of networks. With top-down management of 
networks, we refer to the influence of policy in shaping consortium networks. Even though R&D 
consortia are an important vehicle for generating innovation, their formation is not self-evident. 
(Odagiri et al., 1997; Ouchi & Bolton, 1988; Watanabe, Asgari, & Nagamatsu, 2003; Watkins, 1991). 
Because the nature and range of potential applications is uncertain, and the ability to capture the 
returns of one’s investment is likely to be limited, even if the research is successful (Foray et al., 
 
- 24 - 
2012), the willingness to invest at this early stage of basic research is low. Hence, it is often argued 
that government programs that aim at forging relationships between organizations in order to 
develop and deploy the relevant technologies are needed (Foray et al., 2012; Spencer, Murtha, & 
Lenway, 2005). To be able to develop effective programs, it is important to have knowledge about 
possible hampering or amplifying effects of complete networks on the likelihood of generating 
innovative outcomes by R&D consortia, and to be knowledgeable about levers that can be used to 
influence these structures. To do this, integration of structural and consortium-level theories is 
needed. 
 With bottom-up network management, we refer to designing consortia by consortium 
managers in such a way that effects at the complete network level are considered as well. Especially 
in situations where networks are created unconsciously, awareness of the structural context of an 
R&D consortium and ways in which this context alleviates or strengthens the effect of consortium 
features on the generation of innovative outcomes helps consortium managers to choose a 
consortium design that fits a certain structural context, or maybe even choosing a design that can 
actually change that structural context (Short, Ketchen Jr., Bennett, & Toit, 2006). 
2.2 Theoretical framework 
R&D consortia are collective structures among multiple organizations that focus on carrying out 
research and development activities, and that are typically dissolved after a pre-defined innovative 
goal is reached (Doz et al., 2000; Sakakibara, 2002; Sydow et al., 2012). The focus is on developing 
technologies, based on a certain task or need such as transporting commodities and passengers, 
producing chemical compounds with certain properties, or switching and amplifying electrical 
signals (Van Wyk, 2002). Although marked differences exist between countries (Aldrich & Sasaki, 
1995; Mathews, 2002; Sakakibara & Cho, 2002), R&D consortia are generally initiated with the goal 
to develop products or processes that have the potential to be patented or commercialized (Aldrich 
& Sasaki, 1995). Typical activities conducted by consortium members include -but are not limited 
to- the generation of ideas, exploring technological feasibility, theoretical analysis, experimentation, 
analysis of research data, testing, prototyping, and product development (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; 
Ouchi & Bolton, 1988). 
 The aim of the model that we present in this chapter is to predict the likelihood of R&D 
consortia accomplishing their innovative goals. An important assumption that underlies this model 
is that activities conducted in R&D consortia are not totally ‘blind’, and unrelated with those 
conducted in other consortia (Frenken, 2006; Silverberg & Verspagen, 2005). Instead, research and 
development activities take place against the backdrop of an existing ‘technology landscape’ 
(Aharonson & Schilling, 2016; Fleming & Sorenson, 2001; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). As will be 
explained in this section, technology landscapes offer a useful heuristic for thinking about the space 
that consortium members search in their attempt to develop, or build forth on, useful new 
technologies (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). 
 The conceptual model that reflects our theorizing is depicted in Figure 1. The general thrust 
of this model is as follows. Members of R&D consortia engage in search procedures within a 
technology landscape. This entails improving on an already existing product or process or filling 
up an empty position that has developmental potential. In either case, engaging in search activities 
and building forth on existing knowledge combinations or making new ones are key activities 
(Katila, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). The likelihood of a consortium generating innovative 
outcomes depends, on the one hand, on configurational properties of this consortium that (1) 
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enable the effective transfer of knowledge between consortium members and (2) the existence of 
a collaborative climate that is conducive to knowledge recombination. We conceptualize these 
features as geographical proximity and technological diversity. Because an incomplete picture of 
the technology landscape restricts search in other directions once members succeeded in finding a 
technological improvement or solution (Kauffman, Lobo, & Macready, 2000), the presence of the 
‘right’ mix of these consortium-level features is necessary, yet not sufficient for maximizing search 
within the technology landscape. For that, the complete network in which an R&D consortium is 
embedded needs to provide guidance to consortium members in such a way that it creates an 
overall picture of the interrelated knowledge components within the technology landscape 
(Macher, 2006). As such, it creates a structural context that guides search in the direction of the 
most promising rather than the firstly encountered feasible technological avenue (Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004). Through, for example, creating a broader and better understanding of available 
knowledge components and knowledge interdependencies among consortia (Macher, 2006) or 
improved problem structuring (Shore, Bernstein, & Lazer, 2015), network integration enables 
members of R&D consortia to fully use the innovative potential created through geographical 
proximity and technological diversity by providing insight in the full range of the technology search 
space. 
FIGURE 1 
Conceptual model linking network and consortium-level features to innovative outcomes 
generated by R&D consortia 
 
The remainder of this section will revolve around the elaboration on our conceptual model. The 
section is organized as follows. First, the concept of innovative outcomes in the context of R&D 
consortia is explained. It is outlined that innovation can be considered as a multifaceted process, 
and we focus in this chapter on three distinct outcome categories. Second, the key concept of 
network integration is introduced and a hypothesis for its direct effect on the likelihood of 
generating innovative outcomes is developed. Then, after having developed the baseline 
hypotheses regarding the direct effects of the selected consortium-level antecedents, hypotheses 
for the moderating role of network integration in these relations will be developed. 
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Innovative outcomes. Innovation is a term that encompasses a broad variety of activities (e.g. 
generation or adoption (Rogers, 2003)), foci of interest (e.g. diffusion of innovations through a 
population or organizational innovation (Damanpour, 1991)), degrees of newness (e.g. radical or 
incremental innovation (Tidd, Bessant, & Pavitt, 2005)) and perspectives (e.g. innovation as either 
an outcome or a process (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997)). An 
important dimension of innovation relates to the different stages of the innovation process. One 
can either interpret innovation as a process, consisting of stages such as idea generation, project 
definition, problem-solving, prototyping and commercialization (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 
1997), or innovation can be considered as a discrete outcome. 
 In this chapter, we use the heuristic of a technology landscape. Such a landscape can be 
defined as the overall space of technological possibilities within a technology field (Kauffman et 
al., 2000). Numerous positions can be delineated in such a space, with each position corresponding 
to an invention or innovation. Depending on technological feasibility and economic value, a 
targeted position can be occupied to a varying extent after a given period of time (Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004; Kauffman et al., 2000). In line with this heuristic, we consider innovation as a 
categorical outcome. More specifically, an R&D consortium can generate an outcome that needs 
to be further developed (i.e. the targeted position in the technology landscape has not been reached 
yet), an outcome that can be considered a prototype (i.e. the targeted position in the technology 
has been reached yet is not fully functional yet) or an outcome that is fully realized (i.e. a position 
has been occupied in the technology landscape that fits in terms of performing the task or fulfilling 
the initial need as specified by its members). As the innovation process is fraught with uncertainties, 
we are especially interested in the probability of generating innovative outcomes by consortia. 
 Numerous antecedents of innovation have been identified in the organizational literature, 
taking into account organizational (Damanpour, 1991) and network (Pittaway et al., 2004) 
antecedents. Few studies have considered the effect of both features in concert, especially involving 
features of the complete network (Schilling & Phelps, 2007; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005). In addition, only 
recently R&D consortia are considered as a distinct organizational form, opening the discussion 
what explains the likelihood of consortia generating innovative outcomes. We contribute to this 
discussion by combining insights from the literature on whole networks, university-industry 
interaction, new product development teams and alliance portfolios. Based on two frequently 
discussed antecedents of innovation in these literatures, geographical proximity and technological 
diversity, we hypothesize a direct relation between network integration and the likelihood of 
generating innovative outcomes by a consortium. In addition, we develop cross-level hypotheses 
regarding the role of complete network integration in the relation between technological diversity 
and geographical proximity on the one hand, and innovative outcomes on the other. To this end, 
we will first elaborate on the latter concept. 
Network integration. Integration is a well-established theme in organization and social theory. 
Yet, it has played a much more implicit role in interorganizational network research (Raab, 1998). 
Authors that have reflected on organizational integration consider it as one of the approaches to 
settling differences in organizations. This can be achieved through a system of cross-functioning 
and a sense of collective responsibility which entails both coordination and cooperation (Ettlie & 
Reza, 1992). At the network level, integration has been stated to be ill-defined (Provan & Milward, 
1995; Provan & Sebastian, 1998). Our review of the literature that uses the term, however, 
suggested that similar dimensions to the ones discussed with respect to organizational integration 
can be identified. For example, in the work on whole networks (i.e. consciously created groups of 
three or more autonomous but interdependent organizations that strive to achieve a common goal 
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and jointly produce an output (Raab & Kenis, 2009)), the focus is consistently on both 
interconnectedness between organizations (cooperation) and the extent to which these 
organizations are integrated and coordinated through a central authority (coordination) (Human & 
Provan, 1997; Provan & Milward, 1995; Sydow & Windeler, 1998; Turrini et al., 2009). This 
literature, however, makes strong assumptions about the extent to which network members 
acknowledge the network as a distinct organizational form that is goal-directed and needs steering. 
Many other types of networks, such as alliance networks or the consortium networks that we study 
in this chapter, are much more emergent and the goals are less specified. This means that the 
dimensions cooperation and coordination cannot be translated directly to these settings. Hence, a 
translation of these dimensions is needed. We will do this by using the technology landscape 
metaphor that was introduced earlier. 
 R&D consortia are positioned in an existing technology landscape in which numerous 
positions can be delineated and, possibly, occupied. Occupation of positions in a technology 
landscape is unlikely to be random. Instead, depending on the extent to which a technological 
trajectory for a given technology has been articulated (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978; Dosi, 1982), 
positions tend to cluster (Aharonson & Schilling, 2016). All conceivable positions in a technology 
landscape, regardless of whether they are realized, therefore can be interpreted as accumulated 
bodies of knowledge that prescribe the technological (im)possibilities and viable future research 
directions. Clusters of positions represent the interrelatedness between such bodies of knowledge. 
Thus, the technology landscape specifies the search space in which R&D consortia are positioned 
and operate (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Research and development activities -such as the examples 
given earlier- can be considered as search procedures within this landscape (Landini, Lee, & 
Malerba, 2017). This search can be suboptimal as a limited overview of the full technology 
landscape might lead consortium members to select technological improvements closest to them, 
rather than searching in other, more broad and possibly more fruitful directions (Kauffman et al., 
2000). 
 Several studies have focused on mapping the technology landscape, often using Kauffman’s 
(1993) NK-model. Landscapes are generally conceptualised as links between different knowledge 
components (Wang, Rodan, Fruin, & Xu, 2013). The shape of a technology landscape is influenced 
by different aspects of the technologies present in it (Kauffman et al., 2000), such as technological 
interdependencies (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004), complexity (Mihm, Sting, & Wang, 2015; Ziedonis, 
2004) and range (Granstrand & Holgersson, 2013). Yet, most of a technology landscape is generally 
unknown to actors searching in it (Sorenson & Fleming, 2004; Stuart & Podolny, 1996). As a 
consequence, once a technological improvement has been found, actors tend to restrict search in 
other directions (Kauffman et al., 2000). 
 Instead of focusing on the shape of technology landscapes, we are interested in the extent 
to which search by R&D consortium members in a technology landscape is guided. With this, we 
mean that members are aware of the search space beyond the local search space resulting from the 
knowledge components focused on in the consortium, and hence are in the position to optimise 
search activities across the technology landscape. We propose that this guidance is provided by the 
complete network structure that emerges because of joint member linkages that form between 
R&D consortia3. Those linkages create a complete network that forms the structural context in 
                                                 
3 Several authors have debated the relation between a technology landscape and the relational structure of the actors 
searching in this landscape. Some authors suggest that networks emerging as a consequence of links between different 
knowledge components approximate patterns of connections among researchers (Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008). Other 
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which consortia operate. Different forms of integration of this context affect the extent to which 
consortium members can form a more complete overview of the technology landscape, guiding 
search in the direction of the most promising rather than the firstly encountered feasible 
technological avenue (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004). 
 This guidance can be considered an integrative mechanism in serendipitous networks. This 
integration can have two sources, which can be considered equivalent to cooperation and 
coordination in organizations and whole networks. First, network integration can be achieved 
through mutual awareness between network members of what others are doing (Erikson & 
Bearman, 2006; Fagerberg, Fosaas, & Sapprasert, 2012; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2009). This mutual 
awareness is created through joint consortium members that are sources of identification and help 
to cement consortia in the network (Hollenstein, 2003; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Oh & Jeon, 2007). 
The more inter-consortium ties are formed through joint members, the more understanding 
members obtain of the available knowledge components and knowledge interdependencies among 
these components in the technology landscape. Second, network integration can be achieved 
through a small amount of common thematic foci (Fagerberg et al., 2012) and continuous efforts 
by prominent nodes to integrate the knowledge available in the network (Ata & Van Mieghem, 
2009; Burt, 2007; Fagerberg et al., 2012; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2009). This enhances the 
collective perception of consortium members of viable technological alternatives and possible 
future developments. A network that is integrated this way indicates a general commitment of 
members to a limited amount of core technologies (Afuah, 2013; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Soh, 2010), 
which are usually developed by consortia occupying more central network positions (Gay & 
Dousset, 2005; Powell et al., 2005). 
 An integrated network allows for the exchange of knowledge and information across 
consortia (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Reagans, Zuckerman, McEvily, & Stuart, 2004). This results in 
a joint knowledge base, which facilitates both flexibility and efficient search for additional 
information (Shore et al., 2015; Staber, 1998). Consequently, the widest possible exploration of the 
search space takes place. In addition, it allows for specialization of individual consortia (Sydow & 
Windeler, 1998) by avoiding duplicate search activities (Shore et al., 2015) and allows for mutual 
technological adjustment (Soh, 2010). On the other hand, it has been argued that integrated 
networks make it more difficult for network members to look beyond the collective perception (de 
Vries & Verhagen, 2016; Ferriani, Cattani, & Baden-Fuller, 2009) which might lead to inertia 
(Staber, 1998). This reduces search scope, perceptions of alternatives and the diversity of both 
information and the interpretation of this information (Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; 
Shore et al., 2015). As a consequence, consortium members might prematurely converge on a 
technological solution (Shore et al., 2015). 
 We bring the benefits and drawbacks of network integration for individual R&D consortia 
together through suggesting a curvilinear relationship. In lowly integrated networks, the lack of 
mutual awareness and thematic foci specifies a search space that offers no clear guidance as to 
which research avenues are fruitful to pursue. As a consequence, once succeeded in finding a 
technological improvement, actors tend to restrict search in other directions (Kauffman et al., 2000) 
which might lead them to miss more viable search directions. Under conditions of moderate 
                                                 
authors oppose this view, and argue that both networks are decoupled (Wang et al., 2013). This latter view is echoed 
by authors that suggest coevolution between technology landscapes and relational structures (Gulati, Sytch, & 
Tatarynowicz, 2012; Waguespack & Fleming, 2009). In this chapter, we view both networks as decoupled. We are 
especially interested in ways in which joint member relations across consortia guide search through a technology 
landscape. 
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network integration, either through mutual awareness or common thematic foci, a clearer picture 
of viable research directions emerges, having a beneficial effect on the likelihood of generating 
innovative outcomes by consortia. At high levels of network integration, however, consortia might 
become trapped in premature convergence (Shore et al., 2015), decreasing the likelihood of 
generating innovative outcomes. Thus, consortia benefit most from networks that are integrated 
to such an extent that viable research avenues are revealed and search in the technological landscape 
can be efficient, but not so much as to prevent sufficient exploration of viable options. We 
therefore argue that the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by R&D consortia is the 
highest under moderate conditions of network integration: 
Hypothesis 1: R&D consortia embedded in moderately integrated networks will be more likely to generate innovative 
outcomes compared to R&D consortia embedded in lowly or highly integrated networks. 
Geographical proximity. This concept reflects the extent to which consortium members are 
spatially concentrated (Laursen, Masciarelli, & Prencipe, 2012; Silvestre & Dalcol, 2009; 
Whittington, Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009). A vast literature -often with a focus on clusters of 
firms- points at the “lubricating effects” (Marchington & Vincent, 2004) of geographical proximity. 
It should be noted, however, that the positive effect of geographical proximity often is contingent 
on other factors, such as consortium composition (Dornbusch & Neuhäusler, 2015), duration 
(Broström, 2010), nature of the research (fundamental versus applied) (Autant-Bernard, 2001), the 
co-existence of other forms of proximity (Boschma, 2005; Schwartz & Hornych, 2008), or a 
cluster’s developmental stage (Bodas Freitas, Marques, & Silva, 2013; Pouder & John, 1996). In 
this light, especially the work that has considered geographical proximity in the context of pre-
competitive university-industry interactions, and inventor teams is of relevance to our model. 
 Most studies that considered geographical proximity in this context have underlined its 
enabling role for interactions among consortium members (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011; 
Dornbusch & Neuhäusler, 2015; Ham & Mowery, 1998; Maietta, 2015). The underlying knowledge 
possessed by academic inventors is often not fully codified (Agrawal, 2006) and tacit in nature 
(Bishop, D’Este, & Neely, 2011; Geerts, Leten, Belderbos, & Van Looy, 2017). This type of 
knowledge therefore is difficult to transfer and has a high risk of integrity loss. Consequently, it 
requires specific means of communication. In addition, it is also more easily communicated 
incrementally through time instead of in large batches (Bartmess & Cerny, 1993; Lanzolla & Suarez, 
2012; Sammarra & Biggiero, 2008). Geographic proximity of member firms is particularly useful 
for transferring non-codified, tacit knowledge as it increases the likelihood of informal, face-to-
face interaction (Boardman & Corley, 2008; Kato & Odagiri, 2012). In turn, this increases the 
likelihood of actual knowledge exchange, both in terms of quantity as quality (Audia, Freeman, & 
Reynolds, 2006; Pouder & John, 1996; Vásquez-Urriago, Barge-Gil, & Modrego Rico, 2016). Lab 
visits, for example, allow academic faculty to advice other consortium members (Kato & Odagiri, 
2012) and these members, in turn, can more effectively communicate possible issues, for example 
during a prototype test. 
 Fewer studies have pointed at the association between geographical proximity and 
consortium member local embeddedness. When members in close proximity collaborate, they do 
not only bring their own experience and knowledge to the table, but also their own social capital 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011). This social capital has been demonstrated to be geographically 
determined (Laursen et al., 2012) and provides access to, for example, providers of financial capital 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011) or other research teams (Kuemmerle, 1998). This, in turn could 
promote synergies between members (Vedovello, 1997) through increased opportunities for 
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making new valuable combinations of resources (Molina-Morales, Martínez-Fernández, & Torlò, 
2011). All in all, both increased levels of quantity and quality of knowledge transfer and 
opportunities provided through member’s social capital lead to successful exchange of tacit 
knowledge, clearer problem articulation, more efficient project management, mutual understanding 
and resource access. These factors create a favourable innovative climate (Bramwell & Wolfe, 2008; 
Laursen et al., 2012), increasing the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
 As opposed to the arguments provided for a positive association between geographical 
proximity and the generation of innovative outcomes, authors have pointed at several downsides 
of being spatially close to one another. One of these downsides is that the anticipated ease of future 
interaction might lead to consortia being formed without thorough consideration of the 
consortium’s promises (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011). Another downside is that the generally higher 
levels of trust associated with spatially close consortium members alleviate the risk of a “knowledge 
lock-in” (Crescenzi, Nathan, & Rodríguez-Pose, 2016; Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010; Todo, 
Matous, & Inoue, 2016): given the limits to the amount of knowledge consortium members can 
process (Pouder & John, 1996), the amount of information fed to the consortium through trusting 
relationships between its members could inhibit access to knowledge outside the consortium 
(Molina-Morales et al., 2011) and make the consortium suffer from inertia and member bounded 
rationality (Pouder & John, 1996). 
 The contrasting arguments provided for the relation between geographical proximity and 
innovative outcomes of R&D consortia are brought together in this chapter as follows. First, at 
low levels of geographical proximity, effective transfer of especially sparsely codified, tacit 
knowledge is hampered, and the consortium suffers from inefficient problem articulation and 
project management. This creates an unfavorable innovative climate. This climate improves, 
however, as the level of geographical proximity increases. Here, the opportunity for in-depth, face-
to-face interactions stimulates the transfer of more, higher-quality knowledge. Also, opportunities 
provided through member’s social capital become more salient. After a certain level, however, a 
higher possibility of unthoughtful consortium formation and higher risks of knowledge lock-ins 
lead to inertia and member bounded rationality. This outweighs the before-mentioned benefits of 
geographical proximity, which again creates an unfavorable innovative climate. Hence, consortia 
benefit most from geographically proximate members when proximity enables higher quality 
knowledge transfer, but not so much as to prevent consortium members from becoming inert: 
Hypothesis 2: R&D consortia with moderate levels of geographical proximity will be more likely to generate 
innovative outcomes compared to R&D consortia with very low or very high levels of geographical proximity. 
The moderating role of network integration 
We already made the remark that the effect of geographical proximity is often contingent on other 
factors. We propose network integration to be one of these factors. Network integration (1) 
provides consortium members with an enhanced understanding of the available knowledge 
components in a technology landscape and the corresponding knowledge interdependencies and 
(2) creates a joint perception of consortium members across the complete network of viable 
technological alternatives and possible future developments. It is especially the second aspect of 
network integration that affects two mechanisms underlying the relation between geographical 
proximity and the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. The first is the mechanism related 
to the transfer of tacit knowledge. Under conditions of moderate network integration, consortium 
members create a more fundamental understanding of the technology landscape, and their 
 
- 31 - 
developmental activities will be guided in the most promising technological avenues (Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2004; Rosenberg, 1990). Consequently, the likelihood of moving forward in the process 
of innovation and generating innovative outcomes increases. It is especially in these later R&D 
stages that transfer of tacit knowledge becomes key, as the developed technology needs to be 
transferred to the end users. At the same time, moderate network integration reduces the tendency 
for following opportunistic strategies (Koza & Lewin, 1999). Therefore, the likelihood that 
collaborations are formed without thorough consideration of the consortium’s promises reduces. 
The net effect of both changes in mechanisms is that, under conditions of moderate network 
integration, the need for tacit knowledge transfer leads to a steeper relation between geographical 
proximity and the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. Simultaneously, more thorough 
consideration of a consortium’s purpose leads to a less steep decline in this relation. Hence, we 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: The inverted-u shaped relationship between geographical proximity of consortium members and the 
generation of innovative outcomes is amplified by network integration in such a way that the peak of the shape is 
higher in situations of moderate network integration compared to situations of high or low network integration. 
Technological diversity. Different types of diversity have been identified in the past (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007), and technological diversity is defined in this chapter as the variety in the range of 
knowledge, expertise and experience between members of an R&D consortium (Bunderson & 
Sutcliffe, 2002; Hinds & Bailey, 2003; Reagans et al., 2004). This variety stems from the different 
sectoral backgrounds of members, leading to different routines and processes (Jiang, Tao, & 
Santoro, 2010) and different logics related to the production and valorization of knowledge (Swan, 
Bresnen, Robertson, Newell, & Dopson, 2010). Two streams of literature offer insight in the 
relation between the technological diversity of R&D consortia and the generation of innovative 
outcomes. These are the literature on new product development teams and the literature on alliance 
portfolio diversity. First, arguments for a positive association between technological diversity and 
innovative outcomes are given. 
 Various authors have pointed at the role of technological diversity in providing access to 
resources (Jiang et al., 2010), especially knowledge resources (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Lee, 
Kirkpatrick-Husk, & Madhavan, 2014; van Beers & Zand, 2014). The variety of knowledge 
available to members of an R&D consortium has been argued to increase as technological diversity 
increases (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1995; Faems & Subramanian, 2013; Sakakibara, 2003; van Beers 
& Zand, 2014). As a consequence, the development of collaborative capabilities of consortium 
members is stimulated (Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Sivasubramaniam, Liebowitz, & 
Lackman, 2012). One of the key capabilities in this context is that of understanding the 
developmental process in the consortium more quickly and from a variety of perspectives (Brown 
& Eisenhardt, 1995). Not only does this facilitate the developmental process in general (Lovelace 
et al., 2001), it also leads to a higher potential for creating knowledge complementarities (Jiang et 
al., 2010; Lee et al., 2014; van Beers & Zand, 2014). In addition, improved mutual understanding 
activates a “gatekeeping”-function, as it allows members to catch possible developmental problems 
in an early stage, when these problems are generally smaller and easier to solve (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Gemser & Leenders, 2011). Against this backdrop, the 
flexibility and range of value creating activities in the R&D consortium increases (Jiang et al., 2010), 
as well as member creativity (Lovelace et al., 2001; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2012) and the potential 
for knowledge recombination and subsequent technology development (Faems & Subramanian, 
2013; van Beers & Zand, 2014). As such, technological diversity of an R&D consortium can be 
expected to lead to an increased likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
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Contrary to the positive effect of technological diversity on the likelihood of generating innovative 
outcomes, authors have argued that technological diversity has a detrimental effect on this 
likelihood. These authors challenge the assumption that consortium members display an 
unconditional willingness to share information. The variation in the range of knowledge, expertise 
and experience between members of an R&D consortium signals different functional areas, and 
with that different routines and logics. This can trigger social categorization and stereotyping 
amongst members (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Dahlin, Weingart, & Hinds, 2005). Social 
categorization theory suggests that members seek to maintain high self-esteem through defining 
themselves in ways that lead to favorable social comparisons (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). When 
consortium members place themselves and other members into social groups based on functional 
background, and in turn attribute positive characteristics to their own group and negative 
characteristics to other groups, psychological safety can be diminished and stressful relationships 
initiated (Edmondson & Nembhard, 2009; Keller, 2001). As a consequence, social integration and 
member cohesion is hampered (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Keller, 2001) and knowledge sharing is 
reduced (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Edmondson & Nembhard, 2009; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, 
& Gilson, 2008). 
 When members refrain from sharing knowledge, a joint understanding of the 
developmental process is not created. Instead, different perceptions and interpretations will linger 
(Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Mooney, Holahan, & Amason, 2007), leading to issues in generating 
consensus (Lee & Chen, 2007; Lovelace et al., 2001; Montoya-Weiss, Massey, & Song, 2001) as 
well as an increased potential for conflict (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Mathieu et al., 2008; Mohr & 
Puck, 2005; Mooney et al., 2007; Song & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). This, in turn, further attenuates 
the tendency of sharing knowledge by individual members, as the likelihood of understanding the 
value of doing so to the whole task decreases (Gardner, Gino, & Staats, 2011). Additionaly, from 
a desire to retain harmony members could get the tendency to minimize arguments and conform 
to majority views. As a consequence, the consortium will be less open to adverse information 
(Gemser & Leenders, 2011). Against this backdrop, the innovative potential of the consortium 
might be stiffled due to the process and efficiency losses and increased coordination costs 
associated with the consequences of a lack of joint understanding (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; 
Kotha, George, & Srikanth, 2012; Mathieu et al., 2008; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Mohr & Puck, 
2005; Sivasubramaniam et al., 2012). 
 We reconcile both views on the relation between technological diversity and the likelihood 
of generating innovative outcomes by R&D consortia as follows. First, low levels of technological 
diversity offer meagre opportunity for building a large and varied body of knowledge in the 
consortium, as members essentially draw upon the same knowledge base. This opportunity 
increases when the level of technological diversity increases. As the quantity and variety of 
knowledge available to the consortium increases, opportunities for creating new combinations are 
created. After a certain level of fuctional diversity, however, social categorization is triggered, and 
the development of a joint understanding of the development process is hampered. Here, the costs 
associated with getting all members at the same page outweigh the benefits of a large and diverse 
body of knowledge because the development process now is characterized by process and 
efficiency losses. Hence, consortia benefit most from technologically diverse members when 
diversity creates opportunities for new combinations but not so much as to prevent efficient joint 
understanding. We therefore argue that technological diversity bears a nonlinear relationship with 
the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia: 
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Hypothesis 4: R&D consortia with moderate levels of technological diversity will be more likely to generate innovative 
outcomes compared to R&D consortia with very low or very high levels of technological diversity. 
The moderating role of network integration 
As indicated earlier, network integration provides consortium members with an enhanced 
understanding of (1) the available knowledge components in a technology landscape and the 
corresponding knowledge interdependencies and (2) the joint perception of consortium members 
across the complete network of viable technological alternatives and possible future developments. 
It is especially the first aspect of network integration that affects the mechanism relating to the 
variety of knowledge available and that underlies the relation between technological diversity and 
the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. Previous research has shown that when networks 
are included, the impact of technological diversity drops significantly. Hence, networks substitute 
for technological diversity of consortium members (Reagans et al., 2004): the joint and fast 
understanding of the development process by consortium members no longer arises from their 
varying backgrounds, but instead stems from the enhanced understanding of the technology 
landscape. This is especially salient when networks are integrated in such a way that a clearer picture 
of knowledge interdependencies within the technology landscape emerges. Therefore, knowledge 
recombination is shaped less by the different knowledge resources brought in by consortium 
members, and more by the available knowledge components in the technology landscape. In 
addition, problems in generating consensus will be mitigated, as search directions in the technology 
landscape are more clearly outlined (Song & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). Hence, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: The inverted-u shaped relationship between technological diversity of R&D consortia and the 
generation of innovative outcomes is mitigated by network integration in such a way that the curve is smoothened in 
situations of moderate network integration compared to situations of high or low network integration. 
2.3  Data and methods 
Research setting and data 
To test the hypotheses developed in this chapter, we drew upon a larger data collection endeavour 
intended to generate data for multiple research projects. This involved collecting secondary data 
on 1,928 Dutch R&D consortia, each of which started in one of the years in the time frame 1981-
2004. These consortia are funded by a technology foundation that was established with the aim of 
realizing knowledge transfer from excellent technical-scientific research. The assumption that has 
driven this foundation throughout the years is that even though generating innovative outcomes 
by any research focusing on R&D is inherently uncertain, collaboration between mutliple agents 
increases the chance of succes. 
 Ever since its conception, the foundation has provided research funds to a broad variety 
of consortia, focusing on technologies such as improved donor organs, cleaner waste water, lighter 
airplanes, more reliable bridges, better treatment of heart attacks, faster communication and more 
efficient solar panels (STW, 2016). Two main conditions under which funds are provided are (1) 
the research institution that applies for the consortium and the foundation jointly own the research 
results and (2) potential users of the research results have to demonstrate their commitment 
upfront by participating in a users committee. These committee members can originate from 
industry, but public organizations and other research institutions are likely participants as well. The 
minimum amount of meetings committee members should have is twice a year, but usually contacts 
take place outside these meetings (STW, 2016). Knowledge transfer with the purpose of mutual 
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allignment, steering of the research project and in the end knowledge valorization is key during all 
these interactions. The technology foundation is held accountable for providing consortium funds, 
and hence issues a report on a yearly basis in which consortia that were funded 5 and 10 years ago 
are evaluated. In Appendix I of this chapter, we provide an example of such a consortium 
evaluation, as well as our approach towards converting the information from all evaluations into a 
relational database. 
 Our research interest is in predicting the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by 
R&D consortia, using a model that considers features of the structural context in which these 
consortia are positioned and consortium features that represent the potential for knowledge 
transfer and knowledge recombination. The consortia funded by the technology foundation 
provide a suitable context for our research purpose for several reasons. The first reason is the 
geographical context. Although the Netherlands is a relatively small country, it is large enough to 
create enough variation in spatial concentration among consortium members. Consequently, the 
different contrasting mechanisms described with respect to the relation between geographical 
proximity and the generation of innovative outcomes are likely to be covered. Second, the spatial 
boundedness of our sample facilitates the formation of inter-consortium linkages. Relative to the 
number of consortia started and operated each year, the pool of potential committee members is 
limited. This implies that at any point in time, one or more members create links with other 
consortia through participation in more than one consortium. As a result, a consortium network 
emerges that acts as the representation of the structural context in our model. Third, a variety of 
partners can participate in the consortia, creating a technological diversity range that covers the 
contrasting mechanisms described with respect to that concept. Fourth, the pre-competitive nature 
of the R&D consortia keeps consortium members from claiming positions in the technology 
landscape through patenting, therewith putting a fence around that set of knowledge components 
(Mihm et al., 2015). Fifth, the innovative outcomes of consortia are measured five years after the 
start of a consortium, ensuring a causal relationship between the predictors and the outcome 
measure used. In addition, although the consortium information is provided by the consortium 
leader, the outcome is evaluated by a committee external to the consortium, taking away concerns 
of common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Lastly, the strong 
emphasis on knowledge transfer and utilization create the basic conditions for an innovative 
atmosphere. 
 We use the heuristic of a technology landscape in which members of R&D consortia engage 
in search procedures. Earlier research reports that the propensity to collaborate varies between 
sectors because of differences in the reliance on scientific knowledge among technologies 
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Peri, 2005; Tamada, Naito, Kodama, Gemba, & Suzuki, 2006). In addition, our 
theoretical arguments with respect to network integration draw on the exchange and integration of 
technological knowledge and information between consortia. We therefore considered only those 
inter-consortium ties as being relevant when both consortia were active in the same technology 
field. This network boundary specification step was accomplished through assigning each of the 
1,928 consortia to a technology field, based on a classification scheme proposed by both 
Engelsman and van Raan (1994) and Schmoch (2008). Both authors developed a comparable 
classification scheme based on a translation from International Patent Classification (IPC) codes 
to more generic technology fields. Since a considerable amount of evaluation reports mentioned 
one or more patents as one of the consortium outcomes, we looked up the IPC codes of these 
patents via Espacenet. These codes were used for assigning consortia to one of the following 
subfields within the generic technology fields: Electrical engineering, Instruments, Medical 
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technology, Chemistry, Life Sciences, Mechanical engineering or Civil engineering. When patent 
information was unavailable, we assigned projects to subfields based on an analysis of consortium 
description in the evaluation. Two researchers first coded all 1,928 consortia independently, and 
then compared results. In the event classification of a consortium differed, this difference was 
resolved through discussion between the coders. Appendices I and II in Chapter 5 provide more 
information as to the boundary specification procedure followed. 
 To operationalize network integration, networks were constructed based on technology 
field similarity: a joint member tie between consortia was considered only when both consortia 
belonged to the same technology field and had a joint membership tie in the first year of their 
existence. Because of this, and because of data incompleteness, not all 1,928 consortia were 
included in our final sample. First, 153 consortia did not contain information on committee 
members. These consortia were excluded from the dataset. Second, 141 consortia ended up as 
isolates in our network, and 40 consortia appeared in the network as dyads that were not connected 
to the main component. Because these consortia were not embedded in a technology landscape 
and to come to a fair calculation of complete network measures, these 181 consortia were excluded 
from the data set as well. Lastly, 331 consortia did not receive an explicit evaluation. The reason 
for this was that the technology foundation started using a structured evaluation approach as from 
the early 1990s. This means that consortia reported before could not be compared systematically. 
These consortia were excluded as well from the analysis, resulting in a total of 1,263 R&D consortia 
in our sample. 
Measurements 
Innovative outcomes. In this chapter, we consider an innovative outcome as a categorical 
outcome. As indicated earlier, an R&D consortium can generate an outcome that needs to be 
further developed, an outcome that can be considered a prototype, or an outcome that is fully 
realized. As the innovation process is fraught with uncertainties, we are especially interested in the 
likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by consortia. For each R&D consortium in our 
dataset, an evaluation of the technological outcomes is available. The evaluation is performed five 
years after a consortium’s start and carried out by a committee of specialists. This committee is 
external to the consortium and appointed by the funding agency. In the original evaluations (see 
the three-letter code provided in the first block in Table 6), four distinct scores could be assigned 
to three dimensions, the second4 of which refers to the technological outcome: 0 (failure), A 
(further research is necessary), B (a prototype has been developed) and C (substantial results were 
generated). We created a categorical outcome variable from the described outcome classification 
scheme. Because very few consortia were assigned the outcome score of 0, these scores were 
lumped with outcome category A. The other two categories (i.e. B and C) were left unchanged. 
Network integration. Network integration in this chapter is defined as the extent to which search 
by members of R&D consortia in the technology landscape is targeted. We have identified two 
sources of network integration in serendipitous networks, which can be considered as equivalent 
to the two sources identified in research on whole networks. First, network integration can be 
achieved through mutual awareness between network members of what others are doing. Second, 
network integration can be achieved through a small amount of common thematic foci and efforts 
by prominent nodes to integrate knowledge. Following Provan and Milward (1995), these sources 
                                                 
4 The first letter in this three-letter code refers to the involvement of members during the consortium, and as such can 
be considered an evaluation of the collaboration process. The last letter refers to a consortium’s economic outcome. 
As the three dimensions are strongly correlated, we only focus on the evaluation of technological outcomes. 
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were captured by using two complementary measures: network density and network centralization. 
Whereas network density is an expression of the “connectedness” of consortia through joint 
members (indicating mutual awareness), network centralization expresses the extent to which these 
joint member ties are organized around one or more central consortia (indicating common thematic 
foci). 
 Both measures were calculated for the first year in which a consortium was embedded in 
the complete network. Network density was calculated by dividing the actual number of ties present 
in a network by the total number of theoretically possible ties in that network (Scott, 2000). Ties 
in the consortium networks studied in this chapter were undirected. For calculating network 
centralization, we selected network degree centralization: out of the three centralization measures 
delineated by Freeman (1978), this measure is closest to reflecting transmission of knowledge and 
information, as opposed to betweenness centralization (focus on control) or closeness 
centralization (capturing independence). We normalized all degree centrality scores that were used 
as an input for calculating degree centralization, to account for differences in network size. When 
a network consisted of multiple components, we first calculated degree centralization for each 
component individually, and then a weighted average based on component size was calculated. 
When performing these calculations, use was made of the functionality available in the statnet suite 
(Goodreau, Handcock, Hunter, Butts, & Morris, 2008) available in the R statistical environment (R 
Development Core team, 2016). Table 1 displays the basic descriptive statistics per technology field 
for the resulting centralization and density scores. 
TABLE 1 
Network descriptives per technology field 
Technology field 
Density Centralization 
Mean s.d. Min Max Mean s.d. Min Max 
Chemistry……………….... .23 .05 .17 .32 .38 .06 .29 .47 
Civil engineering………...... .32 .04 .26 .43 .31 .08 .18 .42 
Electrical engineering…….. .36 .06 .28 .47 .32 .03 .27 .36 
Instruments………………. .16 .03 .13 .21 .24 .04 .17 .34 
Life sciences……………… .12 .03 .09 .20 .20 .04 .15 .29 
Mechanical engineering…... .27 .11 .16 .57 .36 .13 .17 .72 
Medical technology………. .21 .04 .15 .27 .34 .07 .24 .45 
 
As a last step, we used the continuous centralization and density variables to create network 
integration dummies. Even though this implies loss of detailed information about the variation in 
values on both variables, we believe that dummies are a fairer representation of network 
integration. One of the reasons for this is that -as earlier indicated- network integration is an ill-
defined concept. Not only does this make interpretation of absolute density and centralization 
scores difficult, another consequence is that the narrative surrounding the concept is characterized 
by rather binary distinctions. One of the dimensions that we identified, for example, was that 
integration is reached when there is mutual awareness between network members of what others 
 
- 37 - 
are doing. This implies that a network does not get integrated when, relative to its size, only few 
members recognize what others are doing, no matter how small ‘few’ exactly is. Instead, a network 
becomes integrated when this ‘few’ turns into the majority of, or even all network members. 
Therefore, even though nuances might exist, we consider differences between networks within 
certain states of integration as less meaningful compared to differences between networks in 
different integration states. Another reason is that by constructing dummies, we can explicitly 
consider the effect of different types of integration: integration can be either density-based, 
centralization-based or both. By using a continuous interaction term in the analysis, especially the 
distinction between the first two types of integration would be lost. 
 Table 2 shows our approach to determining network integration dummies. Based on means 
and standard deviations of both centralization and network density, five distinct categories were 
created. For example, when within a field network both centralization and density scores of a 
network were lower than the mean minus the standard deviation of that field network, the label 
‘low integration’ was assigned. Based on all other possible combinations, dummies were 
constructed that represented ‘average integration’, ‘high integration’, ‘density-based integration’ and 
centralization-based integration’. The reference category was the ‘average integration’ category. 
Whereas ‘low integration’ and ‘high integration’ form the extreme categories, ‘density-based 
integration’ and ‘centralization-based integration’ represent network integration based on one of 
the two dimensions identified. Lastly, the ‘average’ category represents networks that are not 
pronouncedly integrated. Network integration dummies represent the type of network integration 
in the first year a consortium is embedded in the network. 
TABLE 2 
Determination of network integration types 
 Density 
< Mean - s.d. Mean ± s.d. > Mean + s.d. 
Centralization 
< Mean - s.d. low integration density-based 
Mean ± s.d. centralization-based average 
integration 
> Mean + s.d. 
integration  high integration 
 
Geographical proximity. This measure captures the extent to which consortium members are 
spatially concentrated. To calculate it we followed the approach by Gibson and Gibbs (2006) and 
van Beers and Zand (2014). First, for all consortia information was available about the member’s 
residences. Using this information, each member was in turn assigned to one of the 12 Dutch 
provinces. In the rare event one of the members originated from another country, this member 
was assigned to the category ‘other’. Geographical proximity in turn was calculated using the 
formula 1 − ∑ ()
 , where PAij is the proportion of members that belong to province j. 
Because more different provinces lead to a higher score of the index (the second term in the 
formula), this index is subtracted from 1 to cover similarity between members. Due to differences 
in consortium size, the obtained proximity scores could not be directly compared with one another 
(Biemann & Kearney, 2009). To account for these differences, we applied the rescaling procedure 
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outlined by (Solanas, Selvam, Navarro, & Leiva, 2012). The resulting measure reflects member 
geographical proximity during the consortium. 
Technological diversity. We defined technological diversity as the variety in the range of 
knowledge, expertise and experience between consortium members. As a first step in constructing 
the corresponding measure, we assigned SIC-codes to all members. This is an often followed 
approach in alliance research (Lavie et al., 2007; Schilling, 2009). An issue with the resulting 
classification was that it led to a rather fine-grained classification. This hampered making a 
meaningful distinction between members. As a second step, we therefore translated each industry 
that is covered by one of the SIC-codes to one of the five Pavitt sectors (Pavitt, 1984): supplier-
dominated, specialised suppliers, science-based, scale-intensive or information intensive firms. 
Pavitt’s taxonomy is devoted to classifying firms on the grounds of their technological competence 
(Archibugi, 2006), and considers the nature, sources and patterns of innovation (Bogliacino & 
Pianta, 2016). As such, it is a useful representation of consortium members’ different technological 
backgrounds. Using the resulting Pavitt classification, an index equivalent to geographical 
proximity was calculated, using the formula ∑ ()
 , where PAij is the proportion of members 
that belongs to Pavitt sector j. Here, the term is not subtracted from 1 to cover differences between 
members instead of similarity (as is the case for geographical proximity). The resulting index has 
been claimed to be one of the most accepted measures of diversity in the economic literature 
(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; van Beers & Zand, 2014). We followed a similar procedure 
as outlined for geographical proximity for normalizing this measure. The resulting measure reflects 
member technological diversity during the consortium. 
Control variables. Several controls were included in our analysis. First, we included size of the 
consortium as a control. Size is associated with the level of resources available to a consortium (de 
Vaan, Vedres, & Stark, 2015; Kotabe & Scott Swan, 1995; van Beers & Zand, 2014), and hence can 
be expected to have a positive effect on the generation of innovative outcomes. This control 
variable was determined by counting 1 (the research institution with which the project leader was 
affiliated with) plus the number of user committee member organizations. Second, we included 
duration in years as a control variable. Even though time is not of specific interest in this chapter, 
especially the limited availability of it has been argued to play a key role in multi-partner 
collaborations such as R&D consortia (Bakker, DeFillippi, Schwab, & Sydow, 2016). Duration was 
measured in years. Especially in early years, detailed information was given on project’s start and 
end dates. For more recent projects, the website of the funding agency proved to be a valuable 
resource. In cases where no information about the start and end date was given, the start date was 
deducted from the year in which the report was issued, and the end year was estimated using the 
average project duration of all project for which this information was available. Third, the level of 
financial resources was included as a control. This variable captures the funds provided by the 
technology foundation and -being an indication of general commitment to the consortium 
(Sakakibara, 2002)- controls for the likelihood to affect the consortium’s output (Vaarst Andersen, 
2013). Financial resources were measured in 2012 euro’s (*1,000). The fourth control variable is 
consortium leader experience. This variable captures the learning effect that is at play when a consortium 
leader gets more efficient in organizing and executing activities in R&D consortia (Faems, Van 
Looy, & Debackere, 2005; Goerzen, 2007; Hoang & Rothaermel, 2005; Pangarkar, 2009), as well 
as more experienced in technology utilisation (Hoye & Pries, 2009). The variable is determined by 
counting the total number of R&D consortia a consortium leader has executed in the five preceding 
years. The fifth control variable is that of member relational experience. Members who have interacted 
with one another repeatedly are less prone to opportunistic behaviour (Goerzen, 2007; Sakakibara, 
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2002), build trust (Gulati, 1995) and shared routines (Goerzen, 2007) and get embedded in a 
network that they can tap from (Lin, Fang, et al., 2009; Mannak, 2015; Sakakibara, 2002). This 
variable is determined by counting the total number of members a consortium leader has 
collaborated with in the five preceding years. The last control variable included in our analysis is 
that of multiple consortium membership. Lavie et al. (2007) outline two distinct advantages of being 
involved in multiple multi-partner alliances for individual members that also can be argued to 
reflect on the consortium. First, by having members that are exposed to R&D activities conducted 
in other consortia, multiple consortium membership can lead to a better grasp of overall 
technological challenges and their possible solutions. Second, by creating awareness of 
technological developments in other consortia, multiple consortium membership offers 
opportunities for technological integration, for example in terms of complementarity (combining 
a core technology with peripheral components, or vice versa) and interoperability (ensuring that a 
technology works well with other technologies). Both advantages are value enhancing, as they 
increase the chance of a technology becoming (part of) a dominant design (Lavie et al., 2007). In 
addition to these two technological advantages, the literature on multiple team membership 
suggests advantages in terms of collaboration efficiency as well. Involvement in multiple consortia 
prompts members to adopt more efficient collective work practices, as the time and availability of 
individual members is limited. This has been argued to result in a more effective use of inputs and 
gains in processing time, implying a higher potential for generating innovative outcomes (Kolodny, 
1979; O'Leary, Mortensen, & Woolley, 2011). Multiple consortium membership was determined 
as the number of links to different consortia, therewith ignoring the number of joint members 
responsible for these links. Based on the earlier discussed consortium networks, degree centrality 
for each consortium in the first year of its embeddedness in the consortium network was 
determined. This was calculated using the statnet suite (Goodreau et al., 2008) available in the R 
statistical environment (R Development Core team, 2016). The first three controls (i.e. size, 
duration and financial resources) reflect the respective consortium features during the consortium. 
The controls consortium leader experience, member relational experience and multiple consortium 
membership were determined for the first year of the consortium. 
Data analysis 
Two characteristics of the dataset determined the selection of our analytical method. First, based 
on earlier observations that collaboration propensity varies between sectors as a consequence of 
differences in reliance on scientifc knowledge among technologies (Hagedoorn, 2002; Peri, 2005; 
Tamada et al., 2006), we specified 7 distinct technology fields and constructed consortium networks 
for each of these fields. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 1, marked differences in network 
organization exist between technology fields. This reflects differences between fields in, for 
example, common primary motivations (Martin, 2003), institutional contexts (Dimaggio & Powell, 
1983), or innovation speed. Hence, by delineating different fields, we account for the fact that 
consortium outcomes might vary simply because search activities are conducted in different 
technology landscapes. Because of the resulting “nestedness” of consortia within technology fields, 
a multi-level modelling approach is advisable: although consortia will vary in terms of geographical 
proximity and technological diversity, network integration is the same for all consortia embedded 
in a certain network in a certain year. As a consequence, information about the effect of the network 
in which consortium A resides, for example, also provides meaningful insights about the effect of 
this network on consortium B (Holcomb, Combs, Sirmon, & Sexton, 2009). Multi-level analysis 
accounts for these resulting interdependencies between observations, which would violate the 
assumption of, for example, ordinary least square regression (Gelman & Hill, 2007; Gujarati & 
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Porter, 2009; Hox, 2010). The second characteristic of our data is that the dependent variable is 
categorical. Hence, an OLS-based analytical method is not justified here (Pampel, 2000). Taking 
both aspects into account, we have selected a multilevel binary logistic regression to test our 
hypotheses. 
 The general modelling approach consisted of two components: first, an ordinal logistic 
regression with 1,263 data points was conducted for the dependent variable of interest, predicting 
the outcome at t+5 using both consortium and network-level predictors, either at t, or relating to 
the whole duration of the consortium. Intercepts could vary5 by technology field and year. This 
intercept was estimated for each field and year combination by the second component of the 
model, which is an ordinal logistic regression with 112 data points (7 technology fields × 16 years) 
using network and year-level predictors. Five distinct models were estimated. Model 1 only models 
the intercepts across technology fields and years. Next to functioning as the baseline model for 
assessing improvement in the fit of more elaborate models, it also provides insight in the 
proportion of variance in the data that can be explained by consortia simply being grouped in 
different technology fields and years. Models 2-5 gradually build up to the complete model, where 
Model 2 includes all control variables, Model 3 adds the network-level predictors, Model 4 includes 
the consortium-level predictors and Model 5 includes all interactions. Based on this latter model, 
inferences about our hypotheses were made. We used the ‘ordinal’-package (Christensen, 2011) for 
estimating our models. To aid model interpretation, effect plots were created for all significant 
effects in the full model, as well as significant cross-level interactions using the ´effects´-package 
developed by Fox (2003). This package calculates marginal effects of a predictor of interest at the 
average of all other predictors. Both packages were implemented in the R statistical environment 
(R Development Core team, 2016). For interpretation and comparison purposes and to aid model 
convergence, all predictor variables were scaled using the default scale function available in R 
(default settings were used). All pictures in this chapter were made using the ‘ggplot2’-package 
(Wickham, 2009) available in R. 
2.4 Results 
Descriptives and correlations 
Means, standard deviations and the minimum and maximum observation per variable are shown 
in Table 3 for the consortium-level variables, and Table 4 for the network-level variables. It should 
be noted that correlations at the consortium level do not consider non-independence within the 
data, and therefore should be interpreted with caution. Of special interest are predictors that are 
highly associated with one another (if this is the case, multicollinearity could lead to difficulties in 
estimating precise standard errors for the regression coefficients (Gujarati & Porter, 2009)), large 
standard deviations (indicating the presence of outliers that might mainly drive significant results 
in the regression analysis) and peculiarities with respect to the distribution of variables (Zhang & 
Shaw, 2012). 
                                                 
5 A plethora of interpretations has emerged over the years with respect to the terms ‘fixed’ and ‘random’ effects. In an 
illustrative overview, Gelman and Hill (2007) identify 5 distinct interpretations that have been used in different research 
fields, and advise to abandon the terms at all in order to not further exacerbate confusion. We give follow-up to this 
advice in this chapter and indicate for our analyses which of the two main elements in the model that is to be estimated 
(i.e. intercept and slope) can vary across time and technology fields. 
 




Descriptives and correlations among consortium-level variables6 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 
1. Innovative outcomest+5……………… 1.99 .78 1 3 -        
2. Size………………………………….. 4.61 2.50 1 24 .11** -       
3. Duration…………………………….. 4.28 1.04 1 15 .04 .03 -      
4. Financial resources…………………... 535.32 340.92 1.14 3,738.36 .08** .21** .28** -     
5. Consortium leader experiencet……….. 1.13 1.78 0 11 .06* .05 .02 .01 -    
6. Member relational experiencet……….. 1.14 2.35 0 16 .03 .17** -.02 .02 .68** -   
7. Multiple consortium membershipt…… .22 .18 .01 1 -.05 .24** .01 .08** -.00 .07* -  
8. Geographical proximity……………... .26 .28 0 1 -.04 -.29** .03 -.06* -.04 -.07* -.07* - 
9. Technological diversity……………… .64 .30 0 1 .02 .34** -.00 .03 -.02 .06* .13** -.31** 
  
                                                 
6 n = 1,263. **p < .01; *p < .05. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptives and correlations among network-level variables7 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Chemistry…………………………… .19 .40 0 1 -           
2. Civil engineering…………………….. .06 .24 0 1 -.13** -          
3. Electrical engineering………………... .18 .38 0 1 -.23** -.12** -         
4. Instruments…………………………. .18 .39 0 1 -.23** -.12** -.22** -        
5. Life sciences………………………… .24 .43 0 1 -.28** -.15** -.26** -.27** -       
6. Mechanical engineering……………… .04 .20 0 1 -.10** -.05 -.10** -.10** -.12** -      
7. Medical technology………………….. .10 .29 0 1 -.16** -.08** -.15** -.15** -.18** -.07* -     
8. Year…………………………………. 1996.98 4.47 1989 2004 -.00 -.07* .05 -.07* -.03 .04 .01 -    
9. Low integrationt……………………... .08 .27 0 1 .11** -.00 -.14** .18** -.17** -.01 .04 .17** -   
10. Density-based integrationt………….. .18 .39 0 1 .07** .06* .13** -.07* -.16** .06* -.03 -.21** -.14** -  
11. Centralization-based integrationt…… .17 .38 0 1 .11** .09** .23** -.16** -.26** .00 .07** .04 -.13** -.22** - 
12. High integrationt…………………… .10 .30 0 1 .03 -.09** -.16** .04 .16** -.06* -.00 -.28** -.10** -.16** -.15** 
                                                 
7 n = 112. **p < .01; *p < .05. The reference category for the integration dummies is ‘Average integration’. 
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FIGURE 2 
Examples of different forms of network integration8 
Low network integration (Medical Technology network, 1990) 
  
Density-based integration (Life Sciences network, 1998) 
  
Centralization-based integration (Civil engineering, 1994) 
  
  
                                                 
8 Key to all examples: node size indicates consortium size, node colours (darker is higher) indicate levels of 
technological diversity (left) and geographical proximity (right). 
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FIGURE 2 (CONTINUED) 
Examples of different forms of network integration8 
High network integration (Instruments, 2000) 
  
 
Except for a positive correlation with size (r = .06, p < .05). and financial resources (r = .06, p < 
.05), the dependent variable ‘technological outcomes’ does not show any significant associations 
with the consortium-level variables. Especially interesting are the zero correlations between 
technological outcomes and geographical proximity and technological diversity respectively, 
indicating an absence of a linear relationship but not excluding the possibility of the hypothesized 
non-monotonic associations. As mentioned in earlier studies (Hinds & Bailey, 2003), the 
correlation between geographical proximity and technological diversity (r = -.31, p < .01) reflects 
the phenomenon that higher technological diversity often goes hand in hand with spatial 
distribution. With respect to the control variables, especially the associations between the size of 
the consortium and technological diversity (r = .34, p < .01) and geographical proximity (r = -.29, 
p < .01) catch the eye. Intuitively, however, it makes sense that larger consortia are more likely to 
be diverse both in terms of functional background and geographical distribution. This is also 
illustrated by the already mentioned high correlation between technological diversity and 
geographical proximity. Salient is the correlation between member relational experience and 
consortium leader experience (r = .68, p < .01): over time, members tend to cluster around 
consortium leaders that are more experienced. Both variables have relatively large standard 
deviations indicating substantial variation in terms of both types of experiences in our dataset. 
 From Table 4 we infer from the mean values of the first 7 variables that the different 
technology field networks differ in size. Also, many significant correlations exist between 
technology fields and the network integration dummies. The correlation coefficient between the 
technology field ‘Electrical engineering’ and the dummy for ‘Centralization-based integration’ (r = 
.23, p < .01) is an example of this: relative to the ‘Average integration’ category, the centralization-
based category of network integration is observed more often in the field of Electrical engineering. 
This suggests that the different forms of network integration are not equally distributed across 
technology fields. In addition, significant correlations can be found between the year variable and 
the integration dummies, with the exception of the dummy for ‘Centralization-based integration’. 
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TABLE 5 
Results of multilevel ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+5) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 [Innovative outcome = prototype]…... -.94*** (.19) -.97*** (.20) -.87*** (.21) -.88*** (.21) -.90*** (.22) 
 [Innovative outcome = product]…….. .83*** (.19) .84*** (.20) .94*** (.21) .94*** (.21) .96*** (.22) 
Controls      
 1. Size………………………………...  .20*** (.06) .21*** (.06) .23*** (.07) .24*** (.07) 
 2. Duration…………………………...  .02 (.06) .02 (.06) .03 (.06) .04 (.06) 
 3. Financial resources………………....  .16** (.06) .15* (.06) .15* (.06) .14* (.06) 
 4. Consortium leader experiencet……..  .08 (.07) .08 (.07) .07 (.07) .06 (.08) 
 5. Member relational experiencet……...  -.06 (.07) -.05 (.07) -.05 (.07) -.04 (.07) 
 6. Multiple consortium membershipt…  -.22*** (.06) -.24*** (.06) -.23*** (.06) -.24*** (.07) 
Network-level predictors9      
 7. Low integrationt…………………....   -.00 (.22) -.00 (.22) -.10 (.25) 
 8. Density-based integrationt…………   .35* (.17) .35* (.17) .36* (.18) 
 9. Centralization-based integrationt…...   .18 (.16) .19 (.16) .20 (.16) 
 10. High integrationt………………….   .02 (.22) .03 (.22) .02 (.22) 
Consortium-level predictors      
 11. Geographical proximity…………..    -.30 (.19) -.54† (.28) 
 12. Geographical proximity2………….    .28 (.20) .42 (.30) 
 13. Technological diversity…………...    .11 (.20) -.07 (.29) 
 14. Technological diversity2…………..    -.17 (.20) .13 (.29) 
Cross-level interactions      
 15. 7 × 11…………………………….     1.11 (.72) 
 16. 7 × 12…………………………….     -.79 (.79) 
 17. 7 × 13…………………………….     .58 (.97) 
 18. 7 × 14…………………………….     -.20 (.83) 
 19. 8 × 11…………………………….     -.16 (.58) 
 20. 8 × 12…………………………….     .26 (.61) 
 21. 8 × 13…………………………….     1.68** (.65) 
 22. 8 × 14…………………………….     -2.03*** (.61) 
 23. 9 × 11…………………………….     .45 (.49) 
 24. 9 × 12…………………………….     .00 (.53) 
 25. 9 × 13…………………………….     -.14 (.53) 
 26. 9 × 14…………………………….     .00 (.51) 
 27. 10 × 11…………………………...     -.06 (.73) 
 28. 10 × 12…………………………...     -.12 (.71) 
 29. 10 × 13…………………………...     -.27 (.73) 
 30. 10 × 14…………………………...     -.27 (.72) 
 Deviance 2,690 2,656 2,651 2,647 2,609 
 ∆df - 6 10 14 30 
 p (> χ2 ) - .00*** .00*** .00*** .00*** 
 Year variance .14 .15 .16 .16 .20 
 Technology field variance .16 .16 .17 .17 .19 
note: n = 1,263. Multilevel specification used in all models accounting for the levels years (n = 16) and technology fields (n 
= 7). Standard errors displayed between parentheses. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .1  
                                                 
9 The reference category is ‘Average network integration’. 
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FIGURE 3 (CONTINUED) 
Marginal effects for significant coefficients 
Multiple consortium membership 
(c) 
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FIGURE 3 (CONTINUED) 
Marginal effects for significant coefficients 
Technological diversity, density-based network integration 
(e) 
 
This implies that network integration forms either come into existence over time, or instead 
disappear as time progresses. To provide the reader with a sense of what the different types of 
network integration look like, Figure 2 presents examples per network integration type. 
Ordinal logistic regression results 
The results of the multilevel logistic regression analysis are reported in Table 5. Complementary to 
this table, we display marginal effect plots in Figure 3 based on Model 5. These plots show the 
marginal effects for significant variables in this model. All predictor variables were standardized to 
aid model convergence. Hence, variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. Consequently, each coefficient in Table 5 represents the change in log odds when 
the corresponding predictor changes one unit, holding all other explanatory variables at their 
average value. For each significant predictor, Figure 3 displays the probabilities derived from these 
coefficients for the full ranges of these predictors, holding all other predictors at their average. 
Before the results of the hypotheses tests are presented, we first consider (1) intraclass correlations 
and model variance, and (2) model fit. 
 A useful property of Model 1 is that it provides an estimate of the intraclass correlation 
(ICC) (Hox, 2010). This ICC indicates the proportion of the variance explained by the grouping 
structure in the population and can be interpreted as the expected correlation between two 
randomly drawn consortia in the same technology field or same year. As such, it is sometimes used 
to ‘justify’ the additional cost of using multilevel modelling. Because the network integration 
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dummies are the same for consortia in the same technology field and year, a multilevel model is 
needed in any case, because the assumption of independence between observations when 
estimating a classical OLS regression model is violated. Hence, our aim is not to justify the choice 
of a multilevel model, but instead to provide insight in the extent of variation in the generation of 
innovative outcomes that can be explained by a consortium being grouped in a technology field or 
year. The ICC is calculated by dividing the variance of one of the groups by the total variance, 
which is the sum of the group variance and the residual variance. This residual variance in multilevel 
logistic regression models is fixed to approximately ̟2/3 (Hox, 2010). Hence, the ICC for 
technology fields is (.16/3.45) 4.64% and the ICC for years is (.14/3.43) 4.08%. Although 
seemingly small, especially the ICC for technology fields is in the usual ICC range observed in other 
studies that apply multilevel models (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Culpepper, 2013; Hox, 2010). 
 Additional insight in the extent of variation between groups in the generation of innovative 
outcomes can be obtained by examining the technology field and year intercepts. By doing so, we 
can see how consortia in different fields compare to one another with respect to the average 
likelihood for generating innovative outcomes. Recalculating these field intercepts to probabilities, 
this comparison results in (from largest to smallest probability): 67% (Medical technology), 54% 
(Instruments), 53% (Civil engineering), 53% (Electrical engineering), 48% (Mechanical 
engineering), 39% (Life sciences), and 37% (Chemistry). Hence, consortia in fields in which the 
focus is on developing instruments generally are more innovative compared to engineering-based 
consortia. In their turn, engineering-based consortia are more innovative compared to science-
based consortia. With respect to year intercepts (1989-2004), the maximum probability is 63% 
(1994), the minimum probability is 23% (2000), and the standard deviation is 9%. When plotted 
(not displayed), probabilities gradually increase during the time frame 1989-1995, then decline 
between 1996 and 2000. From 2000 to 2001 a steep increase is observed, after which the value of 
the intercept stabilizes from 2001-2004. From this pattern, we deduce that temporality in the 
likelihood of innovative outcomes occurs. 
 Contrary to what one would expect based on classical regression models, adding predictors 
actually increases the variance terms. This is considered non-problematic in multi-level models 
(Gelman & Hill, 2007). The phenomenon can be best understood when one focuses on the 
intercept-only model (Model 1) in Table 5. This model predicts the threshold coefficients that 
denote where the (latent) dependent variable is cut to delineate the three groups that are observed 
in the dependent variable. In addition, the model decomposes the variance in three independent 
components: the variances at the technology field and year level, and the variance at the consortium 
level (labeled 'residual variance') (Hox, 2010). Because of the lack of predictors in the model, 
offsetting between variation across levels is possible (Gelman & Hill, 2007). The more predictors 
are added, the more the 'true' variance at each level might be revealed, causing one or more variance 
terms to increase. This behaviour of variance terms across models is problematic for assessing 
model fit (Hox, 2010; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). For this purpose, we therefore focus at the model 
deviances. Reported in Table 5 are the results of model χ2 tests that compare the difference in the 
deviance of Models 2-5 vis-à-vis Model 1. From these tests, it can be deducted that each of the 
models fits the data significantly better than the baseline model. We will now discuss the outcomes 
of our hypotheses tests using the results of Model 5. 
 In general, the results suggest that both features of the technology field and R&D 
consortium features, as well as interactions between both predict the likelihood of a consortium 
generating innovative outcomes. Our results are not conclusive, however, and offer several insights 
that were not expected based on our theorizing. Our first hypothesis predicted that R&D consortia 
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embedded in moderately integrated networks will be more likely to generate innovative outcomes 
compared to R&D consortia embedded in lowly or highly integrated networks. An indication of a 
curvilinear relationship would be if the dummies representing density-based integration and 
centralization-based integration would be higher compared to the reference category, which 
represents networks that are not pronouncedly integrated. In addition, the dummies for low and 
high integration should not be significant either, as then networks that fall in both categories have 
a similar effect on consortia compared to the average category. We deduct from Table 5 that the 
latter is indeed the case. In addition, consortia embedded in networks characterized by density-
based network integration are more likely to generate innovative outcomes. The positive coefficient 
(.36* (.08)) means that, compared to the reference category, R&D consortia embedded in networks 
integrated through mutual awareness between network members on average have a 59% higher 
probability (e.36/(1+ e.36)) to generate innovative outcomes. The dummy for centralization-based 
network integration is not significant. All in all, under conditions of moderate network integration, 
especially because of mutual awareness across consortia, a clearer picture of viable research 
directions in the technology landscape emerges, having a beneficial effect on the likelihood of 
generating innovative outcomes by consortia. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported in as far as density-
based network integration is concerned. For centralization-based network integration, it is rejected. 
 We expected that consortia benefit most from geographically proximate members when 
proximity enables higher quality knowledge transfer, but not so much as to prevent consortium 
members from becoming inert. We therefore hypothesized an inverted u-shaped relationship 
between geographical proximity and the probability of an R&D consortium generating innovative 
outcomes. None of the coefficients for geographical proximity are significant at the 5%-level, 
which suggests the absence of a salient non-linear relationship. Even though a weakly significant 
negative relationship between geographical proximity and the probability of an R&D consortium 
generating innovative outcomes is suggested by our analysis, we do not find support for hypothesis 
2. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that the curvilinear effect of geographical proximity on the likelihood 
of generating innovative outcomes would be amplified under conditions of moderate network 
integration. Even though our test of hypothesis 2 did not provide evidence of a curvilinear 
association between proximity and innovation at all, it could still be the case that under conditions 
of moderate network integration this curvilinear association appears. The relevant cross-level 
interactions that shed light on this question are the interactions numbered 19, 20, 23 and 24. None 
of these interactions is significant at the 5% level, hence we do not find support for our third 
hypothesis. 
 We expected that consortia benefit most from technologically diverse members when 
diversity creates opportunities for new combinations but not so much as to prevent efficient joint 
understanding. Our fourth hypothesis therefore predicts an inverted u-shaped relationship between 
technological diversity and the probabilty of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
However, the corresponding coefficients in Table 5 are not significant at the 5% level (.-.07 (.29) 
and .13 (.29)). Hence, we do not find support for hypothesis 4. 
 Hypothesis 5 predicts that the inverted-u shaped relationship between technological 
diversity and the probability of a consortium generating innovative outcomes is smoothened by 
network integration in such a way that the effect of technological diversity dissapears under 
conditions of moderate network integration. Our results suggest the opposite: the hypothesized 
relationship actually appears under the condition of density-based network integration and is absent 
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when other forms of integration are considered: panels (d) and (e) in Figure 3 suggest that under 
the condition of average network integration, no association between technological diversity and 
the probability of generating innovative outcomes exists (panel (d)). An association appears, 
however, under the condition of density-based network integration: at both low and high levels of 
technological diversity, a low likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes is 
observed. However, at intermediate levels of technological diversity, we observe the highest 
likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes (panel (e)). The corresponding 
coefficients in Table 5 suggest the existence of this inverted u-shaped relationship under the 
condition of density-based network integration as well (1.68** (.65) and -2.03** (.61)). Following 
Haans, Pieters, and He (2016), we modelled this non-linearity using a multilevel ordinal logistic 
spline regression model. The results of this regression are that the slope in the low range of 
technological diversity is positive and significant at the 5% level, the slope in the range of the 
turning point is non-significant, and the slope in the high range of technological diversity is negative 
but significant at the 10% level. Hence, hypothesis 5 is not supported and our results suggest that 
an inverted-u shaped relationship between technological diversity of R&D consortia and the 
generation of innovative outcomes exists under the condition of density-based network integration, 
with the understanding that one of the slope tests using a spline regression is significant at an alpha 
of 10%. 
 With respect to the included control variables, both the effects of consortium size (.24** 
(.07) and panel (a) in Figure 3) and financial resources (.14* (.06) panel (b) in Figure 3) are as 
expected. Contrary to what we did expect, however, the effect of multiple consortium membership 
on the probability of a consortium generating innovative outcomes is negative (-.24*** (.07)). This 
interesting by-catch of our analysis will be explored further in our discussion. 
Robustness tests 
One of the concerns with the analysis reported in this chapter is that the specification of the 
network integration dummies could affect our results. We therefore estimated two models with 
alternative dummy specifications. Both specifications varied in the approach outlined in Table 6: 
following approach 1, any combination that involved a group ‘Mean ± s.d.’ was classified as 
‘average network integration’ instead of being assigned to either centralization- or density-based 
network integration. In approach 2, these combinations were assigned to their adjacent more 
extreme form of integration (i.e. either ‘low integration’ or ‘high integration’). With respect to the 
direct effects of both network-level as consortium-level predictors, analysis results using the 1st 
alternative dummy specifications were the same. The effect of density-based network integration 
disappeared when dummies were specified according to approach 2. With respect to this approach, 
however, one could question how sensible it is to assign a middle group to the lowest or highest 
category. Depending on how large or small the reference category ‘average network integration’ 
was made, cross-level interactions tended to disappear or shift across terms 15 – 30 in Table 5: 
following approach 1, the significant interaction between density-based network integration and 
technological diversity dissapeared, whereas following approach 2 both significant cross-level 
interactions dissapeared and were replaced by an interaction between high network integration and 
technological diversity that was significant at the 10%-level. The issue with approach 1, however, 
is that it lumps the majority of the networks in one group, making it difficult to detect nuances in 
the data set. All, in all, we believe that the coding approach to network integration followed in this 
chapter gives the most fair grouping of network integration based on the underlying scores on 
network density and centralization. 
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The second concern with the analysis reported in this chapter that we address is that a model that 
only allows intercepts to vary by year and technology field might be insufficient to capture all 
effects. The longitudinal nature of our data, for example, invites the possibility that relations of 
interest might change over time. It has, for example, been suggested that the significance of 
geographic proximity should wane as time progresses, because of the expansion of the geographic 
reach of actors resulting from a more institutionalized technology field (Stuart & Sorenson, 2003). 
More insight in this could be obtained by estimating a model that allows for varying slopes across 
fields. However, estimating such models is plagued by computation and convergence issues. 
Splitting the sample multiple times in different time frames (e.g. 1989-1996 and 1997-2004; 1989-
1995 and 1996-2004, and so on), however, did shed some light on the issue. We observed no 
changes over time with respect to the effect of the control variables used in the model. The effects 
of both network density and technological diversity seemed especially salient in earlier years. The 
interaction between density-based network integration and technological diversity was most salient 
in early years as well. As our focus in this chapter is on the bigger picture, this is not of much 
concern to the current analysis. The matter of time-dependency of some of the relations, however, 
is considered by us to be of such great interest, that it will be further explored in the next chapter. 
2.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Especially in fields characterized by knowledge production and technological development, R&D 
consortia become a more prevalent form of organizing, due to their conduciveness to knowledge 
transfer, problem solving and joint learning through collaboration among firms and research 
institutions (Fonti et al., 2015; Foray et al., 2012; Sydow et al., 2012). This chapter was motivated 
by two observations: (1) relatively few studies focus on antecedents of the generation of innovative 
outcomes by R&D consortia and (2) generally, the literature on interorganizational networks and 
innovation lacks studies that account for both organizational features and features of the complete 
network. 
 This study addressed these two issues by focusing on the extent to which different types of 
network integration moderate the relationship between geographical proximity of members and 
their technological diversity on the one hand, and the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes 
on the other. We envisioned members of R&D consortia as engaging in search procedures within 
an existing technology landscape. One of the determinants of the likelihood of a consortium 
generating innovative outcomes in this model was the extent to which member search through the 
technology landscape was guided. This was reflected in the network-level concept of network 
integration. In addition, we proposed that configurational properties at the consortium-level (1) 
enable the effective transfer of knowledge between consortium members (geographical proximity) 
and (2) create a collaborative climate that is conducive to knowledge recombination (technological 
diversity) are important predictors of the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes as well. 
Lastly, we proposed that interactions between network-level and consortium-level features existed: 
the relationship between geographical proximity and the likelihood of generating innovative 
outcomes could only come to full fruition under conditions of moderate network integration, 
whereas this same condition of network integration would dampen the relationship between 
technological diversity and innovation. 
 We found that embeddedness in consortium networks in which consortium members are 
mutually aware of what members of other consortia are doing, increases the likelihood of these 
consortia generating innovative outcomes. Hence, the first key finding of this research is that when 
a certain critical mass of joint membership ties between consortia is reached in a network, 
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serendipitous joint members between consortia transform to important conduits for information 
both to, and from the consortium. As a result, the available knowledge components as well as 
knowledge interdependencies in the technology landscape are clearer across consortia, leading to a 
higher probability of any of these consortia to be innovative. This finding resonates well with the 
literature on interorganizational networks, in which the legitimacy of partnerships is positively 
associated with the level of density (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999), as well as research on team boundary 
spanners, which states that the benefits of team boundary spanning can extend well beyond a focal 
team itself to the performance of other interdependent parties and the organization as a whole 
(Mathieu, Marks, & Zaccaro, 2001). The finding also is in line with the work of Schilling and Phelps 
(2007), who find that firms embedded in networks characterized by both clustering and reach -
both are associated with high levels of density- have higher levels of patent performance. 
 The second key finding of our study relates to the role of technological diversity, especially 
in combination with the condition of density-based network integration. Contrary to our 
expectations, we found that, in dense networks, an inverted u-shaped relation exists between a 
consortium’s technological diversity and its innovative outcomes. Thus, contrary to what is 
suggested by our theoretical model, networks do not substitute technological diversity but instead 
enable it. Dense networks enable the joint understanding of the available knowledge components 
and interdependencies of these components in the technology landscape. Through technological 
diversity levels that allow for assimilating and recombining these different knowledge components 
(i.e. a neither too high nor too low level of technological diversity), members of R&D consortia 
are best suited to assess these knowledge components for their potential usability and integrate it 
in the artefact that is developed in the consortium. 
 The third and last key finding of this study relates to the role of geographical proximity. 
None of the hypotheses tests involving geographical proximity suggested a role of this concept in 
the generation of innovative outcomes by R&D consortia. Earlier, scholars have stated that the 
effect of geographical proximity is only salient in certain stages of the innovation process (Knoben 
& Oerlemans, 2006) and only facilitates innovation conjointly with other aspects of a collaboration 
(Boschma, 2005). A possible explanation for not finding empirical support for our hypotheses 
involving geographical proximity could be that in the early stages of the innovation process, aspects 
such as face-to-face interaction and the transfer of tacit knowledge -aspects that are facilitated by 
geographical proximity- are not yet opportune. 
 One interesting secondary finding is worth mentioning: contrary to contemporary insights 
regarding the relationship between centrality and innovation (Meeus et al., 2008), we found a 
negative relationship between multiple consortium membership (operationalized as a consortium’s 
degree centrality) and the probability of this consortium generating innovative outcomes. Not only 
was this an unexpected finding, it is also slightly problematic given one of the primary insights of 
this study that networks characterized by high density increase the likelihood of an innovating 
consortium. Hence, even though from the network’s perspective one wants consortia to have 
relatively many joint member ties with other consortia, this is exactly what hampers individual 
consortia in fulfilling their innovative potential. This suggests that it is most beneficial for individual 
consortia to be positioned in the periphery of a relatively dense consortium network. Possible 
explanations for this negative effect can be found in the team literature. Here, it is stated that 
membership of multiple teams increases the need of team members to switch between contexts, 
and members have multiple deadlines, interruptions and task switches. This leads to coordination 
issues, diluted attention and limited time to allocate to any of the consortia involved in (Bertolotti, 
Mattarelli, Vignoli, & Macrì, 2015). In addition, it decreases opportunities to work collectively 
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(O'Leary et al., 2011). Another explanation can be found in the alliance literature, where the 
direction of knowledge flows between organizations (inward or outward) has been suggested to 
determine whether or not a central network position is actually beneficial: when both flows are in 
balance, centrality benefits the innovative potential of firms, but when central firms have low levels 
of inward and high levels of outward knowledge transfer, this actually hampers innovation (Caner, 
Sun, & Prescott, 2014). In addition, besides being affected by its own joint members, a consortium 
is also affected by the joint members of consortia it is linked with (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). 
Hence, it might be that even though a consortium’s global network position is detrimental to 
innovation, whereas its local centrality position is conducive to it. This is also reflected by the ideas 
regarding first- and second order networks by Uzzi (1997), who proposes differential performance 
effects of a node’s position in its first-order network (i.e. its ego network) and its second-order 
network (i.e. its ego network and the relations that ego’s alters have with others). The distinction 
between the local and global network position of consortia and the effect of both on the likelihood 
of generating innovative outcomes will be further elaborated on in the next chapter. 
Theoretical and practical implications 
All in all, and to the best of our knowledge, this chapter is one of the first works to report on a 
large-scale quantitative study on the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia, considering both 
consortium features and network features. It demonstrates the importance of complete network 
effects and shows that both network and consortium features play a role in explaining the 
generation of innovative outcomes by R&D consortia. As such, it provides novel insights to both 
the work that considers R&D consortia as an organizational form in its own capacity and the work 
that has stressed the importance of combining organization and network features as predictors of 
the generation of organizational outcomes. With respect to the first, we have demonstrated the 
importance of network integration and technological diversity, as well as the effect of multiple 
consortium membership. With respect to the second, we have shown that indeed both features 
matter, and that the effect size of network features can be like those related to consortium features. 
 Our findings bear implications for practice as well. Many governmental programs that focus 
on stimulating joint R&D are driven by the with to stimulate demand by potential users for the 
technologies being developed by involving users early in the process of R&D (Foray et al., 2012). 
Our results suggest that this homogeneous recipe should be refined, and the focus should not only 
be on funding consortia in isolation, but also on the overall network in which these consortia are, 
or will be, embedded. Even though these networks form in a serendipitous way, they do have 
important ramifications for the outcomes generated by the consortia embedded in them. A first 
step would be to map these networks for different technology fields and assess their levels of 
network integration. The goal then would not be to just increase their density, but to consider the 
state of the technology landscape. Based on this consideration, it could be decided to assign explicit 
leading roles to consortia, or to either stimulate or discourage the formation of joint member ties. 
We believe it is most important to become aware of these overarching network structures to more 
effectively initiate and design R&D consortia. 
 From a bottom-up management perspective, consortium managers and members should 
be focused on establishing a level of technological diversity that is neither too high nor too low to 
maximize the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. In addition, network mapping and 
assessment is important for these actors as well, as being central in a network characterized by 
density-based integration does not necessarily has to lead to the largest possibility for generating 
innovation. Our results suggest that the number of joint members should be kept to a minimum. 
 
- 55 - 
In addition, consortium managers should consider the structure of the complete network they 
might get embedded in when involving members. 
Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research 
One of the strengths of this chapter is that a large dataset is employed, focusing on 1,263 R&D 
consortia dispersed over 7 technology fields and 16 years. Although some of the measures used 
(e.g. geographical proximity and technological diversity) might be somewhat crude, we were still 
able to sketch a large, overall picture of the antecedents of innovation in R&D consortia across 
different fields and years. These findings particularly echo the call for including multiple levels of 
analysis in network research (Ibarra et al., 2005), and invite a closer consideration of the role of 
technological diversity in R&D consortia. This strength, however, also has the drawback that we 
could not go in more depth into single fields and years. For example, even though we observed 
that technology fields and network integration are correlated, our main research focus kept us from 
delving deeper into this. Another limitation is that, even though we have considered many R&D 
consortia, these consortia all have formed in a specific context and fell under a specific funding 
scheme. Although a large leap was made in terms of generalizability in as far as it concerns these 
specific consortia, future replication studies should demonstrate to what extent our findings hold 
for R&D consortia that have formed under different conditions. In addition, these studies should 
incorporate a comparison with consortia that do not have joint member ties with other consortia 
at all, to assess how being embedded in a larger structural context compares to not being embedded 
in such a context at all. 
 In addition, some of the correlations found as well as the results of our robustness tests 
showed that the role of time is rather pervasive in our study. For example, our correlation analysis 
suggested that some forms of integration emerge over time, whereas others dissolve as time 
progresses. In addition, from the robustness tests it appeared that both network density and 
technological diversity seemed especially salient in earlier years. We already suggested that this 
could have something to do with the developmental stages of the underlying technologies, and also 
want to echo here the suggestion made by Shore et al. (2015) that different structures might be 
needed for different phases of collective problem solving. This time-dependency would be a very 
interesting avenue to include in future research designs. We will focus on this in the next chapter. 
 Moreover, the role of joint consortium membership discussed in the above should be 
examined in more detail. As indicated earlier, existing literature suggests that differential 
performance effects of a node’s position exist, depending on whether the first-order network or 
the second-order network is considered. Involving time here might prove fruitful as well: are 
consortia that are central in early years of their existence more innovative compared to central 
consortia in later years? 
 Furthermore, the question to what extent successful consortium members actually are 
aware of the structural context in which their consortium operates, how they navigate through the 
network and what the costs are associated with doing so (Reagans et al., 2004) are interesting ones 
to answer. Hitherto, only a handful of empirical studies into networks actually has connected such 
network strategies to outcome measures (de Man & Duysters, 2005). Insight in this, however, might 
deliver more tangible levers for individual consortium managers to influence their network position 
in a more targeted way. 
 All in all, both complete network and consortium features have direct and interacting 
effects on the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. Given that both features 
 
- 56 - 
matter in predicting innovative outcomes, both governments aimed at stimulating innovation and 
consortium managers should not only think about the design of individual consortia, but also 
consider the structural context in which consortia operate.  
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Appendix I: Data Sources and Database Construction 
The technology foundation is held accountable for providing consortium funds, and hence issues 
a report on a yearly basis in which consortia that were funded 5 and 10 years ago are evaluated. We 
used the 5 year reports as the main source for our data collection throughout this dissertation. 
Although marked differences between different editions of the reports issued exist, a typical 
example of a 5-years consortium evaluation can be found in Table 6. This table consists of several 
blocks of information, the majority of which is self-explanatory. Of special interest is the three-
letter code provided in the first block that also contains the project code. This code represents a 
multi-dimensional project evaluation and is used as the operationalization of the concept of 
innovative outcomes. 
TABLE 6 
Example of consortium evaluation 
04671 
BAC 
Aerobic Granular Sludge Reactors 
project leader: Prof.dr.ir. M.C.M. van Loosdrecht allocated research grant in euro: 
201.023,50 contracts: Transfer Technische Universiteit Delft, DHV Water BV; research 
collaboration: TUD-TNW, STOWA patents: none incomes in euro: 136.134,00 
goal: The development of a simple, cost-efficient and compact wastewater treatment technology 
based on aerobic grain slurry. 
result after 5 year: This research has developed a first concept of growing aerobic grain slurry 
in the laboratory into a full-flegded technology based on SBR reactors. In a very compact reactor, 
high simultaneous removal of CZV (100%), nitrogen (94%) and phosphate (94%) can be 
accomplished. The design of a water purification plant based on aerobic grain sludge shows that 
75% less space is needed compared to conventional active sludge installations. Also, energy 
consumption can be reduced up to 30% and investment costs are 15% to 20% lower. This 
technology -developed by TU Delft and DHV- is very interesting for purifying both domestic 
and industrial wastewater. The aerobic grain slurry is patented in two patents. DHV introduces 
the technology on the market under the name of Nereda™. There has been considerable interest 
from Dutch water boards and industry, where three installations already are implemented. Pilot 
research will lead to the first application for domestic wastewater, and (inter) national projects 
for the construction of Nereda™ installations are scheduled. 
user committee members: DHV Water BV, Amersfoort / Haskoning Nederland BV, 
Nijmegen / Paques BV, Balk / STOWA, Utrecht / Van der Pluijm Water- en 
Milieumanagement, Boxtel / Wageningen Universiteit & Researchcentrum, Wageningen / 
Waterschap AA en Maas, Den Bosch / Waterschap Hollandse Delta, Dordrecht / Waterschap 
Reest en Wieden, Meppel 
 
In total, the information from 23 evaluation reports was collected. Before entering this information, 
we conducted a pilot project in which the evaluations available in the three most recent reports 
were entered in a database. This pilot project served several purposes. The first purpose was to 
establish a basic database design. We followed general database design principles as outlined in 
Groh et al. (2007), as well as the principles tailored to designing a database that allows for generating 
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network data as outlined in Appendix 1.3.3. in de Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj (2005). Second, we 
developed a set of queries that allowed for extracting the relevant data needed for variable 
construction. In addition, because data entry involved splitting up each project report in five 
separate tables, a set of queries was developed in order to reproduce the original reports to check 
for possible errors in data entry and database design. The last goal of this pilot project was to 
develop data entry heuristics. Especially the names of organizations involved in user commitees 
turned out to be prone to variation, in terms of both small semantic differences as well as more 
salient differences, for example as a consequence of reorganizations or mergers. Even though a 
subjective element in making data harmonizing decisions can never be ruled out completely, 
developing these heuristics allowed for a consistent data entry approach. 
 After the pilot stage, consortium evaluations from the remaining 20 reports were entered. 
As from 2001, these reports were available through the website of the technology foundation. 
Hardcopies from the 13 reports issued in earlier years were sought after in Dutch libaries and 
digitalized, after which applying OCR made them suitable as well for entering in the database. Data 
normalization principles (Groh et al., 2007) were applied as much as possible and five core tables 
were contructed: a table containing project information (1,928 projects, in total 3,186 distinct 
records), a table containing user information (2,634 unique users, 3,045 distinct records), a table 
containing consortium leader information (1,361 distinct records), a table linking consortium 
leaders with projects (3,883 links. Especially in early editions of the report multiple consortium 
leaders were reported) and a table linking users with projects (15,539 links). In the event a 
consortium report was incomplete, we resorted to the foundation’s website and 10 year reports 
that in some cases contained additional project information.  
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3. From Pipes to Prisms: The Time-Varying Effects of Global 
Brokerage and Local Closure on the Generation of Innovative 
Outcomes by R&D Consortia10 
Abstract 
Existing research on organizational knowledge networks and innovation has yielded important 
insights regarding the relation between an organization’s network position and its innovative 
performance. However, no consensus has emerged with respect to the question which network 
position is most advantageous. This is especially salient in the debate that focuses on the question 
whether network brokerage or closure provides the most efficient structure for innovation. This 
chapter addresses this issue by analysing the effect of both global and local network position on 
the likelihood of generating technological innovation, including the role of time in the salience of 
this effect. We test our theoretical predictions with a multi-level analysis of 814 Dutch R&D 
consortia, each of which was active somewhere in the time frame 1989-2004. Contrary to our 
expectations, we find that -although not salient across all years- global brokerage has a negative 
effect on the likelihood of generating technological innovation. We also find that local cohesion 
consistently enhances the likelihood of innovation over time. Lastly, a time-dependent effect is 
found for the interaction between both: especially in the early years, consortia that combine being 
in locally embedded networks with a brokerage position in the complete network are more 
innovative compared to consortia that have other combinations of these network positions. In 
addition to elucidating the direct effect of global brokerage and local closure on the innovative 
potential of R&D consortia, as well as the importance of the interaction between both in early 
stages of an R&D consortium, our study results provide valuable insights for both consortium 
managers and innovation policy. 
3.1 Introduction 
Existing research on organizational networks suggests that an organization’s outcomes are affected 
by its network position. Well-positioned organizations augment their internal resources and 
capabilities through mechanisms such as access to external resources, trust, power and control, and 
signalling an organization’s network position. These determine its access to diverse information, 
the cost-effective functioning of its collaborations, interdependencies with its partners and means 
to evaluate potential partners (Zaheer, Gozubuyuk, & Milanov, 2010) which all are determinants 
of its innovative performance, chances of firm survival, and overall performance (Borgatti & 
Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 2004; Gulati, 1999; Podolny & Page, 1998). 
 A specific body of research focuses on the role of interorganizational networks for 
innovation. Here, the focus is on the role of knowledge (see Meeus et al. (2008), Phelps, Heidl, and 
Wadhwa (2012) and Pittaway et al. (2004) for literature reviews on this topic). Given the increased 
emphasis on interaction in the literature on systems of innovation (Edquist & Hommen, 1999), 
user-producer interaction (Meeus et al., 2001; von Hippel, 1988) in science policy and innovation 
studies (Foray et al., 2012; Martin, 2012; Perkmann et al., 2013), this research has yielded important 
insights, enabling both organizations and policy makers to devise more targeted networking 
strategies and policy measures. However, even though the empirical evidence points at the 
                                                 
10 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the 28th EGOS Colloquium (Helsinki, July 2012) and the DRUID 
Academy 2014 Conference (Copenhagen, June 2014). 
 
- 62 - 
existence of a relation between network position and innovation, there is no consensus among 
researchers regarding which network position is most advantageous. In their review on inter-
organizational networks and innovation, for example, Meeus et al. (2008) and Dagnino, Chiara 
Cantù, Levanti, Minà, and Picone (2015) observe that for several network features, research has 
provided a mixed bag of findings regarding their relation with innovation. 
 An important question in the literature on the topic of interorganizational networks and 
innovation is whether dense networks provide the most efficient structure for knowledge search 
(i.e. closure (Ahuja, 2000a; Coleman, 1988; Hung, 2017)), or if this search is facilitated by networks 
rich in ties that bridge distant, unconnected nodes (i.e. brokerage (Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 1992; 
Soda, Stea, & Pedersen, 2017; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009)). According to the closure perspective, 
organizations embedded in cohesive networks have several advantages, such as building up trust 
and fine-grained information sharing (Coleman, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1996). 
Others have pointed at the downsides of being embedded in cohesive networks, and advocated 
the structural holes perspective, with its timely access to non-redundant information and control 
benefits (Burt, 1992). Although seemingly contradictory, attempts to unite these perspectives have 
been made by considering the boundary conditions of both (Burt, 2005; Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 
2017) or, in other words, by considering the factors that determine whether an organization can 
adequately exploit either structural holes or closure. Indeed, recently authors have suggested 
environmental contingencies that might be at play here, especially focusing on industry context 
(Ahuja, 2000a; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Pollock, Porac, & Wade, 2004; 
Rowley et al., 2000). 
 Two important issues are rarely addressed in this literature. First, most of the studies that 
examine the effect of brokerage and closure on innovation focus on ego networks and examine 
the position of a focal organization in this ego network. Although the issue has been addressed by 
some authors (Everett & Borgatti, 2005; Pallotti, Tubaro, & Lomi, 2015; Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2008; Salman & Saives, 2005; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2013a), scholars usually have overlooked the 
possibility that these effects might stem from an organization’s position in the complete network 
(Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). For example, in the 
nascent and scarce research on second-order social capital, it is emphasized that the performance 
effects of a node’s first-order network location should be separated from its second-order network 
location (Burt, 2000; Sasson, 2008). The issue at stake here is control: whereas a focal organization 
can control its own direct ties, it is usually much harder to control the establishment of ties between 
its partner’s ties, ties between the partners of its partners, and so on (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). 
In addition, even in relatively small organizational contexts, it is difficult to accurately perceive 
those ties that connect us to distant alters (Krackhardt & Kilduff, 1999). Hence, should higher 
order network effects be present, then the difficulties an individual organization has with affecting 
its position in this higher order network could be a reason for policy to aim at mitigating possible 
detrimental higher order network effects through top-down network interventions. Work in this 
area has shown inconsistent findings, ranging from non-relevance of second-order contacts (Burt, 
2007) to a significant effect of this second-order network on employee influence (Galunic, Ertug, 
& Gargiulo, 2012; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997; Sparrowe & Liden, 2005). In a slightly different 
context, studies have shown that clusters of obese persons extended to three degrees of separation 
(Christakis & Fowler, 2007). Similar findings were reported in studies focusing on the spread of 
happiness in social networks (Fowler & Christakis, 2008) or smoking cessation behaviour 
(Christakis & Fowler, 2008). These studies suggest that both local as global network effects can be 
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discerned, and extended consideration of both network dimensions -despite its relevance- is 
missing at present in most organizational network research (Kilduff & Brass, 2010). 
 The second issue is that, although often a call for the specification of time in organizational 
research has been made (Albert & Bell, 2002; Ancona et al., 2001; George & Jones, 2000; Kavanagh 
& Araujo, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1999), studies that incorporate the role of time in generating benefits 
from either a brokerage or closure position are scarce (Bidwell & Fernandez-Mateo, 2010). Scholars 
have suggested that relationships and with that networks are prone to development over time, 
which means that the significance of bridging structural holes is not unconditionally present. 
Instead, its salience depends on for example the extent to which a network is subject to structural 
and population dynamics (Ahuja et al., 2012). In addition, time must pass for relationships to 
develop, strengthen and deepen. Hence, it can be expected that the effect of closure is not present 
instantly but needs some time before becoming manifest. It also might retain its value longer 
compared to network brokerage (Soda, Usai, & Zaheer, 2004). Lastly, several authors have 
suggested different knowledge gestation times for different technology fields (Gilbert & Campbell, 
2015; Park & Zhou, 2005; Rothaermel & Hill, 2005), industries (Becker & Lillemark, 2006; Fabrizio 
& Thomas, 2012; Hameri, 1996; Henisz & Macher, 2004; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005; Nishimura 
& Okada, 2014; Spithoven et al., 2010), and types of innovative activity (Ahuja et al., 2014; Flammer 
& Bansal, 2017; Maine et al., 2005; O'Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Prettner & Werner, 2016; 
Souder, 1983). This implies that not considering the role of time in the relation between brokerage 
and closure and innovation might be too simplistic. 
 In this chapter, we take on the challenge of incorporating (1) the effect of network position 
in networks of different orders on the likelihood of generating innovation and (2) the role of time 
in the salience of this effect. We focus on a specific form of collaboration for generating innovation 
that, due to the increased complexity of innovation problems (Foray et al., 2012), has become a 
prominent form of collaboration: the R&D consortium. Members in these consortia jointly 
develop product or process innovations that are new to the world, with the aim of innovation 
adoption by one or more end users. Through joint member ties with other consortia, a consortium 
network emerges in which each consortium is embedded. By characterizing R&D as a search 
process over a knowledge space that aims at refining or recombining existing knowledge 
components, we propose time-varying effects of a consortium’s global brokerage and local closure. 
By doing so, we build forth on scholars that propose that brokerage and closure are complements 
rather than mutually exclusive (Burt, 2005). We argue that global brokerage (i.e. brokerage in the 
complete network of R&D consortia) provides access to distant information types about the 
distribution of knowledge elements or know-how in a certain technology field, as well as access to 
the latest developments and trends in this field. This helps consortium members in the initial 
problem-solving stage of the consortium. This function of networks as ‘pipes’ (Podolny, 2001) is 
especially important in early stages of the R&D consortium. As the artefact that is developed in a 
consortium matures, activation of members of neighbouring consortia becomes important, to 
embed the artefact in the existing technology base. Here, the function of local closure (i.e. an ego 
network characterized by a high level of density) is important, and for this the function of networks 
as ’prisms’ (Podolny, 2001) is relevant, as it enables knowing who to activate in this stage. 
 We test the empirical value of these theoretical ideas by performing a multi-level analysis 
of 814 R&D consortia, each of which was active in the Netherlands somewhere in the time frame 
1989-2004. Through constructing consortium networks based on joint member ties between 
consortia, we established both the global as the local network structure of each consortium over 
multiple years, and in turn estimated several multilevel ordinal logistic regression models that 
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predict the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes as a function of 
global brokerage and local closure. Contrary to our expectations, we find that global brokerage has 
a negative effect on this likelihood, which does not always occur as time goes by. In addition, we 
find that local cohesion consistently enhances the likelihood of innovation over time. Lastly, a time-
dependent effect is found for the interaction between both: especially in the early years, consortia 
that combine being in locally embedded networks with a brokerage position in the complete 
network are more innovative compared to consortia that have other combinations of these network 
positions. 
 With this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature on organizational networks in two 
related ways. First, we add to the debate on brokerage and closure in networks that it is especially 
the combination of global brokerage and local closure in early stages of an R&D consortium that 
is beneficial for the innovative potential of this consortium. Whereas most studies on the relation 
between networks and innovation take into account using a network that consist of a mix of 
collaborations in only one sector (de Man & Duysters, 2005), we make this claim based on an 
analysis that focuses on one type of relation, taking into account seven different technology fields. 
Second, we show that the direct effects of brokerage and closure in this specific setting are time-
invariant. With this insight, we contribute to the contingency view on brokerage and closure: for 
R&D consortia to come fully to fruition, these consortia need dense local networks and in general 
should avoid obtaining a brokerage position in the complete network of consortia. 
 In addition to the theoretical contributions of our study, we offer insights for practice. Our 
results show that positive network effects for R&D consortia occur at the first network order, 
which can be controlled by members of these consortia. This insight opens the door for actively 
managing this local environment by consortium members. This can, for example, be achieved by a 
targeted selection of members active in other consortia, to establish cross-consortium links and, 
with that, enhance the cohesion of the focal consortium’s ego network. In addition, by focusing 
on the interaction between global brokerage and local cohesion and its associated time dimension, 
our results suggest that members of R&D consortia -in addition to building a dense local network- 
benefit from brokerage positions in the complete network in the consortium’s early stages. This 
brokerage position, however, is difficult to manage by members of individual consortia. Instead, 
here lies a task for innovation policy. As indicated earlier, interorganizational knowledge networks 
are important for innovation. Although this insight has been adopted by innovation policy, most 
policy measures are relatively untargeted and happen out of the realm of control of those positioned 
in these networks (Meeus et al., 2008). Our results suggest that policy should more directly target 
these networks, through developing measures that aim at stimulating network brokerage for newly 
started R&D consortia, as well as stimulating enough structural dynamics in these networks for 
these consortia not to get trapped in their network position without being able to change this 
position. 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
We draw on two distinct but related streams of literature for building our theoretical arguments. 
We start from the literature on social and organizational networks, especially one of the important 
debates in that literature that focuses on the question whether dense networks provide the most 
efficient structure for knowledge search (i.e. closure (Coleman, 1988)), or if search is facilitated by 
networks rich in ties that bridge distant, unconnected nodes (i.e. brokerage (Brass et al., 2004; Burt, 
1992; Soda, Stea, et al., 2017; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009)). Both views are grounded in the 
assumption that network structure affects the flow of knowledge between actors, and as such 
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determines the extent to which actors can use this knowledge to beneficial ends (Kajikawa, Takeda, 
Sakata, & Matsushima, 2010). We then combine arguments taken from this literature with the 
literature on organizational search (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Katila, 2002; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
2001) to develop a theory of search in the context of interrelated R&D consortia. Especially the 
distinction between local and distant search in the strategic management literature has been 
fruitfully combined with the lenses of brokerage and closure that are employed in the network 
literature (Paruchuri & Awate, 2016). It is this distinction that forms the basis of our theoretical 
arguments. The basic arguments in both literatures are well known, and we do not aim in this 
chapter to make fundamental changes to these arguments. What we do aim for, however, is to 
make the role of time -often implicit in the arguments used- more explicit and develop hypotheses 
that include this role. 
 To set the stage of our theoretical framework, we will start with focusing on the debate that 
revolves around the distinction between brokerage and closure in relational structures. We then 
will characterize the process of research and development by members of an R&D consortium that 
is interconnected in a network of R&D consortia as a knowledge search process and explain the 
role of brokerage and closure in such a network. We especially focus on the role of global brokerage 
(i.e. access to a wide array of bodies of knowledge and the possibility of knowledge arbitrage) and 
local cohesion (i.e. the possibility to mobilize members of neighbouring consortia to deepen a 
specific body of knowledge). For each concept, a separate hypothesis is developed that includes 
the moderating effect of time on the concept’s relation with the likelihood of generating innovative 
outcomes. Lastly, we develop a time-dependent hypothesis for the interaction effect between both 
concepts. 
 The brokerage perspective asserts that networks consist of multiple groups of 
interconnected nodes. The key assumption underlying this perspective is that knowledge, values 
and behaviour are homogeneous within groups, and heterogeneous between groups (Burt, 2004; 
Soda, Stea, et al., 2017). This homogeneity results from the specialization of members in each group 
by focusing on a limited set of problems and -in tandem with that- a shared focus on the immediate 
tasks resulting from solving these problems to the exclusion of adjacent tasks. Consequently, holes 
emerge in the organization of the network: nodes within groups lose track of what those in other 
groups are working on and become unaware of the benefits they could offer one another. Because 
ties within groups are likely to carry the same knowledge, they are called redundant. The abundance 
of redundant ties within the group and the lack of non-redundant ties across groups is argued to 
result in nodes within groups not fully realizing their potential (Burt, Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000). 
However, nodes that are connected across different groups through non-redundant ties gain 
exposure to a greater variety of knowledge and ways of thinking. Consequently, the likelihood to 
see connections between otherwise disparate knowledge elements increases, which increases the 
likelihood of creating new knowledge combinations (Burt, 2004; Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; 
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). Hence, nodes that have a brokerage position in the network have more 
opportunities to obtain performance advantages from their position compared to nodes that are 
not in such a position (Kajikawa et al., 2010; Shipilov, 2006). 
 Different conceptions of what a brokerage position entails exist in the literature. In Burt’s 
(1992) original explanation, brokers were presented as the tertius gaudens, or “the third who 
benefits”. In this conception, a broker can obtain important performance advantages by exploiting 
relationships to partners that do not maintain direct ties to one another. The latter implies that 
these partners are connected to heterogeneous sources of information, and that their invitations to 
jointly exploit business prospects present the broker with access to diverse knowledge 
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recombination opportunities (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Shipilov, 2006). This enables the broker to 
take advantage of opportunities that arise from bridging otherwise disconnected parts of a network 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). Hence, in the conception of brokerage as tertius gaudens, individual 
brokers gain advantages by employing a strategy of disunion through the preservation of unique 
ties to other nodes and keeping those other nodes apart from one another (Collins-Dogrul, 2012; 
Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; Quintane & Carnabuci, 2016). 
 Scholars that use the conception of brokerage as tertius gaudens often study brokerage in 
competitive relationships found in markets or conflict mediation, in which reaping individual gains 
is key (Collins-Dogrul, 2012). Another conception of brokerage focuses at the collective advantages 
that can be obtained through bridging disconnected groups in a network (Ibarra et al., 2005). In 
this conception, brokers are present as the tertius iungens, or “the third who connects”. By joining 
previously disconnected groups, this type of broker facilitates coordination, collaboration and the 
pursuit of common goals (Obstfeld, 2005). Next to this role as go-between, this type of broker can 
play a combinatorial role by assisting in bringing together previously disparate pieces of knowledge 
to, for example, create a novel technological approach (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Stuart, Ozdemir, 
& Ding, 2007). Both are achieved through balancing and eliminating possible incompatibilities 
between groups. As such, brokerage in this conception not only involves the structural position of 
a node, but also its relational practices by enabling direct knowledge exchange between brokered 
parties (Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010; Quintane & Carnabuci, 2016). 
 The conception of brokerage as tertius iungens implies that over time, nodes in a network 
become more connected. This brings us to the complementary perspective of brokerage, which is 
called the closure perspective. This perspective stresses the role of cohesive ties in fostering an 
environment that facilitates cooperation among nodes (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). When nodes in 
a network are connected through a closed network, each node has access to fine-grained and 
redundant but in-depth knowledge, for example about the capability and willingness of other nodes 
to join forces and share resources in cooperative ventures (Baum, Rowley, & Shipilov, 2005; Forti, 
Franzoni, & Sobrero, 2013; Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997), as well as their ‘idiosyncratic’ knowledge 
and particular knowledge domains (Morris & Snell, 2007). This eases the mobilization of nodes 
around new ideas, partly due to similarities in perspectives and interests (Obstfeld, 2005). In 
addition, network closure increases the likelihood of knowledge being up to date, accurate and 
reliable (Patzelt, Lechner, & Klaukien, 2011). These knowledge features are absent in networks 
characterized by structural holes, yet necessary to achieve synergies and share resources with 
network partners that enhance a node’s ability to be innovative (Ahuja, 2000a; Shipilov & Li, 2008; 
Soda, Stea, et al., 2017). Closure also results in more shared partners and trust between nodes, 
which reduces their action autonomy because they take feedback from one another into 
consideration (Patzelt et al., 2011), and facilitates long-term relationships and learning (Forti et al., 
2013). It has been suggested that it is especially local cohesion, i.e. cohesion in the immediate 
neighbourhood of nodes, that is beneficial (Guler & Nerkar, 2012). 
 Although initially the brokerage and closure perspective were competing perspectives, there 
is increasing consensus that the efficiency of a certain network structure depends on contingencies 
such as the environment in which a node operates, or the nature of the task. Hence, the key to 
creating value is to put the two together (Ahuja, 2000a; Baum, Cowan, & Jonard, 2014; Burt, 2005; 
Lee, 2007), meaning that a combination between both needs to be established in which a trade-off 
is made between getting knowledge access through structural holes and integration of knowledge 
through closure (Funk, 2013; Gilsing & Duysters, 2008; Michelfelder & Kratzer, 2013; Mors, 2010; 
Obstfeld, 2005). 
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The conceptual model that guides our theorizing is shown in Figure 4. We propose that innovative 
R&D consortia capitalize on their tertius gaudens position initially, accessing different bodies of 
knowledge and increasing the prominence of the artefact that it developed by disseminating its 
knowledge through the network. Then, as time progresses, a tertius iungens position is occupied: 
through mobilizing and activating members of neighbouring consortia around the artefact that is 
developed, its interoperability is ensured and valuable complementarities with artefacts in other 
consortia can be recognized. Somewhere over time, an amplifying effect of both network positions 
can be discerned (Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017). 
FIGURE 4 
Conceptual model linking local and global brokerage to innovative outcomes generated 
by R&D consortia 
 
 
Innovative outcomes. Research and development, invention and innovation are terms that 
encompass a broad variety of activities, analytical levels, degrees of newness and perspectives 
(Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997). Many scholars have framed these activities as a search 
problem (Henderson & Clark, 1990; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Schumpeter, 1934), sparked by 
idiosyncratic problems and opportunities that members of, for example, R&D consortia face 
(Ahuja & Katila, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982). R&D activities focus at searching, developing and 
recombining different types of knowledge that were previously non-associated, or refining previous 
knowledge combinations (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2011; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Fleming & 
Sorenson, 2001; Kogut & Zander, 1992). This eventually leads to invention (i.e. the creation of a 
new product, technology or process) which, once successfully adopted, can be classified as 
innovation (lo Storto, 2006). 
 The focus in this chapter is on the process of research and development in R&D consortia 
that are embedded in an emergent consortium network. Members in these consortia jointly develop 
product or process innovations that are new to the world, with the aim of innovation adoption by 
one or more end users. Multiple stages in this generation process have been identified. In an 
extensive review, Gopalakrishnan and Damanpour (1997) identified five stages: (1) idea generation, 
(2) project definition, (3) problem-solving, (4) design and development, and (5) marketing or 
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commercialization. Our interest is especially in the last three stages: whereas marketing or 
commercialization of the artefact that is developed is the aim, problem solving and development 
into a final product are the main search activities members of R&D consortia engage in. 
 A key element in our current understanding of search in the context of innovation is that 
actors search over a knowledge space. Different conceptualizations of such a space exist (Kauffman 
et al., 2000; March, 1991), but the overarching argument is that knowledge that potentially can be 
further developed or recombined is sought after from a set of knowledge elements in an actor’s 
environment (Katila, 2002; lo Storto, 2006). The implication of this is that search rarely starts ab 
initio, but instead builds forth on already existing knowledge elements and combinations 
(Yayavaram & Chen, 2015). The development of new technology by members of an R&D 
consortium concerns incorporating scientific knowledge into physical artefacts for the benefit of 
users (Ahuja & Katila, 2004). These artefacts must function reliably in a variety of usage 
circumstances and hence development involves experimentation and feedback-based, experiential 
learning by members (Ali & Gittelman, 2016). Consequently, search activities focus on both 
scientific knowledge and technology-related knowledge. 
 Several types of information have been suggested to be relevant to innovation. First, this 
information may focus on the distribution of knowledge elements or know-how within a 
technology field or, in other words, who knows what. Secondly, information about the latest 
developments and trends in a certain area can be sought after. This information can be about trends 
in methods, procedures and tools for solving technological problems, or contemporary 
technological issues. It is this type of information that is likely to be a guide to advancing the 
contents of existing knowledge elements, or the creation of new, or new combinations of 
knowledge elements. Lastly, characteristics of other agents active in the search space such as their 
current endeavours, capabilities and trustworthiness can be relevant (Wang et al., 2013). 
 Search activities for this type of information may be local (i.e. close to the current 
knowledge of consortium members), or distant (i.e. farther away from the existing knowledge of 
members) (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Lopez-Vega, Tell, & Vanhaverbeke, 2016; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996). Whereas both types of search are aimed at overcoming the limitations of a consortium’s 
existing knowledge base (Ahuja & Katila, 2004), local search has been shown to result in 
convergence of search approaches (Stuart & Podolny, 1996). In contrast, distant search entails 
recombination of knowledge (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001), which 
provides more opportunities for the generation of innovation (Lopez-Vega et al., 2016). Given that 
R&D consortia often focus on problems at the interface between science and technology that is 
characterized by ill-structured problems, novelty creation and with that engaging in distant search 
is key for consortium members (Stokes, 2014). 
 By bringing together multiple partners, R&D consortia already are intended to be diversity-
enabling platforms. Although sometimes hampered by issues stemming from joint search activities 
by multiple organizations (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014), the range of recombination opportunities 
resulting from search indeed has often been argued to increase by bringing together organizations 
with complementary knowledge (Bonesso, Comacchio, & Pizzi, 2011; Garriga, von Krogh, & 
Spaeth, 2013; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Guided by its own perspectives, each member organization 
can trigger a process of deliberate exploration in which various areas of the search space can be 
considered (Knudsen & Srikanth, 2014; Olsen, Sofka, & Grimpe, 2016). However, we contend that 
even multiple members of an R&D consortium that are united by a joint problem still are limited 
in their potential for knowledge recombination. Because the potential for knowledge 
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recombination in the knowledge space is essentially infinite, it is hard for individuals, groups or 
even communities to obtain an overall picture of all knowledge elements and opportunities for 
refinement or recombination (Fleming, 2001). So, relative to all possible improvements and 
potential for recombination in the knowledge space, consortium members still build on relatively 
local knowledge sources. Hence, we propose that in addition to the diversity generated by 
consortium members, the potential for accessing even more distant knowledge can be tapped from 
the complete network of R&D consortia, which acts as a vehicle for diffusing ideas through the 
knowledge space (Chang & Harrington, 2007). As a result, the position of R&D consortia in this 
network becomes of interest, as well as the question what type of search in this network (i.e. distant 
or close) is relevant, and when during the innovation process these types are most relevant. 
 We claim that access and activation are key elements in the answer to this question. Access 
to distant information types about the distribution of knowledge elements or know-how in a certain 
technology field, as well as access to the latest developments and trends in this field aids consortium 
members in the initial problem-solving stage of the consortium. In analogy with Podolny’s 
metaphor, it is especially the role of networks as pipes (i.e. conduits through which knowledge 
flows (Podolny, 2001)) that is of importance here. Building on Burt’s (1992) conception, we capture 
this aspect of networks with the concept ‘global brokerage’. As time progresses, knowing which 
ties to other consortia to activate becomes of key importance to generate a bearing area for the 
artefact that is being developed in the focal consortium. Having insight in the characteristics of 
other consortia becomes relevant here, and it is the role of networks as prisms (i.e. optical elements 
that split out and induce differentiation among other consortia in the network (Podolny, 2001)) 
that becomes important. Here, we build forth on Coleman’s (1988) ideas and capture this aspect 
of networks with the concept of ‘local cohesion’. 
Global brokerage. The arguments for network brokerage were initially developed for social 
networks (Burt, 1992). Both Leana and Van Buren (1999) and Gulati (1998), however, explained 
that the ideas stemming from research on social networks can be extended to organizations and 
their intra- and interorganizational networks. R&D consortia are especially suitable for studying 
the changing role of network brokerage over time in the generation of innovation: the initial focus 
on problem specification and goal setting (Corey, 1997; Doz et al., 2000; Evan & Olk, 1990), long 
exchange horizons between members (Das & Teng, 2002) and external knowledge inflows 
stemming from the involvement of members in multiple consortia simultaneously (Lavie et al., 
2007) are three features of R&D consortia that are of importance here. They allow for changing 
information needs over time, a time horizon long enough to allow for these needs to change and 
various levels of network brokerage across consortia that allow for each consortium to be at various 
levels of risk of bumping into knowledge that provides the opportunity to be innovative (Burt, 
2004). 
 Regarding this latter point, an orthodox interpretation of brokerage sets rather strict 
constraints to the networks being studied: these networks need to combine both clustered groups 
of nodes and bridging ties between those clusters for individual nodes to be the only bridge 
between two otherwise separated clusters. The existing research on organizational brokerage and 
its relationship with innovation, however, has been more lenient in its interpretation. Some scholars 
have constructed organizational ego networks and studied to what extent the ego organization in 
such networks brokered the relations between its alters, and its subsequent knowledge and 
innovation benefits (Aalbers, Dolfsma, & Leenders, 2016; Ahuja, 2000a; Lee, 2010; Vanhaverbeke 
et al., 2009; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Other scholars have considered the question if the knowledge 
benefits stemming from structural holes are not only the product of an organization’s primary ties, 
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but also stem from its secondary ties (i.e. moving knowledge between partners of partners) (Burt, 
2007; Galunic et al., 2012; Kajikawa et al., 2010). Lastly, authors have related the concept of 
brokerage to an organizations’ position within the overall pattern of relationships between 
organizations (Meeus et al., 2008; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Salman & Saives, 2005; van Wijk, 
Jansen, & Lyles, 2008). 
 This last conception of network brokerage is closest to our use of the term in the context 
of interconnected R&D consortia. With innovation in these consortia being the result of search 
activities across a broad knowledge space that is hard to comprehend by individuals, groups, or 
even communities (Fleming, 2001), having a broker position within the overall pattern of 
relationships between organizations rather than being a broker in the 1st or 2nd order network 
puts members of R&D consortia at the highest risk of encountering information or knowledge that 
has the potential to serve as the input for innovation. Hence, our label ‘global brokerage’. This 
interpretation is also in line with Burt (2007), who outlines that whereas brokerage in the first order 
network is especially relevant for an ego being affected in his or her emotions, brokerage in the 
second order (and higher) networks is more salient for capturing information advantages. We will 
now start reviewing arguments for the innovative advantages of global brokerage in general before 
relating those arguments to the contingency of time. 
 The literature has proposed two main mechanisms along which global network brokerage 
leads to innovation that are relevant for the R&D consortia studied in this chapter: access to non-
redundant knowledge and information, and knowledge arbitrage. With respect to the first 
mechanism, the reader should be reminded that R&D activities can be considered as search 
activities over a knowledge space, and innovation looms once knowledge is recombined. It is this 
latter feature of knowledge search that is enabled by global brokerage: joint member ties that allow 
a consortium to reach different parts of a network enable members of R&D consortia to move 
beyond local solutions and engage in broader search for non-redundant information and 
knowledge (Dahlander, O'Mahony, & Gann, 2016; Jung & Lee, 2015; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; 
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). Not only does the increased amount of new knowledge elements 
overcome pre-mature idea saturation (Guler & Nerkar, 2012), it allows consortium members to 
envision novel connections and elaborate syntheses between apparently disparate and unrelated 
knowledge elements. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of making novel combinations and a 
larger set of recombination opportunities, which increases the likelihood of finding a global 
optimum in the form of an invention (Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Gruber, MacMillan, & 
Thompson, 2008; Kajikawa et al., 2010; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Because a global brokerage position 
also allows for the timely access to these knowledge elements, consortium members can seize 
opportunities relatively early, therewith pre-empting others from doing so (Lee, 2010; Soh, 2010). 
 Another effect of having access to redundant knowledge and information is that the 
knowledge generated by consortia that have a brokering position is perceived to be rich by 
members of other consortia, for example because access to diverse knowledge sources helps 
members of such a consortium to reach a more accurate understanding of the search space 
(McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Shipilov, 2006). This might attract members of other consortia to seek 
out this knowledge for recombination in their own activities, with the result that the brokering 
consortium’s knowledge is also used in the recombinant activities of other consortia (Nerkar & 
Paruchuri, 2005). 
 With respect to the second advantage of global brokerage, knowledge arbitrage, a brokerage 
position may enable the consortium to act as an information gateway that disseminates and receives 
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information and knowledge through its joint member ties. For example, through disseminating 
knowledge about the design of the artefact that is being developed and affecting the flow of 
information and knowledge, consortia can improve their own chances on generating innovation by 
shaping the expectations of other consortia with respect to preferred standards and with that, the 
possibility to develop complementary products (Jones et al., 1998; Lee, 2010; Nerkar & Paruchuri, 
2005; Soh, 2010). In addition, by virtue of an accurate understanding of the knowledge search 
space, consortium members might recognize potential collaboration opportunities with other 
consortia faster (Burt et al., 2000). Through increasing its knowledge and product prominence, a 
consortium increases its likelihood to successfully diffuse its innovation. 
 Contrary to these positive effects of brokerage, the literature has identified two effects of 
brokerage that are detrimental to the innovative outcomes generated by R&D consortia. First, even 
though a brokerage position allows for searching the broader knowledge space, excessive search 
of this space can be counterproductive as it demands time and resources. When search takes place 
excessively, this reduces the time devoted to further integrating the obtained knowledge (Ahuja & 
Katila, 2004; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). Second, brokerage might lead to random drift (i.e. the 
consortium’s knowledge base is altered frequently in uncertain directions) (Ahuja & Katila, 2004; 
Lounamaa & March, 1987; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). Not only does this cause the accessed novel 
knowledge to be difficult and costly to integrate, it also decreases the reliability of the artefact that 
is developed (Hsu & Lim, 2014; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Hence, both from a search costs as 
knowledge integration point of view, having many non-redundant ties decreases the potential for 
effective knowledge recombination (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). 
 We integrate the benefits and drawbacks of global brokerage by introducing the role of 
time. That the value of network brokerage changes over time has been suggested by several authors 
in the management literature (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Soda et al., 2004; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; 
Walker et al., 1997). In addition, recent research on social networks, creativity and innovation has 
suggested that in each phase of the innovation process, innovators have distinct primary needs: 
whereas flexibility and an environment that enables remote and uncommon associations between 
conceptually distant ideas are needed initially, a more unifying climate is needed once the 
developmental stage is reached. Features of the initial stage might even be detrimental for this later 
stage (Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017). This implies that, whereas initially members of R&D 
consortia benefit from exploring the larger search space which enables them to envision new 
connections and syntheses between apparently disparate and unrelated knowledge elements, it is 
exactly the broadness of this search space that leads to the overflow of information that has been 
suggested to lead to drift in later stages (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). We therefore argue that the 
positive effect of global network brokerage on the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes 
by R&D consortia is eroded over time, and turns negative as the consortium comes closer to its 
end: 
Hypothesis 1: Time negatively moderates the positive effect of complete network brokerage on the likelihood of an 
R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
Local cohesion. Similar to the arguments for network brokerage, the arguments for network 
closure can be extended to organizations and organizational networks (Gulati, 1998; Leana & Van 
Buren, 1999). In addition, the interconnectedness of R&D consortia through joint members, and 
the relatively long duration of R&D consortia allows for applying the brokerage perspective to the 
changing knowledge and information needs of these consortia over time. When a consortium is 
embedded in a cohesive network, this means that joint membership ties between consortia are 
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configured in such a way that the pattern of inter-consortium linkages is dense. Features of cohesive 
ties are their ability to circulate fine-grained and redundant but in-depth knowledge (Baum et al., 
2005; Forti et al., 2013; Morris & Snell, 2007; Uzzi, 1997; Walker et al., 1997), and that they foster 
trust (Patzelt et al., 2011). Contrary to the broad knowledge and information benefits stemming 
from global brokerage, cohesion has often been suggested to be especially salient for innovative 
outcomes in the local context (i.e. a consortium’s ego network) (Guler & Nerkar, 2012; Soh, 2010). 
Hence, we use the label ‘local cohesion’ for this concept. 
 Local cohesion provides an environment that facilitates the collective circulation of fine-
grained information and knowledge, which has the tendency to be in-depth, complex and tacit 
(Fleming, Mingo, & Chen, 2007; Hung, 2017; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Soh, 2010). For example, 
it enhances in-depth understanding of product complementarities, and standards ensuring 
interoperability (Lavie, 2007; Soh, 2010). In addition, network closure increases the likelihood of 
knowledge being up to date, accurate and reliable (Patzelt et al., 2011). These knowledge features 
are absent in networks characterized by structural holes, yet necessary to achieve synergies and 
share resources with network partners that enhance a node’s ability to be innovative (Ahuja, 2000a; 
Shipilov & Li, 2008; Soda, Stea, et al., 2017). As a result, more in-depth search can take place, which 
positively affects product innovation as it enhances creativity, reduces the likelihood of errors and 
false starts and facilitates the development of routines, which makes search more reliable (Fleming, 
2001; Fleming et al., 2007; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). In addition, it makes search more predictable 
and deepens the understanding of already familiar concepts (Katila & Ahuja, 2002). 
 Next to the knowledge benefits of local cohesion, cohesive ties generate trust, which 
facilitates exchange and stimulates flexibility and risk-taking (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Even 
though it reduces the action autonomy of consortium members, as they take feedback received 
from other consortia into consideration (Patzelt et al., 2011), it facilitates long-term relationships 
and learning (Forti et al., 2013). In addition, increased trust eases the mobilization of suitable nodes 
around new ideas, also partly due to similarities in perspectives and interests (Leana & Van Buren, 
1999; Obstfeld, 2005). Finally, inter-consortium trust facilitates positive affect, learning, and risk 
taking, all considered to be crucial components of creativity (Fleming et al., 2007). 
 Contrary to the positive effects of local cohesion on innovation, authors have proposed 
several potential detrimental consequences. First, local cohesion incurs costs, for example costs 
due to the maintenance of ongoing joint member ties (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Second, 
although knowledge depth increases the understanding of members between consortia, excessive 
depth can have the negative consequence that members become too rigid in their search activities 
and search a part of the knowledge landscape that is already close to exhaustion (Katila & Ahuja, 
2002). In addition, the continuous in-depth knowledge sharing between the same consortia over 
time might become without value, as knowledge redundancy looms at the horizon. This reduces 
the potential for new combinations between knowledge elements, and with that innovation 
(Battilana & Casciaro, 2012; Forti et al., 2013; Guan, Zuo, Chen, & Yam, 2016; Leiponen & Helfat, 
2010). It also may reduce the openness of consortium members to alternative information and 
ways of doing things, which decreases the consortium’s innovative potential (Guler & Nerkar, 
2012). Consequently, costs of foregone innovation are incurred, due to members being stifled in 
embedded practices and procedures which hampers new information from entering the system, 
and causing members to have a preference for the most close solutions (Dornbusch & Neuhäusler, 
2015; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). 
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Analogous with the changing value of global brokerage over time, some scholars have suggested 
that the effect of local cohesion on the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by members 
of an R&D consortium is subject to the influence of time (Adler & Kwon, 2002; Soda et al., 2004; 
Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009; Walker et al., 1997). First, the effects of closure take time to fully come 
to fruition: no closed network delivers results right away (Walker et al., 1997). Kogut (2000), for 
example, stresses the longer time horizons that are needed for local cohesion to deliver benefits 
compared to brokerage. In addition, Bidwell and Fernandez-Mateo (2010) argue that as ties last 
longer, it is easier for actors to gain access to private information. Lastly, the distinction between 
brokerage as tertius gaudens and brokerage as tertius iungens implies that local cohesion needs time to 
develop: one first needs to have a structural brokerage position before one can act upon this 
position and bring disparate parties together and close the network (Obstfeld, 2005). 
 In addition to the time that is needed for local cohesion to develop, the needs of consortium 
members also change over time. In early stages, too much closure can lead members to become 
trapped in local search activities (Yu, Gilbert, & Oviatt, 2011). Perry-Smith and Mannucci (2017), 
in their work on social networks, creativity and innovation, argue that especially in later stages of 
the developmental process, legitimacy, shared vision and understanding are critical, which 
underlines the need for closure in later stages. Closure in later stages also has been argued to be 
beneficial as it shields consortia from possible knowledge spill-overs to consortia beyond a 
consortium’s ego network, who by that time might be more at competition with the focal 
consortium (Hernandez, Sanders, & Tuschke, 2014). Hence, we argue that initially, local closure 
has a negative effect on the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes by R&D consortia, but 
this effect becomes smaller over time and turns positive once the consortium reaches its final 
stages: 
Hypothesis 2: Time positively moderates the negative effect of local cohesion on the likelihood of an R&D consortium 
generating innovative outcomes. 
Interaction between global brokerage and local closure 
Besides the direct effect of global brokerage and local cohesion on the likelihood that an R&D 
consortium generates innovative outcomes, we propose a time-dependent interaction effect 
between both. Various authors already have proposed an interaction effect between brokerage and 
closure, or related concepts (Burt, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). In short, these authors contend that 
combining both features makes that the negative effects of global brokerage (i.e. difficulty in 
knowledge integration and risk of random drift) are offset by the positive effects of local cohesion 
(i.e. in-depth, tacit and up-to-date knowledge and flexibility), and the negative effects of local 
cohesion (i.e. costly and risk of over-search) are offset by the positive effects of global brokerage 
(i.e. access to non-redundant knowledge and information and knowledge arbitrage). 
 For example, authors that used Granovetter’s (1973) distinction between strong and weak 
ties -comparable to local cohesion and global closure- have shown that strong ties with key partners 
and weak ties with peripheral partners results in an organization’s highest innovative capability 
(Capaldo, 2007). In the context of innovation projects, it has been shown that a combination of 
bridging ties and strong ties results in the highest level of knowledge integration (Tiwana, 2008). 
Lastly, in the German car industry, a combination between embedded strong ties and a weak 
network architecture has the most beneficial consequence for innovation (Rost, 2011). The 
arguments used here all combine the need for access to a diverse array of knowledge stemming 
from distant search through bridging ties that in turn needs to be integrated through the activation 
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of strong local ties in order for this knowledge to be applied instead of being lost (Rost, 2011; 
Tiwana, 2008). 
 This productive combination between local cohesion and global brokerage also resonates 
in the literature that focuses at network brokerage and closure and innovation. Nerkar and 
Paruchuri (2005), for example, argue that global brokerage can help to amplify the quality of the 
knowledge circulated through local cohesion. In addition, it has been argued that the potential 
information overflow stemming from spanning structural holes can be mitigated by the focus that 
results from having a close, local network (Baumann & Siggelkow, 2013; Caner, Cohen, & Pil, 
2016; Paruchuri & Awate, 2016; Puranam, Alexy, & Reitzig, 2013). Diverse knowledge acquired 
through global brokerage can be received with more support in a dense ego network (i.e. local 
closure) as here mobilization around this new knowledge can be expected to be easier (Soh, 2010). 
 Although the studies reported in the above make fruitful claims about the positive effects 
of combining global brokerage with local closure, none of them explicitly address the role of time. 
In line with the arguments we provided for the effect of time on global brokerage and local 
cohesion, we argue that the interaction between both features is especially salient when the needs 
of consortium members switch from non-redundant knowledge and information to tacit and up-
to-date knowledge. According to the developmental stages proposed by Perry-Smith and Mannucci 
(2017), this would be in the switch from the idea elaboration stage -with an emphasis on making 
uncommon associations between conceptually distant ideas to the idea championing stage, where 
the emphasis is more on gaining legitimacy. This is the point where a switch takes place from idea 
generation to acting on the idea (Obstfeld, 2005; Tiwana, 2008). Even though it is the exact timing 
of this switch cannot be specified, we can at least hypothesize that the interaction effect is not 
salient at either the start or end period of the R&D consortium: 
Hypothesis 3: A positive interaction effect between an R&D consortium’s local cohesion and global brokerage on 
the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes exists in-between the consortium’s initial stage 
and end stage. 
3.3 Data and methods 
Research setting and data 
The empirical value of our hypothesis is assessed with a dataset that was developed for multiple 
research projects (see, for example, the other chapters in this dissertation and Mannak (2015)). This 
dataset11 contains secondary data on 1,928 Dutch R&D consortia that were funded by a technology 
foundation aiming at realizing knowledge transfer between science and industry. Each consortium 
consists of one project leader -usually an academic researcher- and one or more interested 
organizations. These organizations form the so-called ‘users committee’, which is involved already 
in the early stages of the resarch. Its main tasks are taking note of and discussing the research 
progress and results, reflecting on the applicability of research findings to practice, and steering the 
research where and when necessary. Also, organizations involved can act as a testing-ground for 
the artefact being developed in the consortium in order to further aid its development. All in all, 
                                                 
11 As indicated in the general introduction of this dissertation, several topics regarding the construction of this dataset 
are elaborated on in the different appendices to the different empirical chapters in this dissertation. The topics covered 
are (1) data sources and database construction (Chapter 2), (2) node specification (Chapter 3), (3) tie and network 
specification (Chapter 4) and (4) network boundary specification (Chapter 5). 
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the committee’s explicit task is to provide an environment in which the chance of knowledge 
utilisation is maximized. 
 The first consortia started in the spring of 1981, and the most recent starting year that is 
included in the dataset is the year 2004. On average, 80 new consortia started each year, which 
means that at any point in time as from the year 1985, about 400 consortia were active, dispersed 
over 7 technology fields (see Appendix I and II of chapter 5 for the classification approach taken). 
Although no data are available on the exact relational structure amongst members within consortia, 
the occurrence of many organizations that participate in multiple consortia provides ample 
information on ties between consortia. This information was used to construct the consortium 
networks that form the basis of our analysis. The procedure followed with respect to tie and 
network specification is explained in Appendix I of Chapter 4. 
 The selection of the consortia included in our analysis was based on several considerations. 
First, out of all 1,928 consortia of which data was available, 153 consortia did not contain 
information about members of the users committee. In addition, 141 consortia did have members 
reported, but none of these members were involved in one or more of the other consortia. Also, 
40 consortia did have joint members with other consortia, but the resulting dyad was not part of 
the main component of the network. Of another 331 consortia, no outcome evaluation was 
available. Consequently, these consortia (totalling 665) were excluded from the dataset, resulting in 
1,263 consortia that were eligible for analysis. Since in this chapter we are interested in the effect 
of global brokerage and local closure over time, it was key that the consortia being analysed were 
embedded in the consortium network for at least 5 years without any interruptions. This was not 
the case for 449 consortia. These consortia either were embedded in the consortium network for 
less than 5 years (445 consortia12) or were not embedded in the consortium network for 5 
subsequent years (4 consortia). After removing these consortia, a dataset resulted with 814 
consortia that were suitable for analysis. 
 Our research interest in this chapter is in examining the role of time in the relationship 
between global brokerage and local closure on the one hand and the likelihood of an R&D 
consortium generating innovative outcomes on the other. We consider the consortia funded by the 
technology foundation that are analyzed in this chapter suitable for characterizing this relationship 
for several reasons. First, activities in each consortium are conducted in the context of highly 
knowledge-intensive and innovation driven technology fields (i.e. Chemistry, Civil engineering, 
Electrical engineering, Instruments, Life sciences, Mechanical engineering, and Medical 
technology) and focuses at pre-competitive research and development. This means that 
overcoming the limitations of a consortium’s existing knowledge base through distant search and 
recombining existing knowledge elements as well as integrating these elements are pivotal for these 
consortia to be succesful. Second, the interconnectedness of consortia through joint members or 
consortium leaders allows for examining the resulting consortium network structure. Especially the 
long time period over which the funding agency has reported the results of funded consortia allows 
for the determination of both global and local network positions of consortia over time. These 
positions can be assumed to vary over time, due to the yearly new inflow of newly started consortia, 
                                                 
12 Although the number of 445 consortia might seem alarmingly large, one should realize that most of these consortia 
started after the year 1999. Given that the most recent year of observing consortia is 2004, these consortia simply were 
not observed long enough to allow for measuring global brokerage and local cohesion for 5 subsequent years. In 
addition, it should be noted that none of the consortia that started in the technology field 'Mechanical engineering' in 
1991 nor the technology field 'Civil engineering' in 1992 fulfilled the selection criteria outlined above. Hence, the 
consortia studied in this chapter are dispersed across 82 unique technology field – year combinations. 
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and outflow of consortia that have finished. Collecting network data over longer time periods is an 
exception more than the rule, given the daunting task of collecting longitudinal data for multiple 
networks (Provan et al., 2007). Hence, our dataset provides an excellent opportunity for studying 
the time-varying effects of networks on innovation. This is enabled by the clear time lag that exists 
between the moment of measuring for example a consortium’s global brokerage and the moment 
of measuring its innovative outcomes. Depending on the specific structure chosen, this lag is always 
at least one year, which suppresses concerns of reversed-causality between the independent and 
dependent variables in our model (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2010). 
Measurements 
Innovative outcomes. We consider innovative outcomes in this chapter as the result of R&D 
activities that focus at searching, developing and recombining different knowledge components 
that are sought after in a knowledge landscape. Our interest is in three stages of these search 
activities (Gopalakrishnan & Damanpour, 1997), namely problem-solving activities, design and 
development and commercialization. Given a fixed duration between the start of an R&D 
consortium and the moment of its evaluation (i.e. 5 years after its start), the results of any 
consortium can be categorized into one of these three outcomes when evaluated. Indeed, the 
evaluation score of the technological outcomes of a consortium that is assigned by the funding 
agency (see the three-letter code provided in the first block in Table 6 in Chapter 2) resembles this 
categorization: four distinct scores can be assigned, which ranges from 0 (failure), A (further 
development needed), B (prototype) and C (outcome realized). As consortium outcomes rarely get 
assigned a score of 0, this category was lumped with category A. As a result, three ordinal classes 
were created, each representing a unique stage in the knowledge search and recombination process. 
Global brokerage. This concept is operationalized using Freeman’s (1978) betweenness centrality 
measure. A host of centrality measures for network analysis are available, yet Freeman’s three 
measures (degree, betweenness and closeness centrality) can be considered to be the bedrock 
measures based on which further refinements have been made (Friedkin, 1991). Out of these three 
measures, betweenness centrality captures global brokerage best, as it considers the frequency with 
which a focal consortium falls between pairs of other consortia on the shortest paths connecting 
them. As such, it captures the extent to which an R&D consortium occupies a brokerage position 
in the complete network. It has been used to capture network brokerage -either implicitly or 
explicitly- by many other authors (see, for example, (Allatta & Singh, 2011; Bekkers, Duysters, & 
Verspagen, 2002; Bond, Walker, Hutt, & Reingen, 2004; Breschi & Catalini, 2010; Dess & Shaw, 
2001; Díez-Vial & Montoro-Sánchez, 2016; Geletkanycz, Boyd, & Finkelstein, 2001; Gilsing, 
Nooteboom, Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & van den Oord, 2008; Hansen, 2002; Mehra, Dixon, Brass, 
& Robertson, 2006; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004; Salman & Saives, 2005; Thieme, 2007)). 
 The betweenness centrality CB of a consortium k reflects the frequency with which this 
consortium falls between pairs of other consortia on the shortest or geodesic paths connecting 
them13 (Freeman, 1978). The obtained value for betweenness centrality can be made independent 
of network size by employing the following formula: 
′() =  2()
 − 3 + 2 
                                                 
13 In the event of multiple possible shortest or geodesic paths, one must work with probabilities in the calculation of 
a point’s betweenness centrality. For the sake of simplicity, this situation is not being considered in this example. 
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The result of this formula yields a score that ranges from 0 (representing a case in which a 
consortium does not fall on the shortest path between any pair of other consortia) to 1 
(representing a case in which a consortium falls on the shortest path between all pairs of other 
consortia). Consortium I in panel (c) of Figure 10, for example, lies on two shortest paths between 
other pairs of consortia: the path between consortium II and III and the path between consortium 
II and IV. Hence, the absolute betweenness centrality score of consortium I is 2. The betweenness 
centrality score of the other consortia in this figure is 0, as none of them is bridging the path 
between any other pair of consortia. Given that n = 4, normalizing the betweenness score of 
consortium I using the formula in the above yields ⅔ (2×2 / 6). 
 Calculations of betweenness centrality for each consortium were supported using the 
statnet suite (Goodreau et al., 2008) that is available in the R environment for statistical computing 
(R Development Core team, 2016). These calculations did not include tie strength (e.g. one joint 
member link to another consortium is formed by multiple members of the focal consortium). In 
addition, when a network consisted of multiple components, the normalization of the betweenness 
centrality score took place using the size of the component a consortium was part of, and not using 
the size of the total network. 
Local cohesion. We use Burt’s constraint measure (Burt, 1992) to determine the connectedness 
of a consortium at the ego network level. Together with the measures for effective network size 
and number of bridges, constraint is one of the three measures that expresses the extent to which 
the ego-network -or local network- of a consortium acts like a ‘straight jacket’ for that consortium, 
in the sense that opportunities for receiving non-redundant knowledge and information are limited. 
Whereas the first two measures rely on counts (Borgatti, 1997; Burt, 1992), constraint is a measure 
that provides a normalized measure of the extent to which an ego-network is clustered, making it 
conveniently comparable with our measure for global brokerage, betweenness centrality. In 
addition, it can be considered a more refined measure of the multiple consortium membership 
control variable that was used in the previous chapter. 
 Being calculated using a consortium’s ego network, the constraint index varies with three 
conditions: (i) ego network size (larger networks are less constraining), (ii) density (networks of 
more strongly interconnected contacts are more constraining), and (iii) hierarchy (networks in 
which all contacts are exclusively tied to a single contact are more constraining) (Burt, 1992). Local 
cohesion, or the constraint of a consortium i was calculated with the following formula (Burt, 
1992): 
 =  +   


,  ≠ ,  
In this formula, pij denotes the proportional strength of consortium i with consortium j. This 
proportional strength is based on the degree (i.e. the total number of joint member links with other 
consortia, regardless of the number of members that forge that link) of consortium i. Consortium 
I in panel (c) of Figure 10, for example, has a total degree of 3. Hence, the proportional strength 
of the link that consortium I has with any of the other consortia is ⅓. The product piqpqj expresses 
the extent to which one of the other consortia to which consortium i is linked, q, is also linked with 
consortium j. The higher this product term, the more augmented a direct link between i and j 
becomes through the pathway from piq to pqj, and the less likely it is that i receives novel information 
and knowledge from j. 
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The squared product represents the constraint of i from a lack of primary holes around consortium 
j. If, for example, one would be interested in the constraint of consortium I with respect to 
consortium III in panel (c) of Figure 10, we do not only have to consider the link between both 
consortia, but also the link between consortium III and IV as the latter consortium too is linked to 
consortium I (with proportional strength of ½). Hence, the constraint of consortium i with respect 
to a lack of primary holes around consortium III is 0.25 (⅓ + (⅓×½))2. Aggregated across all 
contacts q (excluding i), this yields the aggregated constraint of i. In the example given, the 
aggregated constraint of consortium I equals .61, the aggregated constraint of consortium II is 1 
and the aggregated constraints of consortia III and IV are 1.01. 
 Operationalizing local cohesion -or the lack of local brokerage opportunities- using 
constraint is consistent with a long research tradition (Battilana & Casciaro, 2012; Hernandez et al., 
2014; Lee, 2010; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009; Shipilov, Li, & Greve, 2011; Soda, Stea, et al., 2017; 
Soda et al., 2004; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Scores on constraint range from 0 (representing full 
brokerage) to 1 (representing full constraint). In special cases, this measure can exceed 1 
(Bruggeman, 2008). In those cases, the score was normalized to 1 as this value is normally assigned 
to nodes that have a complete lack of structural holes (Foss, Frederiksen, & Rullani, 2015). We 
calculated constraint using the igraph package (Csárdi & Nepusz, 2006) that is implemented in R 
(R Development Core team, 2016). Similar to the calculation of betweenness centrality, these 
calculations ignored tie values. 
Control variables. The control variables included in the previous chapter were used in this 
chapter’s analysis as well. Hence, in addition to technology field and year dummies, size, duration, and the 
levels of financial resources, consortium leader experience and member relational experience all were included 
in the analysis. In addition, we controlled for the curvilinear effects of geographical proximity and 
technological diversity which were shown in the previous chapter to influence the likelihood of a 
consortium generating innovative outcomes as well. Variables examined in the previous chapter 
that were not included in our primary analyses were the variables that reflected the level of network 
integration. The main reason for not doing so stems from the difference between the lag structure 
used in previous chapter’s model (independent variables at t were related to a dependent variable 
at t+5) and the model that is estimated in the current chapter (independent variables at various 
points in time, t+i (with i ranging from 0 to 4), are related to a dependent variable at t+5). The 
assumption underlying the first model is that network integration serves its role with respect to 
creating mutual awareness and common thematic foci among R&D consortium members 
especially in the consortium’s maiden year, as at that point in time the search space is still fully 
unexplored. As we did not hypothesize any effects with respect to the time-dependent effect of 
network integration, including the variables in the current model -even though possible- would be 
especially problematic for the years that follow a consortium’s first year, as no theoretical 
expectations have been formulated for these lags. In addition, the different size of the sample 
employed in this chapter compared to the sample used in the previous chapter would make a clear 
comparison between both analyses problematic. We will, however, address the issue in our 
robustness tests. In addition, we did not include the control variable multiple consortium membership, 
as we focus on the more refined network measures global brokerage and local cohesion instead 
and want to avoid multicollinearity issues if too many measures referring to a consortium’s network 
position are included in the analysis.  
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Data analysis 
The three hypothesized relationships all propose a moderating role of time on the relation between 
on the one hand global brokerage and local cohesion (including an interaction between both), and 
on the other hand the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. In the dataset used, all 
variables are time-invariant, with the exception of global brokerage and local cohesion: due to new 
consortia entering the consortium network over time, and older consortia leaving this network, the 
betweenness centrality and constraint measures for a given consortium are prone to variation. For 
this reason, the direct effect of betweenness centrality and constraint on the likelihood of 
generating innovative outcomes will be tested in five sets of models, each of which includes the 
same variables, but differs in the time lag between the predictors and the outcome variable. This 
approach resembles the one taken by Ahuja & Katila (2004). Should there be a significant change 
in the effect of, for example, betweenness centrality as the time lag between observing the 
independent variable and the dependent variable decreases, then this would indicate a moderating 
effect of time. 
 Time lags in this chapter are denoted with the letter i. An i with score 5 means that 5 years 
needs to pass before the consortium is evaluated, i.e. the consortium is at its start. Other time lags 
are i=4, i=3, i=2 and i=1. Although the time lag is determined by the consortium evaluation 
procedure (a consortium is evaluated five years after its start), the current literature suggests that 
exploring a window of five years for assessing the technological impact of R&D is appropriate. 
Studies on R&D depreciation have shown that the value of knowledge depreciates over time, losing 
most of its economic value within five years (Griliches, 1979; Hall, Griliches, & Hausman, 1984; 
Pakes & Schankerman, 1984; Stuart, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). 
 The ordinal nature of the dependent variable implies that an ordinal logistic regression 
approach is required. The nature of the variable fits our research purposes well: say that over time, 
higher scores of betweenness centrality increase the likelihood of ending in the outcome category 
‘further development needed’, this would suggest that global network brokerage causes consortia 
to dwell into the global search space. Similar to the previous chapter, we employ a multi-level 
framework. This choice stems from the nature of the control variables technology field and year, 
which are at the network level instead of at the consortium level. For each time lag, we first 
estimated an ordinal logistic regression model with 814 data points, predicting the outcome at t+5 
using consortium-level predictors at t+i. As intercepts could vary by technology field and year, this 
intercept was estimated for each combination of technology field and year by the second 
component of the model. This latter model is an ordinal logistic regression model with 82 data 
points (5 technology fields × 12 years + 2 technology fields × 11 years), using field- and year-level 
predictors. 
 For each time lag i, four distinct models were estimated. All models include the control 
variables. In addition to these controls, model 1 includes the betweenness variable representing 
global brokerage. In model 2, this variable is removed, and the constraint variable is entered to 
assess the separate effect of local cohesion. Model 3 contains both predictors, and model 4 adds 
the interaction between both predictors. We use the ‘ordinal’-package (Christensen, 2011) for 
estimating our models. Estimating ordinal regression models requires that the assumption of 
parallel regression is fulfilled: under this assumption, the coefficients that describe the relationship 
between the lowest and all higher categories of the response variable are similar compared to those 
describing the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories, and so forth. 
Only when this assumption is fulfilled, one can use one set of coefficients for all outcome 
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categories. Although no formal test of this assumption for multilevel ordinal logistic regression is 
available at present, informal tests are available. We assessed the tenability of this assumption using 
one of the procedures outlined by Harrell (2001). The results of this test are reported in Appendix 
II, in which we draw the conclusion that except for two predictors, the parallel regression 
assumption is likely to be satisfied for each predictor separately. To aid model interpretation, effect 
plots were created for all salient effects of the estimated models. These plots were created using 
the ‘effects’-package developed by Fox (2003). This package calculates marginal effects of a 
predictor of interest at the average of all other predictors. Both packages were implemented in the 
R statistical environment (R Development Core team, 2016). For interpretation and comparison 
purposes and to aid model convergence, all predictor variables were scaled using the default scale 
function available in R (default settings were used). Except when indicated otherwise, all pictures 
in this chapter were made using the ‘ggplot2’-package (Wickham, 2009) available in R. 
3.4 Results 
Descriptives and correlations 
Means, standard deviations and correlations for the consortium-level variables are provided in 
Table 7. Table 8 shows this information for the network-level variables (i.e. technology field and 
year dummies). It should be noted that for the analyses performed, 5 specifications of the same 
sample were used. This sample did not differ on any variable, other than the variables for global 
brokerage and local cohesion at the consortium level, and the ‘year’ variable at the network level. 
 With respect to the correlations at the network level, the scores of the technology field 
dummies indicate that the consortia studied in this chapter are distributed unevenly across 
technology fields. Especially the fields of Civil engineering, Mechanical engineering and Medical 
technology tend to be underrepresented. This is caused by the unequal distribution of consortia 
across technology fields in general, and the fields mentioned in the above have generally smaller 
consortium networks. The correlation between technology field dummies and the year control 
shows that whereas consortia in the field of Civil engineering tend to become less prevalent as 
years go by, consortia in the field of Life sciences tend to become more prevalent as years go by 
instead. These patterns are consistent across different lag specifications. 
 The dependent variable correlates with the size control and the control for geographical 
proximity: bigger consortia tend to have innovative outcomes that are in the higher outcome 
categories of the dependent variable, and their members are more geographically dispersed. A 
correlation with the predictor variables is only present for local cohesion. This correlation is 
consistently visible across the five sample specifications, indicating a lack of time-dependence in 
the positive linear association between generating innovative outcomes and a consortium having a 
cohesive ego network. No correlation is present between our outcome variable and global 
brokerage. This means that no linear association exists between occupying a brokerage position in 
the global network and generating innovative outcomes, regardless of the year in which this 
brokerage position is occupied. 
 Other than with consortium leader experience, consortium size correlates with all other 
consortium-level control variables. A consortium in the sample employed that has more members 
also has a longer duration, more financial resources, members that have more experience with one 
another, and are both more distant and more diverse from one another. Salient correlations are the 
ones between size and global brokerage and local cohesion. From these correlations we deduce 
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that bigger consortia tend to broker more in the network and are locally embedded in less cohesive 
ego networks. Despite a substantial reduction in the sample size compared to the previous chapter, 
the correlation between member relational experience and consortium leader experience is still 
present, indicating that members building up experience with one another and consortium leaders 
gaining experience go hand in hand. 
 With respect to the two predictor variables, it is interesting to see that there are significant 
correlations between geographical proximity (across all lag specifications, except for i=5) and 
technological diversity (consistent across all lag specifications) on the one hand, and global 
brokerage on the other. The negative correlation between proximity and global brokerage tells us 
that when members become more geographically distant from one another, the consortium they 
are member of is more likely to span distant clusters in the consortium network. The positive 
correlation between technological diversity and global cohesion indicates that as members become 
more diverse, the consortium they are member of is more likely to span distant clusters in the 
network. This is in line with observations made by others, for example Sosa (2011) who claims that 
a node’s knowledge diversity is positively associated with network brokerage. The positive 
association between geographical proximity and local cohesion tells us that being geographically 
close to one another facilitates the creation of a cohesive consortium ego network. Except for i=5, 
this correlation is consistent across years. Lastly, the correlation between global brokerage and local 
cohesion that is present for i=1 (r = -.08, p < .05), indicates that as consortia reach completion, 
they tend to either have a global brokerage position, or a locally cohesive ego network. 
 The descriptives of global brokerage and local cohesion warrant some extra inspection. 
Especially the standard deviation of global brokerage is rather large, indicating the presence of 
outliers that might influence significant results in the regression analysis (Zhang & Shaw, 2012). 
Figure 5 displays box and whisker plots for both variables for i=5 to i=1. Indeed, especially the 
global brokerage variable has a considerable number of outliers and most scores observed are 
concentrated in a small range of the total scale. Especially scores of 1 are rarely observed when 
using a betweenness centrality scale. These scores can be explained by consortia that are embedded 
in small networks, where a score of 1 can easily be obtained (if, for example, consortium IV would 
disappear from the network depicted in panel (c) of Figure 10, consortium I would have a 
betweenness centrality score of 1). The skewness in the distribution of global brokerage is not a 
surprise: a network measure is used, and nodes are rarely randomly distributed in a relational 
structure (Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003; Lusher et al., 2013). Although the distribution does raise 
concerns about the extent to which we can empirically discern consortia that differ in their 
brokerage position, these outliers are not removed from the analysis, as this would dismiss the 
exact reason for using network-based measures. In the visualizations of the relevant effects, 
however, these extremes will be included in the calculations but not shown for the sake of visual 
clarity. 
 In addition to the box and whisker plots for global brokerage and local cohesion, Figure 3 
also provides scatterplots in which global brokerage is plotted by local cohesion with observations 
marked by both technology fields and years, as well as pictures in which consortia with different 
combinations of scores on global brokerage and local cohesion are highlighted. With respect to the 
scatter plots, for the fields Electrical engineering, Chemistry, Life science and Instruments, scores 
on both variables tend to cluster together on smaller ranges that are also closer to zero. For the 
other three fields, Mechanical engineering, Medical technology and Civil engineering, both 
variables cluster less and a larger range of scores can be observed. As noted earlier, the cause of 
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TABLE 7 
Descriptives and correlations among consortium-level variables14 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Innovative outcomest+i……..…..……. 1.98 .80 1 3 -         
2. Size……….…………………....……. 4.33 2.31 1 23 .15** -        
3. Duration…………………….………. 4.55 1.00 4 15 .02 .13** -       
4. Financial resources…………..………. 543.35 356.09 13.87 3,738.36 .04 .23** .27** -      
5. Consortium leader experiencet…......… 1.11 1.71 0 11 .06 .05 -.00 .00 -     
6. Member relational experiencet…...….... 1.04 2.10 0 15 .03 .10** .02 .01 .64** -    
7. Geographical proximity………...……. .28 .29 0 1 -.07* -.30** -.01 -.05 -.04 -.08* -   
8. Technological diversity………..…....... .63 .31 0 1 -.01 .37** .07* .03 -.04 .04 -.33** -  
9. Global brokeragei=5………......………. .03 .07 0 1 -.00 .27** .02 .05 .06 .01 -.06 .12** - 
10. Local cohesioni=5………………….... .28 .21 .07 1 .08* -.11** -.06 -.08* -.02 -.09** .07 -.02 -.04 
9. Global brokeragei=4………......………. .02 .06 0 1 .00 .27** -.01 .07 .08* -.00 -.08* .13** - 
10. Local cohesioni=4…………………... .27 .20 .07 1 .07* -.11** -.02 -.07* -.00 -.08* .08* -.03 -.04 
9. Global brokeragei=3………......………. .02 .05 0 .51 -.02 .28** .01 .04 -.02 -.02 -.08* .14** - 
10. Local cohesioni=3………………….... .26 .19 .07 1 .08* -.10** -.04 -.07* .00 -.07 .09** -.03 -.04 
9. Global brokeragei=2………......………. .02 .06 0 1 -.03 .23** .00 .01 -.02 -.01 -.07* .11** - 
10. Local cohesioni=2………………….... .26 .19 .06 1 .08* -.10** -.03 -.07* .02 -.04 .09** -.06 -.02 
9. Global brokeragei=1………......………. .02 .04 0 .53 -.01 .25** .00 .04 -.05 -.03 -.08* .12** - 
10. Local cohesioni=1…………………... .26 .20 .06 1 .09* -.12** -.02 -.07* .02 -.05 .11** -.06 -.08* 
                                                 
14 n = 814. **p < .01; *p < .05. 
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TABLE 8 
Descriptives and correlations among network-level variables15 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Chemistry………………………….... .19 .39 0 1 -       
2. Civil engineering……………................ .07 .25 0 1 -.13** -      
3. Electrical engineering…………............ .17 .37 0 1 -.22** -.12** -     
4. Instruments…………………………. .20 .40 0 1 -.24** -.13** -.22** -    
5. Life sciences………………………..... .26 .44 0 1 -.28** -.16** -.26** -.29** -   
6. Mechanical engineering……………… .03 .18 0 1 -.09** -.05 -.08* -.09** -.11** -  
7. Medical technology………………….. .09 .29 0 1 -.15** -.09* -.14** -.16** -.19** -.06 - 
8. Yeari=5…………………….………… 1995.07 3.26 1989 2000 .01 -.09** .00 -.05 .08* .01 -.01 
8. Yeari=4………………………………. 1996.07 3.26 1990 2001 .01 -.09** .00 -.05 .08* .01 -.01 
8. Yeari=3………………………………. 1997.07 3.26 1991 2002 .01 -.09** .00 -.05 .08* .01 -.01 
8. Yeari=4………………………………. 1998.07 3.26 1992 2003 .01 -.09** .00 -.05 .08* .01 -.01 
8. Year i=1……………...……………….. 1999.07 3.26 1993 2004 .01 -.09** .00 -.05 .08* .01 -.01 
 
                                                 
15 n = 82. **p < .01; *p < .05. 
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FIGURE 516 
Global brokerage and local cohesion: distributions, scatter plots and examples of R&D 
consortia with different combinations of both variables 
Distributions global brokerage Distributions local cohesion 
  
Global brokerage by local cohesion; Observations marked 
by technology field 
Global brokerage by local cohesion; Observations marked 
by year. 
  
Low global brokerage (left), low local cohesion (right) (Electrical engineering, 1999. 
Global brokerage = .00; local cohesion =.14) 
  
                                                 
16 Key to the network pictures: the left panel shows the position of the focal consortium in the complete network; the 
right panel shows its position in its ego network. Node size indicates the score on global brokerage, node colours 
(darker is higher) indicate levels of local cohesion. 
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FIGURE 5 (CONTINUED) 
Global brokerage and local cohesion: distributions, scatter plots and examples of R&D 
consortia with different combinations of both variables 
Low global brokerage (left), high local cohesion (right) (Life sciences, 1994.  
Global brokerage = .00; local cohesion = .29) 
  
High global brokerage (left), low local cohesion (right) (Instruments, 1992.  
Global brokerage = .05; local cohesion = .15) 
  
High global brokerage (left), high local cohesion (right) (Chemistry, 1990.  
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this is that the first four networks are generally bigger compared to the last three networks. In this 
specific research setting, this means that these networks are generally denser, which makes it more 
difficult to obtain a brokerage position for individual consortia. 
 The density of the consortium networks observed in this chapter can be deduced from the 
pictures in Figure 3 that provide illustrations of consortia having different combinations between 
global brokerage and local cohesion (i.e. low-low, low-high, high-low and high-high). Based on a 
focal consortium, both the complete network in which this consortium is embedded, and its ego 
network is shown (this focal consortium is marked in both networks by a dotted circle, connected 
by a dotted line). Although illustrative, we aimed at comparability when selecting consortia for 
those pictures. Outliers, for example, were not considered. A consortium was considered to score 
low on the variables of interest when this score ranged from the minimum observation to the mean 
score (global brokerage: .00 - .03; local closure: .06- .29). Our selection was biased towards the 
lower scores in this range. A consortium was considered to score high on the variables of interest 
when this score ranges from the mean score to one standard deviation above this mean score 
(global brokerage: .03 - .09; local closure: .29- .52). Once again, our selection was biased towards 
the higher scores in this range. In addition –for comparability purposes– we made sure that 
complete network sizes as well as the size of the ego network of the focal consortium were the 
same across different combinations. Especially the features of ego network size (larger networks 
are less constraining) and density (more dense networks are more constraining) that are considered 
are visible in the ego network pictures: generally, the ego networks that have low scores on 
constraint are bigger and less dense. 
Ordinal logistic regression results 
Results of the multilevel ordinal logistic regression results using the average scores across the five 
sample specifications can be found in Table 9 until Table 13 (with i ranging from 5 to 1). The 
coefficients of the variables of interest in these separate analyses are summarized in Table 14. 
Complementary to these tables, marginal effect displays for selected models are provided in Figure 
6 to aid effect interpretation. The logic behind displaying the selected effects will be explained as 
we proceed through discussing our hypotheses tests. With an eye on model convergence, all 
predictor variables were standardized. Consequently, each coefficient in the ordinal logistic 
regression tables represents the change in log odds when the corresponding predictor changes one 
unit, holding all other predictors at their average value. 
 Our results in general suggest that there are significant effects of both global brokerage as 
local cohesion on the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. The relevant 
coefficients in the models (summarized in Table 14) suggest that this interaction is present one year 
after the start of a consortium. In addition, whereas the effect of local cohesion is unidirectional 
and robust over time, the effect of global brokerage -even though unidirectional as well- is not 
significant for each lag specification. All in all, our results offer several interesting insights not 
expected based on our theoretical model. 
 The benefits and drawbacks of global brokerage have been brought together in a hypothesis 
that proposed a negative moderation effect of time on the positive relationship between complete 
network brokerage and the likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. It can be seen in Table 
14 that this significant negative effect is visible across time lags, although the coefficient is not 
significant 5, 3 and 1 year(s) before the evaluation of a consortium. The effect of global brokerage 
  
 






Results of ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+i), i=5 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[Innovative outcome = prototype]………... -.96*** (.27) -.89*** (.27) -.91*** (.27) -.93*** (.27) 
[Innovative outcome = product]………….. .81** (.27) .88*** (.27) .86** (.26) .85** (.27) 
1. Size………...…………………………... .36*** (.09) .34*** (.09) .37*** (.09) .39*** (.09) 
2. Duration……………………………….. .00 (.07) -.00 (.07) .00 (.07) -.00 (.07) 
3. Financial resources……...……………… .07 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) 
4. Consortium leader experiencet.….............. .00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.00 (.09) .01 (.09) 
5. Member relational experiencet.….............. -.02 (.09) -.00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.02 (.09) 
6. Geographical proximity….…..................... -.69** (.25) -.64* (.25) -.64* (.25) -.64* (.26) 
7. Geographical proximity2……..................... .62* (.27) .56* (.27) .56* (.27) .56* (.27) 
8. Technological diversity………….…….... .19 (.26) .18 (.26) .18 (.26) .19 (.26) 
9. Technological diversity2……………….... -.39 (.25) -.40 (.25) -.40 (.25) -.40 (.25) 
10. Global brokeragei=5……..……......……. -.11† (.07)  -.09 (.07) -.18† (.09) 
11. Local cohesioni=5……..…..…...……......  .18* (.08) .16* (.08) .18* (.08) 
12. 10 × 11………………….........................    .14 (.10) 
Deviance 1,676 1,674 1,672 1,670 
∆df - 0 1 2 
p (> χ2 ) - - .04* .04* 
Year variance 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 
Technology field variance 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.28 
note: n = 814. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †< .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses 
 






Results of ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+i), i=4 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[Innovative outcome = prototype]………... -.95*** (.27) -.89*** (.27) -.91*** (.27) -.92*** (.27) 
[Innovative outcome = product]………….. .82** (.27) .89*** (.27) .87** (.27) .87** (.27) 
1. Size………...…………………………... .35*** (.09) .34*** (.09) .36*** (.09) .40*** (.09) 
2. Duration……………………………….. -.00 (.07) -.00 (.07) -.01 (.07) -.01 (.07) 
3. Financial resources……...……………… .08 (.08) .08 (.08) .09 (.08) .07 (.08) 
4. Consortium leader experiencet.….............. .01 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.00 (.09) .00 (.09) 
5. Member relational experiencet.….............. -.03 (.09) .00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
6. Geographical proximity….…..................... -.68** (.25) -.65* (.25) -.65* (.25) -.65* (.25) 
7. Geographical proximity2……..................... .60* (.27) .57* (.27) .56* (.27) .57* (.27) 
8. Technological diversity………….…….... .18 (.26) .19 (.26) .19 (.26) .20 (.26) 
9. Technological diversity2……………….... -.39 (.25) -.40 (.25) -.39 (.25) -.42† (.25) 
10. Global brokeragei=4……..……......……. -.11 (.08)  -.08 (.08) -.22* (.10) 
11. Local cohesioni=4……..…..…...……......  .18* (.08) .16* (.08) .20* (.08) 
12. 10 × 11………………….........................    .23* (.10) 
Deviance 1,677 1,674 1,672 1,667 
∆df - 0 1 2 
p (> χ2 ) - - .04* .01** 
Year variance 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 
Technology field variance 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 
note: n = 814. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †< .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses 
 






Results of ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+i), i=3 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[Innovative outcome = prototype]………... -.98*** (.27) -.89*** (.27) -.93*** (.27) -.92*** (.27) 
[Innovative outcome = product]………….. .80** (.27) .89*** (.27) .86** (.27) .86** (.27) 
1. Size………...…………………………... .36*** (.09) .34*** (.09) .37*** (.09) .38*** (.09) 
2. Duration……………………………….. .00 (.07) .00 (.07) .00 (.07) .00 (.07) 
3. Financial resources……...……………… .07 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) 
4. Consortium leader experiencet.….............. -.00 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
5. Member relational experiencet.….............. -.02 (.09) -.00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
6. Geographical proximity….…..................... -.66** (.25) -.67** (.25) -.65* (.25) -.66** (.25) 
7. Geographical proximity2……..................... .59* (.27) .59* (.27) .57* (.27) .57* (.27) 
8. Technological diversity………….…….... .17 (.26) .20 (.26) .18 (.26) .19 (.26) 
9. Technological diversity2……………….... -.38 (.25) -.41 (.25) -.39 (.25) -.40 (.25) 
10. Global brokeragei=3……..……......……. -.17* (.08)  -.13† (.08) -.15† (.09) 
11. Local cohesioni=3……..…..…...……......  .19* (.08) .16* (.08) .18* (.08) 
12. 10 × 11………………….........................    .05 (.10) 
Deviance 1,674 1,673 1,669 1,669 
∆df - 0 1 2 
p (> χ2 ) - - .04* .10† 
Year variance 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 
Technology field variance 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.27 
note: n = 814. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †< .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses 
 






Results of ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+i), i=2 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[Innovative outcome = prototype]………... -.98*** (.27) -.89*** (.27) -.93*** (.27) -.94*** (.27) 
[Innovative outcome = product]………….. .80** (.27) .89*** (.27) .85** (.27) .85** (.27) 
1. Size………...…………………………... .36*** (.09) .35*** (.09) .38*** (.09) .41*** (.09) 
2. Duration……………………………….. -.00 (.07) .00 (.07) .00 (.07) -.00 (.07) 
3. Financial resources……...……………… .06 (.08) .08 (.08) .07 (.08) .07 (.08) 
4. Consortium leader experiencet.….............. -.01 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
5. Member relational experiencet.….............. -.02 (.09) -.00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
6. Geographical proximity….…..................... -.69** (.25) -.71** (.25) -.71** (.25) -.70** (.25) 
7. Geographical proximity2……..................... .61* (.27) .63* (.27) .63* (.27) .61* (.27) 
8. Technological diversity………….…….... .18 (.26) .21 (.26) .20 (.26) .21 (.26) 
9. Technological diversity2……………….... -.39 (.25) -.42† (.25) -.41 (.25) -.42† (.25) 
10. Global brokeragei=2……..……......……. -.18* (.08)  -.15† (.08) -.28** (.11) 
11. Local cohesioni=2……..…..…...……......  .18* (.07) .15* (.08) .19* (.08) 
12. 10 × 11………………….........................    .18† (.10) 
Deviance 1,673 1,673 1,669 1,665 
∆df - 0 1 2 
p (> χ2 ) - - .04* .02* 
Year variance 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 
Technology field variance 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.27 
note: n = 814. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †< .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses 
 






Results of ordinal logistic regression models predicting p(technological outcomest+i), i=1 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
[Innovative outcome = prototype]………... -.97*** (.27) -.89*** (.27) -.93*** (.27) -.93*** (.27) 
[Innovative outcome = product]………….. .80** (.27) .89*** (.27) .86** (.27) .86** (.27) 
1. Size………...…………………………... .36*** (.09) .35*** (.09) .37*** (.09) .39*** (.09) 
2. Duration……………………………….. .00 (.07) .00 (.07) .00 (.07) -.00 (.07) 
3. Financial resources……...……………… .07 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) .08 (.08) 
4. Consortium leader experiencet.….............. -.01 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.02 (.09) -.02 (.09) 
5. Member relational experiencet.….............. -.02 (.09) -.00 (.09) -.01 (.09) -.01 (.09) 
6. Geographical proximity….…..................... -.66** (.25) -.71** (.25) -.69** (.25) -.68** (.25) 
7. Geographical proximity2……..................... .58* (.27) .62* (.27) .60* (.27) .59* (.27) 
8. Technological diversity………….…….... .16 (.26) .21 (.26) .19 (.26) .20 (.26) 
9. Technological diversity2……………….... -.37 (.25) -.42† (.25) -.40 (.25) -.41 (.25) 
10. Global brokeragei=1……..……......……. -.15* (.07)  -.11 (.07) -.15† (.08) 
11. Local cohesioni=1……..…..…...……......  .20** (.07) .17* (.07) .20* (.08) 
12. 10 × 11………………….........................    .09 (.09) 
Deviance 1,675 1,672 1,669 1,668 
∆df - 0 1 2 
p (> χ2 ) - - .02* .04* 
Year variance 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.30 
Technology field variance 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 
note: n = 814. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †< .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses 
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TABLE 14 
Summary of results for models with varying lags i 
i Global brokerage Local cohesion Interaction effect 
5 -.18† (.09) .18* (.08) .14 (.10) 
4 -.22* (.10) .20* (.08) .23* (.10) 
3 -.15† (.09) .18* (.08) .05 (.10) 
2 -.28** (.11) .19* (.08) .18† (.10) 
1 -.15† (.08) .20* (.08) .09 (.09) 
 
on the likelihood of being in one of the three outcome categories after five years can further be 
seen in panel (a) of Figure 6: as global brokerage increases, the likelihood that consortium members 
get stuck in the larger search space (indicated by the ‘further development needed’-line) increases. 
This comes at the cost of both the likelihood of creating a prototype or realizing an innovation. 
The effect of time on this relationship is displayed in panels (c) and (d) of 4. Panel (c) shows the 
effect of global brokerage on the dependent variable for the two significant time lags: i=4 (4 years 
before consortium evaluation) and i=2 (idem, now 2 years). The steeper line for i=2 indicates that 
the negative effect of global brokerage is stronger at especially higher levels of global brokerage as 
the consortium comes closer to its moment of evaluation. Similarly, the chances on being 
innovative decreases more steeply for i=2, which can be seen in panel (d). Given the distribution 
of this variable, the confidence intervals broaden as the score on global brokerage increases. Yet, 
even when we consider the range in which most of the global brokerage scores fall (0-.10), the 
effect is salient, leading to about a 10% increase in the likelihood of getting in the class ‘further 
development needed’. Hence hypothesis 1 is not supported. Instead, we find a negative effect of 
global brokerage on innovation that is especially salient 4 and 2 years before evaluation. 
 With respect to local closure we hypothesized that in early stages of the consortium, it could 
lead to consortium members become trapped in local search activities, with a detrimental effect on 
innovation. As time progresses, this negative effect would reduce and eventually become positive. 
The positive coefficients of this variable in the lagged models (Table 14) show the effect of local 
cohesion to be consistently positive and significant over time. This is also demonstrated in panel 
(b) of 4: the chances on realizing the consortium’s initially envisioned outcomes increases as local 
cohesion increases, at the cost of the other two outcome categories. When this relationship was 
visualized over time (not displayed here), the patterns were strongly consistent with one another. 
Hence, we do not find support for hypothesis 2: although we find a generally positive effect of 
local cohesion on innovation, our expectations regarding its initially negative effect and the change 
of this effect over time were not confirmed based on our empirical analysis. 
 Our third hypothesis teases out whether global brokerage and local cohesion could have a 
mutually stimulating effect in generating innovation, especially after a consortium’s start and before 
its final stage. It is in this stage of the consortium that combining the results from a broad 
knowledge search and mobilizing the local environment of the consortium with the aim of 
implementing this knowledge can stimulate an innovative climate in the consortium, and with that 
its innovation outcomes. This effect is present for i=4 (i.e. 4 years before the consortium’s 
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FIGURE 6 






                                                 
17 Panels (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) are based on Model 4 from Table 10; panel (d) is based on Model 4, Table 12. 
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FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED) 
Marginal effects for significant coefficients (selection)17 
Global brokerage (further development needed) 
(c) 
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FIGURE 6 (CONTINUED) 
Marginal effects for significant coefficients (selection)17 
Interaction effect (prototype) 
(e) 
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outcomes are evaluated). The visualization of this effect tells an interesting story. Based on the 
outcome category ‘prototype’ (panel (e)) and ‘outcome realized’ (panel (f)), we deduct the following. 
With respect to the likelihood of generating a prototype, a clear ‘sweet spot’ is visible: the effect of 
local cohesion on the likelihood of generating a prototype increases as global brokerage increases, 
yet up to a certain point. After this point, this likelihood decreases. This inverted-u shape relation 
steepens as global brokerage further increases. With respect to the effect of cohesion on the 
likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes, the positive effect of local cohesion is 
amplified as global brokerage increases: when global brokerage = 0, a linear effect is observed. This 
effect transforms to an s-curve that gets steeper as global brokerage increases. Hence, global 
brokerage and local cohesion amplify one another towards the mid stage of a consortium. Although 
one can debate whether the second year still belongs to the initial stage of a consortium or to a 
later stage, we conclude that hypothesis 3 is supported. 
Robustness tests 
When comparing the analysis in the current chapter with the one performed in the previous 
chapter, a concern can be that the effect of network integration was not considered in the models 
presented in this chapter. We argued that including the network integration dummies would be at 
odds with the perspective of time-dependency taken in this chapter, and that the resulting 
differences in sample sizes used in both chapters would make comparison of results difficult. Yet, 
the model that includes complete network brokerage and local closure at the start of the consortium 
(i=5) most resembles the model presented in the previous chapter. When running this model 
including the network integration dummies (as well as the interactions between these dummies and 
geographical proximity and technological diversity), we find that the effects of global network 
brokerage and local cohesion as reported in Table 9 remain unchanged. None of the variables 
involving the network integration dummies is significant. The reduction in the size of the sample 
used in this chapter and that of the sample used in the previous chapter is the most likely 
explanation for this. 
 A second concern with the current analysis could be that the outliers observed in the global 
brokerage variable and -to a lesser extent- the constraint variable might drive significant results in 
the regression analysis (Zhang & Shaw, 2012). Using the IQR-rule, we replaced any outliers within 
a technology field and year combination with their median value for that combination. With Q1 
and Q3 being the 1st and third quartile and IQR being the interquartile range, this rule states that 
any observation that lies below Q1-1.5×IQR or above Q3+1.5×IQR can be considered an outlier. 
Repeating our analysis with the adjusted scores on global brokerage and local cohesion show robust 
effects with respect to the local cohesion variable. All significant terms involving the global 
brokerage variable, however, disappear. This underlines the value of including the inherently 
skewed betweenness centrality measure as operationalization of global brokerage: if including or 
not including outliers in the analysis is decisive for finding significant effects for global brokerage, 
this means that especially consortia with extreme values on this variable have a higher likelihood 
of generating innovative outcomes. In other words: only those consortia that have a network 
position that comes closest to Burt’s (1992) original conception of brokerage are more innovative. 
 A third concern that we consider here is that the betweenness centrality measure is too 
restricted due to its exclusive focus on shortest paths. It might very well be that knowledge follows 
a more circuitous route, for example because of random communication or through intentional 
channelling via many intermediaries (Freeman, Borgatti, & White, 1991). Consequently, the 
betweenness measure might be unrealistic in its characterization of knowledge flows. We therefore 
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also ran an analysis in which the betweenness measure was replaced by the flow betweenness 
measure. Contrary to betweenness centrality, this measure captures the overall knowledge flow 
between pairs of consortia along all the paths that connect both consortia (Freeman et al., 1991). 
Our analysis results are similar across all time lags for the effects of cohesion and the interaction 
effects but differ from the ones summarized in Table 14 with respect to betweenness centrality: 
only the negative effect of global brokerage for i=4 remains significant, the other significant effect 
for i=2 disappears. This does not change our initial findings much, however, else than that the 
negative effect (as opposed to the positive effect that was hypothesized) of global brokerage is not 
salient any longer as the consortium comes closer to its end. 
 A last, minor concern could be that the measure used for local cohesion was normalized to 
eliminate scores that exceeded one (Foss et al., 2015). However, using the non-normalized scores 
of the constraint measure did not change our results. 
3.5 Discussion and conclusion 
In this chapter, we took on the challenge of incorporating the effect of network position in 
networks of different orders on the likelihood of generating innovation and the role of time in the 
salience of this effect. We argued that initially, members of R&D consortia need to capitalize on 
the role of networks as pipes. In other words, initially access to distant information types about the 
distribution of knowledge elements or know-how in a certain technology field, as well as access to 
the latest developments and trends in this field needed to be ensured by being in a global brokerage 
position. Secondly, we argued that as the consortium progresses, the role of networks as prisms 
becomes more important. With the artefact that is developed in a consortium being matured, 
activation of members of neighbouring consortia becomes important, to embed the artefact in an 
existing technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982). It is in this stage where occupying a locally close 
position in the network is important as it enables knowing who to activate in this stage. Third, and 
lastly, we argued that somewhere amid the course of the R&D consortium, global brokerage and 
local closure positively interact with one another, as the benefits of global brokerage outweigh the 
drawbacks of local closure, and vice versa. 
 Using a dataset that included 814 Dutch R&D consortia dispersed over 7 distinct 
technology fields, our findings sketched a slightly different picture. Global brokerage, with 
interruptions, tends to negatively affect the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia regardless of 
developmental stage. Local closure, on the other hand, consistently has a positive effect in the 
innovative outcomes of R&D consortia over time. As we expected, both features indeed positively 
interact with one another, just after the consortium’s starting year. 
Theoretical and practical implications 
With this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature on organizational networks in two related 
ways. First, we add to the debate on brokerage and closure in networks that it is especially the 
combination of global brokerage and local closure in early stages of an R&D consortium that is 
beneficial for the innovative potential of this consortium. Hence, brokerage and closure are 
complements rather than mutually exclusive, which is in line with Burt’s (2005) suggestion. Our 
study shows the importance of unravelling network structural effects, as it suggests that the effects 
of the local network position of a consortium on its innovative performance differs compared to 
the effect of a consortium’s global network position. 
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In the consortium networks that we study in this chapter, global brokerage is a hampering rather 
than a stimulating factor for innovation. A possible explanation for this could be that the early 
stages of idea generation and elaboration (Perry-Smith & Mannucci, 2017) already are behind the 
consortium members once the consortium starts. In other words, search does not play an 
important role anymore once a consortium starts, and the hypothesized positive effect of global 
brokerage cannot be observed simply because we do not observe these initial search stages. Instead, 
idea gestation time already has progressed when we start observing the consortia, and the flipping 
point from a positive effect to a negative effect of global brokerage has already occurred. This is 
also demonstrated by the interaction effect between brokerage and closure, which occurs relatively 
early in the existence of a consortium. 
 The literature suggests that this negative effect of brokerage on innovative outcomes can 
be explained because of the myopia that stems from occupying brokerage positions. For example, 
Flynn and Wiltermuth (2010) suggest that high brokerage is associated with the information that is 
exchange being superficial. Because the power that comes with such a brokerage position also is 
likely to make the broker weaker in perspective taking, such brokers might be more likely to assume 
that the agreement they share with others, for example the agreement resulting from knowledge 
arbitrage activities, is higher than what is warranted. This leads to an overestimation of the extent 
to which the broker’s technology is being embedded in the network. Other authors propose 
alternative explanations for the negative effect of brokerage, for example by proposing that instead 
of network brokers, peripheral actors have a stake in the diffusion of their technology instead. 
Whereas peripheral actors consider this an opportunity to improve their network position, brokers 
may diffuse only in the presence of a new practice that could possibly disrupt the existing network 
order (Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi, 2014). This suggests that brokerage might be especially beneficial 
under conditions of technological turmoil instead of technological stability (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990). 
 The limited role of search at the start of a consortium also might be an explanation for the 
consistent positive effect on innovation by the cohesion of a consortium’s ego network. What is 
interesting about this is that apparently the creation of trust and circulation of fine-grained 
information do not need time to develop in such networks. At the same time, it is not realistic to 
assume that these mechanisms will come into play instantly the moment a consortium starts. An 
alternative explanation for the positive effect of local closure from the start of a consortium, 
especially in the context of technological innovation, could be found in the informal mechanism 
of trading know-how between those involved in R&D. As von Hippel (1988) suggests, as long as 
the knowledge being exchanged does not seem to be vital to the competitive position of the sender 
and the receiver of knowledge seems to be a potentially useful expert who might be of future value, 
technological know-how will be exchanged between consortia. Hence, the more joint member ties 
a consortium has, the higher the likelihood of knowledge exchange and its subsequent chance of 
generating innovation. Cohesive joint member ties could also point at the existence of a transactive 
memory system between consortia, which leads to an enhanced collective memory of task 
knowledge and coordination which in turn enhances innovation (Lewis & Herndon, 2011). 
 Our second contribution with this chapter is that we show that the direct effects of 
brokerage and closure in this specific setting are time-invariant. With this insight, we contribute to 
the contingency view on brokerage and closure: for R&D consortia to come fully to fruition, these 
consortia need dense local networks and in general should avoid obtaining a brokerage position in 
the complete network of consortia. An additional secondary finding here is that the network 
positions of R&D consortia studied in this chapter do not fluctuate much over time. An implicit 
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assumption underlying our theory was that fluctuation in the network position would be the case 
for some consortia, as our arguments for innovative R&D consortia drew on a switch from global 
brokerage initially to local closure in later stages. Other studies have shown such network migration 
patterns, where nodes that started in the relative periphery of a future core technology moved more 
towards the core of the network throughout the years (Ahuja et al., 2014). As this is not the case 
for the consortia focused at in this chapter, testing the time aspect of our theoretical framework 
has proven to be challenging. 
 Our study offers insights for practice as well. First, the results show that positive network 
effects for R&D consortia occur at the first network order. This is a part of the network that can 
still be controlled by these members. This insight opens the door for active bottom-up network 
management. This can be achieved by, for example, a targeted selection of members active in other 
consortia, to establish cross-consortium links and, with that, enhance the cohesion of the focal 
consortium’s ego network. Second, by focusing on the interaction between global brokerage and 
local cohesion and its associated time dimension, our results suggest that members of R&D 
consortia -in addition to building a dense local network- benefit from brokerage positions in the 
complete network in the consortium’s early stages. This brokerage position, however, is difficult 
to manage by members of individual consortia. Managing this part of the network could be a task 
for innovation policy. As indicated earlier, interorganizational knowledge networks are important 
for innovation. Although this insight has been adopted by innovation policy, most policy measures 
are relatively untargeted and happen out of the control of those positioned in these networks 
(Meeus et al., 2008). Our results suggest that policy should more directly target these networks, 
through developing measures that aim at stimulating network brokerage for newly started R&D 
consortia, as well as stimulating enough structural dynamics in these networks for these consortia 
not to get trapped in this network position without being able to change this position. 
 Another implication of our results is that indeed, activation of members of neighbouring 
consortia might aid consortia to yield more innovative results. The question, however, is that local 
cohesion involves many assumptions: first, consortium members must know that they are 
embedded in a cohesive ego network. Second, they must act upon being positioned in such a 
cohesive network and third, they must have the coordinating abilities to do so to reap the 
innovative benefits of such a position. Hence, another implication for consortia leaders and 
members is that they should engage in mapping their local network environment to become aware 
and eventually follow a tertius iungens strategy to increase the chance of generating innovative 
outcomes (Lingo & O'Mahony, 2010). 
Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research 
One of the strengths of our study is that it employs a large-scale dataset in exploring the role of 
time in the relation between global brokerage and local closure and the likelihood of generating 
innovation. This required a large-scale data collection effort yet makes that this study distinguishes 
itself from other work that relies on cross-sectional approaches. In addition, although the role of 
brokerage often has been studied in sparse networks (Ho & Pollack, 2014), the results of our 
robustness test show the value of using the -inherently skewed- measure of betweenness centrality 
for capturing brokerage in more dense networks. Excluding outliers in this variable in our analysis 
was decisive in finding significant effects, which means that especially consortia with extreme 
values on this variable have a higher likelihood of generating innovative outcomes. In other words: 
only those consortia that have a network position that comes closest to Burt’s (1992) original 
conception of brokerage are more likely to generate innovative outcomes. 
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One of this study’s limitations is that -despite the sample size employed and number of distinct 
technology fields- it focuses on a specific type of collaboration in a specific geographic context: 
funded consortia in the Dutch context that focus on public-private interaction. This raises the 
concern of generalizability to other settings. Hence, future research should focus on replicating this 
study’s findings, for example for other types of collaborations and in other geographic settings. 
 Another limitation of this study is that the measures used for global brokerage and local 
cohesion are proxies for the mechanisms of access (networks as pipes) and activation (networks as 
prisms) that form the basis of our theoretical argument. Hence, even though both measures capture 
the structural position of a consortium, they do not capture the actual behaviour of consortium 
members. Hence, future research should focus this behaviour, for example by sampling consortia 
based on their network position and unravelling how this position relates to the behaviour of 
consortium members. 
 Although the dataset used in this chapter has several advantages, we believe that its 
potential is not fully tapped into yet. For example, it offers ample opportunities for further in-
depth studies. In the current analysis, we employed a structuralist view on innovation. Further 
research could consider the functioning of joint consortium ties, and what exactly flows through 
it. Both tie functioning and flow have been suggested to be the most important platform for further 
theorizing relations (Daskalaki, 2010; Soda, Stea, et al., 2017). In addition, it would be interesting 
to further focus at the distinct technology fields, and to examine the extent to which the positive 
effects of local cohesion spill-over to other consortia in the ego-network (Clement, Shipilov, & 
Galunic, 2017). Lastly, it would be interesting to further explore tie multiplexity, by examining 
multiple networks between consortium members (Sasson, 2008). Also, especially to aid policy 
development, it would be interesting to devise an experiment in which nodes follow distinct 
network migration patterns and relate these patterns to their innovative outcomes. 
 All in all, by exploring the role of time in the relation between global brokerage and local 
closure, our study offers valuable insights and hints for leveraging R&D consortium networks, 
both for the bottom-up management of these consortia by their members and the top-down 
management of consortium networks by policy. By teasing out the effects of both predictors, their 
interaction and the role of time, this study underlines the importance of unravelling network 
structural effects across network order and time.  
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Appendix I: Incorporating Mergers, Spin-offs and Aggregation Differences 
When constructing the table that contained all organizations that participated in the users 
committee in one or more consortia in the time frame 1981-2004, we reduced an initial list of 
15,539 organizational listings to a list containing 2,634 unique organizations. Two main issues are 
worth describing here. The first issue arose from organizational mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs 
and the like that took place in the observed time frame (1981-2004). An example of a sequence of 
mergers that eventually led to the merger of 6 distinct organizations in 1980 to one organization in 
2000 is illustrated in Figure 8. Shown are changes in organizational entities because of mergers of 
several seed companies that were active in the Netherlands. Initially, three companies were active: 
Zaadunie, Syngenta Seeds and Mogen International B.V. In the early 1990s, Zaadunie was taken 
over by Sluis & Groot Seeds B.V., which in turn merged into Novartis Seeds in 1996. Novartis 
later merged with AstraZeneca into Syngenta Seeds. A similar pattern can be seen for Mogen 
International B.V., which first got acquired by AstraZeneca, and in turn merged with Novartis 
Seeds into Syngenta Seeds18. 
FIGURE 7 
Merger history of several seed companies involved in one or more consortia 
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Sluis & Groot Seeds B.V. 
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AstraZeneca 
                
                
Mogen International B.V. 
                
                
 
Such changes over time in organizational entities had 2 main consequences. First, consortium size 
was affected because of these organizational changes. Second, consortium member turnover took 
place. For example, the take-over of Zaadunie by Sluis & Groot Seeds depicted in Figure 7 resulted 
in the replacement of Zaadunie by Sluis & Groot Seeds in the user committee of the consortium. 
This could also lead to a joint member link with a consortium that was previously unconnected, 
because Sluis & Groot might already be involved in another consortium. Obviously also other 
types of organizational change could affect both consortium membership and joint member ties 
with other consortia. 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that the years reported are not always accurate in terms of the exact years in which the 
organizational entities mentioned changed. AstraZeneca, for example, was founded in 1999. Because the funding 
organization reported projects five years after the start of the project, it could occur that AstraZeneca did exist in the 
year the report was written, and hence was mentioned as a user in a project that started in a year AstraZeneca did not 
exist yet. It was very well possible, however, that other project evaluations in the same year still mentioned its 
predecessor, Mogen International B.V. To synchronize these differences, we included the starting years of the projects 
in which the new name of an organizational entity appeared for the first time rather than the actual year of occurrence 
of this new entity. 
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The funding agency usually reported new names of existing organizations once the change in name 
took place. If the changes in organizational entities would not be accounted for, different identifiers 
would be assigned to the same organization, and over time more unique organizations would be 
represented than the amount of organizations that existed. In turn, with the data not being 
normalized fully, errors would occur with respect to counting the number of project members at a 
certain point in time, as well as with respect to specifying joint member ties between consortia. 
 We addressed this issue as follows. For each organization, not only a unique identifier was 
assigned to the name of that organization, but also a time frame during which the organization 
carried a certain name was specified. For organizations that did not undergo any change in the 
years in which the evaluation reports were issued, one record for that organization sufficed, with a 
time frame starting in 1980 and ending in the year 9999. Including the change histories of each 
organization, the table with organizations contained 3,044 records. For sake of illustration we show 
this coding system in Table 15. For organizations that did undergo changes over the years, this 
approach enabled us to construct organizational change records. The organization that started as 
Zaadunie, for example, got assigned the unique identifier (main id) of 2 in our example in. Although 
this unique identifier was not allowed to change for this specific entity, the names assigned to this 
entity could change. To facilitate this, each name was assigned a sub-identifier (sub id) as well as a 
time frame during which the name occurred. Whereas the unique identifier was linked to a unique 
entity, the sub-identifier was linked to a unique name, and hence could occur multiple times in the 
table as can be seen for Syngenta Seeds. 
TABLE 15 
Sample table containing organizational change records 
main id sub id name from till 
1 1.01 Syngenta Seeds 1980 9999 
2 2.01 Zaadunie 1980 1994 
2 2.02 Sluis & Groot Seeds B.V. 1994 1997 
2 2.03 Novartis Seeds 1997 2001 
2 1.01 Syngenta Seeds 2001 9999 
3 3.01 Mogen International B.V. 1980 1997 
3 3.02 AstraZeneca 1997 1999 
3 1.01 Syngenta Seeds 1999 9999 
 
The organization of Table 15 enabled a selection of the actual number of unique organizations 
present in each year. For example, listing the organizations that were present in 1984 could be done 
by specifying a query that selected only the unique records, based on the sub id-field, that included 
the year 1984 in the bandwidth that was specified by the ‘from’ and ‘till’ fields. This would yield 
three organizations: Syngenta Seeds, Zaadunie and Mogen International B.V. and is consistent with 
Figure 7. Should this search be applied to the year 1999, only two unique sub-id’s (1.01 and 2.03) 
would be identified, and hence two organizational entities would be included in assigning project 
membership and determination of inter-project ties. 
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The second issue we encountered while constructing the organization table was that variations 
existed in terms of the extent to which distinct parts of an organization were reported. Not only 
did this occur with respect to parent organizations and their subsidiaries, it also applied in other 
cases such as businesses and their business units, research organizations and their knowledge 
centres and ministries, their directorate-generals and implementation agencies. Pinpointing a level 
of organization that was homogeneous across all these different levels proved to be a challenging 
task. The issue of homogenizing the level at which organizations are specified is addressed in the 
alliance literature for parent-subsidiary relations. Here, the common approach is to specify 
subsidiaries at the level of the parent organization (Ahuja, 2000a; Schilling & Phelps, 2007; 
Vanhaverbeke, Gilsing, & Duysters, 2012). This approach, labelled ‘head office assignment’ by 
Birkinshaw, Hood, and Jonsson (1998), is based on the premise that the parent organization to a 
large extent understands and controls all value creating processes that take place within the 
enterprise (Ciabuschi, Forsgren, & Martín, 2011) and is responsible for defining the overall strategic 
objectives and the alliances that follow from these objectives. Determination of where these 
strategies and alliances in turn will be implemented within the enterprise is of minor importance. 
This integrative view on strategy formation and implementation implies that the strategy of a 
subsidiary thus is strongly affected by its parent (Birkinshaw et al., 1998; Faems et al., 2005), 
implying that the subsidiary is no more than an executing agent of the parent and all outcomes of 
the alliance in the end accrue to the parent. For this reason, it should be the parent rather than the 
subsidiary that should be seen as the appropriate alliance partner. 
 A competing perspective, labelled ‘subsidiary choice’ by Birkinshaw et al. (1998) assigns a 
bigger role to the subsidiary and its management in determining its strategy. Here, subsidiary 
management is assumed to understand the capabilities and market of the subsidiary better than the 
parent organization. This is one of the ‘raison d’êtres’ of the parent-subsidiary structure. The 
subsidiary thus has more autonomy and might even be mandated for pursuing new strategic 
directions and initiating collaborations with other actors Birkinshaw et al. (1998). Rather than 
integrating all strategic decisions, these decisions are differentiated based on the subdivision of 
tasks within the organization that was deemed necessary. With the subsidiary having a more 
autonomous role, it seems more appropriate to use the subsidiary rather than the parent as the 
appropriate alliance partner. 
 In normalizing the table with organizations, we decided to combine both perspectives by 
letting the data reported by the funding agency speak for itself: when organizational business units 
were reported, this apparently meant that for this specific consortium that business unit was 
mandated and in turn was responsible for project participation and knowledge exchange. When, 
on the other hand, a parent organization was mentioned as a participant of a consortium, this 
apparently meant that the consortium was of strategic importance for the whole enterprise, and 
hence the parent should be interpreted as the relevant actor in that consortium19. The same was 
done for research institutions and ministries, which ensured that in the end all nodes were specified 
at the level at which knowledge exchange was most likely to happen. This also allowed us to keep 
as close as possible to the original data reported.  
                                                 
19 Because of the dual-reporting system, it might happen that in the interim report the name of the subsidiary was 
reported, while in the utilization report the parent company was used. In these situations, we specified the organization 
at the level of the subsidiary for both reports. 
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Appendix II: Check of Parallel Regression Assumption 
An important assumption underlying ordinal logistic regression is that the coefficients that describe 
the relationship between the lowest versus all higher categories of the response are similar to those 
describing the relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories, and so forth. 
When this parallel regression assumption (or the assumption of proportional odds) holds, it is 
possible to use only one set of coefficients to describe the relationship between each pair of 
outcome groups instead of using different sets of coefficients. Although statistical tests are available 
for testing the assumption of parallel regression, they have been criticized for being extremely 
lenient with respect to rejecting the null hypothesis (i.e. the sets of coefficients are the same), 
indicating that the parallel regression assumption does not hold even in cases where it actually does 
hold (Harrell, 2001; Peterson & Harrell, 1990). In addition, formal tests are not readily available for 
multilevel models. In this Appendix, we therefore follow an alternative informal approach, using 
linear predictions from a logit model. To check the parallel regression assumption on its tenability, 
the assumption is relaxed by predicting the probability that, for each level of the dependent variable, 
this variable is greater than or equal to a given value using one independent variable at a time. When 
the assumption of parallel regression holds, the difference in logits between different levels of the 
dependent variable should be the same at all levels of the independent variable (Harrell, 2001). 
 Table 16 shows the linear predicted values that would be obtained if the innovative 
outcome variable was regressed on the independent variables one at a time, without the assumption 
of parallel regression. This assumption now can be evaluated by running a series of binary logistic 
regressions that vary in cut-off points for the innovative outcome variable and checking the equality 
of coefficients across these cut-off points. This is achieved by first transforming the original ordinal 
innovative outcomes variable into a new binary variable that equals zero if the original ordinal 
dependent variable is less than 2 (“further development needed”) and 1 if this variable is greater 
than or equal to 2 (“prototype” and “outcome realized”). The coefficients resulting from this 
regression are shown in column ‘y>=2’ in Table 16. Second, a new binary variable is created that 
equals zero if the original ordinal dependent variable is less than 3 (“further development needed” 
and “prototype”) and 1 if this variable is greater than or equal to 3 (“outcome realized”). The logits 
that result from this regression are shown in column ‘y>=3’ in Table 16. The distance in logits 
between different cut-off points for the innovative outcome variables should be roughly the same 
at all levels of the predictor variable, as this means that the distance between slopes is equal or in 
other words, the slopes are parallel. These distances are calculated in the column ‘∆’. The column 
‘∆max – ∆min’ shows the difference between the largest and smallest distance between logits. 
 Other than the technology field dummies and duration, differences between distances are 
similar for all predictors, although the last column in Table 16 suggests several large differences 
between the maximum and minimum distance scores. However, often these are caused by one 
extreme score in a series of otherwise consistent differences (for example, see Global brokeragei=5). 
Since our multi-level model considers differences between fields by estimating separate intercepts 
and duration is a non-significant control, potential issues with these predictors can be dismissed. 
Apart from Duration, we therefore conclude that the parallel regression assumption is likely to be 
satisfied for each predictor separately.  
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TABLE 16 
Results of parallel regression assumption test 
Variable Range n y>=2 y>=3 ∆ ∆max - ∆min 
Technology field  
1 154 .261 -1.548 1.810 
1.042 
2 55 1.771 -.405 2.176 
3 136 1.060 -.606 1.666 
4 159 1.124 -.606 1.730 
5 208 .174 -1.316 1.489 
6 27 1.050 -1.482 2.531 
7 75 1.562 .027 1.536 
Year  
[1991,1996) 259 .664 -.824 1.488 
.242 
[1996,1998) 153 1.215 -.330 1.545 
[1998,2001) 261 .984 -.745 1.730 
[2001,2002] 141 .014 -1.584 1.598 
Size  
[-1.442,-.143) 315 .392 -1.111 1.504 
.459 
-.143 172 .949 -.836 1.785 
.29 127 .927 -.399 1.326 
[.723, 8.086] 200 1.020 -.619 1.639 
Duration  
-0.585 540 .693 -.769 1.462 
1.430 
0.51 164 .767 -.972 1.740 
1.604 78 .693 -.693 1.386 
2.699 20 2.197 -.619 2.816 
3.793 5 1.386 -1.386 2.773 
4.888 7 .288 -1.792 2.079 
Financial resources  
[-1.487,-.631) 204 .418 -.829 1.246 
.586 
[-.631,-.212) 203 .941 -.869 1.809 
[-.212, .362) 204 .715 -.606 1.321 
[.362, 8.972] 203 .892 -.941 1.833 
Consortium leader 
experience 
-.647 422 .647 -.911 1.559 
.111 [-.0632, 1.1052) 277 .849 -.715 1.564 
[1.1052, 5.7784] 115 .786 -.667 1.453 
Member relational 
experience 
-.494 541 .688 -.912 1.600 
.392 -.018 89 .727 -.481 1.208 
[.4576, 6.6425] 184 .879 -.677 1.555 
Geographical proximity  
[-2.056,-.359) 213 .736 -.757 1.493 
.370 
[-.359, .163) 197 .530 -.826 1.355 
[.163, .692) 206 .985 -.643 1.628 
[.692, 1.208] 198 .693 -1.032 1.726 
Technological diversity  
[-.965,-.590) 238 .796 -.662 1.458 
.446 
[-.59,-.285) 178 .940 -.753 1.693 
[-.285, .284) 237 .770 -.952 1.722 
[.284, 2.532] 161 .390 -.886 1.276 
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Table 16 (CONTINUED) 
Results of parallel regression assumption test 
Variable Range n y>=2 y>=3 ∆ ∆max - ∆min 
Global brokeragei=5 
-.387 349 .884 -.871 1.755 
.415 
-.247 174 .542 -.799 1.340 
[-.106, .174) 137 .617 -.748 1.366 
[.174,13.648] 154 .732 -.732 1.465 
Local cohesioni=5 
[-1.02,-.635) 233 .573 -1.082 1.655 
.508 
[-.635,-.298) 182 .588 -.710 1.297 
[-.298, .329) 197 .640 -.802 1.442 
[.329, 3.461] 202 1.193 -.613 1.806 
Global brokeragei=4 
-.406 359 .857 -.857 1.713 
.416 
-.240  166 .595 -.702 1.297 
-.074  92 .879 -.488 1.366 
[.0927,16.2107] 197 .574 -.974 1.547 
Local cohesioni=4 
[-.994,-.652) 208 .552 -1.048 1.600 
.537 
[-.652,-.262) 221 .567 -.748 1.315 
[-.262, .324) 186 .717 -.767 1.484 
[.324, 3.544] 199 1.174 -.678 1.852 
Global brokeragei=3 
-.470 351 .920 -.851 1.772 
.621 
-.273 168 .511 -.640 1.151 
[-.077, .316) 140 .526 -.780 1.306 
[.316, 9.545] 155 .772 -.925 1.697 
Local cohesioni=3 
[-.978,-.617) 223 .640 -.932 1.572 
.537 
[-.617,-.307) 185 .474 -.886 1.360 
[-.307, .364) 215 .771 -.624 1.395 
[.364, 3.823] 191 1.092 -.805 1.897 
Global brokeragei=2 
-.387 342 .870 -.842 1.711 
.609 
-.229 169 .347 -.756 1.103 
[-.0708, .2450) 162 .986 -.665 1.652 
[.245,15.4055] 141 .630 -.961 1.591 
Local cohesioni=2 
[-1.005,-.593) 235 .586 -.919 1.506 
.528 
[-.593,-.284) 174 .591 -.880 1.472 
[-.284, .333) 215 .645 -.728 1.373 
[.333, 3.832] 190 1.199 -.701 1.900 
Global brokeragei=1 
-.486 329 .843 -.887 1.730 
.576 
-.263 193 .453 -.701 1.154 
-.040 103 .752 -.752 1.504 
[.1836,11.3377] 189 .840 -.815 1.655 
Local cohesioni=1 
[-1.005,-.599) 230 .629 -1.019 1.648 
.550 
[-.599,-.294) 179 .373 -.920 1.293 
[-.294, .366) 209 .773 -.665 1.438 
[.366, 3.769] 196 1.211 -.633 1.843 
Overall  814 .734 -.808 1.542  
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4. Do Network Dynamics Differ Between Technology Fields? 
Describing Complete Network Dynamics Using Network 
States and State Changes20 
Abstract 
Existing literature suggests a differentiated development of networks in different technology fields. 
However, innovation policy often displays a homogeneous approach towards structuring these 
networks and ensuring network viability. The question if interorganizational technology field 
networks differ in their development is therefore open for further exploration. By considering both 
network structural characteristics and the node set that comprises a network, we propose an 
analytical framework that revolves around the concept ‘network state’. We conceptualize a network 
state as a configuration of values in a five-dimensional state space –network centralization, network 
density, network size, the numbers of exiting nodes, and entrants– that captures all possible 
network states. This model of network states is used to explore the evolution of 7 distinct field 
networks of consortia over 23 years, using a latent profile analysis. This method allows a mapping 
of all possible dynamics of a network through tracing a sequence of state changes over time. Our 
findings reveal that network dynamics unfold over sequences of changes in five distinct states: 
formation, growth, stagnation, stability and disintegration. We find a core sequence of state changes 
of formation, via growth, to stability, but also find variations on and extensions of this pathway. 
The most important finding is that field network dynamics are anything but homogeneous. We 
find considerable differences in the duration of states across consortium networks in different 
technology fields. Based on the obtained insights, we formulate policy recommendations as a first 
step towards a more targeted and differentiated management of complete interorganizational 
technology networks. 
4.1 Introduction 
The adage that in order to adapt to fast changing environments, generating innovation through 
networked collaboration is key (Birkinshaw, Bessant, & Delbridge, 2007; Jarvenpaa & Välikangas, 
2014; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996) has resonated well with policy 
makers. Driven by the philosophy that stimulating joint research and development between 
research institutions and industrial organizations is one of the key drivers of economic growth 
(Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Meeus et al., 2008), governmental policies 
especially target the creation and consolidation of public-private links. Such policies aim for 
example at stimulating public-private mobility, public-private research consortia, and exchange and 
interaction between public and private organizations (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016; Meeus et al., 2008; 
Peterman et al., 2014; Salter & Martin, 2001). 
 In addition to the stimulation of collaboration between public and private organizations, a 
key task for policy is to maintain network viability, which boils down to sustain the inflow of new 
nodes in a network. Node entry impacts network viability in several ways, for example through 
adding diversity to existing network populations, enlarging partnering opportunities and signalling 
the value of new technological opportunities (Meeus et al., 2008). In addition to node entry, 
network size and nodes that exit a network have policy implications. Both aspects can be 
                                                 
20 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the 3rd Amsterdam Workshop on Social Networks and 
Organizations (Amsterdam, June 2013) and the 31st EGOS Colloquium (Athens, July 2015). 
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considered as gauges for network viability: whereas size reflects the attractiveness of a technology 
network, node exits is an indicator of –amongst others– its level of competition. Gauging both 
viability features aids policy makers in avoiding bottlenecks, such as lock-in effects or the 
emergence of competitive barriers to collaboration and innovation (Rondé, 2001). 
 Hence, government has an important role in the formation and subsequent dynamics of 
interorganizational networks geared towards technological development (Peterman et al., 2014). 
However, an important issue that warrants further exploration of the dynamics of such networks 
is that, whereas current innovation policy assumes that field network dynamics are homogeneous 
(Meeus et al., 2008), other literature on industrial dynamics suggests that these field network 
dynamics are heterogeneous instead. For example, it has since long been acknowledged that the 
most appropriate type of instrument aimed at stimulating innovation and technological change 
depends on sectoral patterns of production and use of innovations (Kivimaa & Kern, 2016; Pavitt, 
1984). Although the organization of innovative activities within sectors is known to be rather 
homogeneous, profound differences with respect to this organization have been detected across 
sectors (Audretsch, 1997; Gort & Klepper, 1982; Lechevalier et al., 2014; Leiponen & Drejer, 2007; 
Luo, 2003; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1996; Pavitt, 1984). Some sectors, for example, are shaped by high 
degrees of knowledge accumulation, whereas others can be characterized by a sustained level of 
knowledge diversification (Alkemade, Heimeriks, Schoen, Villard, & Laurens, 2015). Considering 
that a link has been suggested between the structural and dynamic properties of the firm population 
of a sector and its underlying technology field (van Dijk, 2000), we expect developmental 
differences between networks that form and develop in different technology fields. 
 If network development is heterogeneous across technology fields, this implies that policy 
measures should be tailored to the specific developmental features of such technology field 
networks. However, such tailoring of policy to the field network and technological dynamics is not 
without constraints. Some authors have criticized the idea that networks can be rationally steered, 
and pose that the processes that drive network formation and subsequent dynamics can be far less 
coherent, controllable and rational than contended (Doz et al., 2000; Knights, Murray, & Willmott, 
1993). This implies that policy has a limited role in early stages of network formation and 
development. Another group of scholars suggests that once networks have formed serendipitously, 
network members can become aware of one another and develop shared goals (Moretti & Zirpoli, 
2016). The interdependencies that result from working towards these shared goals allow for more 
targeted policy interventions and coordination (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). This suggests that –
depending on the pace and nature of network dynamics– there is a time for policy to let network 
development take its course, and a time to more actively steer this development. This timing, 
however, could be different for different technology fields. 
 Even when different pacing of field network and technology development is acknowledged, 
and ‘planned change approaches’ are no longer prevailing in innovation policy, it remains surprising 
how uniform policies for different technology fields are. Differentiation in policies for distinct 
fields and technologies, is surprisingly absent when one considers the measures available to 
governments for stimulating interaction between public and private organizations and sustaining 
network viability. As Meeus et al. (2008) observe, the bulk of measures available to governments, 
such as funding schemes or innovation platforms (Kivimaa & Virkamäki, 2014; Klein Woolthuis 
et al., 2005; Magro & Wilson, 2013; Meeus et al., 2008) draw upon generic network mechanisms 
without taking into account the developmental stage of a network. To what extent 
interorganizational technology networks differ in their development, however, remains a question 
that is open for further exploration. In this chapter, we investigate this question and present a 
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method for describing the dynamics of such networks. This method in turn is applied to come to 
a comparison of seven distinct technology field networks. 
 To develop our model of state changes in field networks over time, we build on a research 
literature that explains causes and consequences, and typologies of organizational network 
development. First and foremost this literature refers to the nodes that comprise a network, the 
ties that connect those nodes and the structure that results from these connections (Ahuja et al., 
2012, p. 435). Existing research on the topic of interorganizational network dynamics, seems to be 
biased towards drivers of tie formation between organizations. For example, scholars have 
explained tie formation as a function of attributes of the organizations involved (Ahuja, 2000b; 
Ahuja, Polidoro, & Mitchell, 2009; Baum et al., 2005; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Shipilov et al., 
2011; Walker et al., 1997; Yue, 2012), relational attributes (Gimeno, 2004; Hallen, 2008; Li & 
Rowley, 2002; Rosenkopf, Metiu, & George, 2001; Shipilov & Li, 2012; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 
2013b), network structural features (Garcia-Pont & Nohria, 2002; Jiang, Jun, Cannella, & Xiao, 
2017) or a combination of said predictors (Giuliani, 2013; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Kenis & Knoke, 
2002; Lomi & Pattison, 2006; Lusher et al., 2013; Snijders, 2001). In addition to explaining tie 
formation, scholars have considered the dynamics of ties after they have been forged, for example 
tie dissolution (Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010; Greve, Mitsuhashi, & Baum, 2013; 
Hernandez et al., 2014; Rogan, 2014; Yue, 2012), tie persistence (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 
2004; Dahlander & McFarland, 2013; Howard, Withers, Carnes, & Hillman, 2016; Kim, Oh, & 
Swaminathan, 2006), tie dynamics (Ibert & Müller, 2015; Quintana-García & Benavides-Velasco, 
2004), and tie activation (Daskalaki, 2010; Mannak, 2015; Mannak, Raab, & Smit, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the importance and relevance of work that focuses on tie formation and 
dynamics, these studies do not offer a solid hold for describing and comparing the dynamics of 
interorganizational technology field networks, simply because they do not account for the set of 
nodes amongst which ties can be forged. The studies that look into the node dynamics and describe 
the development of such networks (e.g. Gay and Dousset (2005); Orsenigo et al. (2001); Powell et 
al. (2005)), are limited in their generalizability, since they focus on the life sciences field only. 
 In this study, we contribute to research on the development of interorganizational 
technology networks over time, by focusing on understudied aspects of the definition of network 
dynamics by Ahuja et al. (2012) that reflect the earlier mentioned focus of innovation policy in the 
realm of networks and innovation: the structure of relations among organizations (i.e. network density and 
degree centralization), and the set of nodes –R&D consortia– that comprises a network (i.e. node entry, node exit 
and network size). These aspects are incorporated in a conceptual model that revolves around the 
heuristic of a network state. We model the development of field networks over time as a function of 
these five aspects or dimensions, which yields a series of states and state changes. Such a network 
state is bounded by a state space, which is the space of all possible network states. Using this 
heuristic allows for mapping network dynamics through tracing a path in the state space over time 
(Bickhard & Campbell, 2003; Kauffman & Oliva, 1994). This path is determined by initial 
conditions of the network itself, as well as various constraints on dynamics operating in the state 
space (Bickhard & Campbell, 2003; Makadok & Walker, 2007). 
 This model is explored using 7 distinct interorganizational technology networks in the 
Dutch context over a time span of 21 to 23 years. In these networks, nodes consist of R&D 
consortia, and the links between these nodes consist of joint membership ties. Using said 
parameters, we apply the technique of latent profile analysis to identify distinct network states. The 
outcomes of our analysis allow us to discern five distinct network states: formation, growth, 
stagnation, stability and disintegration. Although a common formation pathway lingers through the 
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evolution of these 7 networks (i.e. from formation, via growth, to stability), we identify variations 
on and extensions of this pathway. In addition, we find considerable differences in the duration of 
states across networks. 
 With this chapter, we contribute to the existing literature on organizational networks and 
innovation in two related ways. First, organizational network scholars have been criticized to focus 
rather exclusively on network structure (Ghosh & Rosenkopf, 2015). By focusing not only on the 
development of network structure over time, but also by focusing on changes in the set of nodes 
that comprises a network, we add the population dimension to the study of networks dynamics 
and combine this dimension with the structural development of a network. Especially node entry 
and exit have been characterized already by Thorelli (1986) as key aspects that characterize network 
dynamics. The few studies on interorganizational network dynamics that included node turnover 
have offered interesting yet anecdotal insights with respect to the different roles played in a network 
by new entrants, incumbents and organizations leaving the network (Gay & Dousset, 2005; 
Orsenigo et al., 2001; Powell et al., 2005). New entrants, for example, have been suggested to either 
complement incumbent organizations (Kogut, Walker, & Kim, 1995; Orsenigo et al., 2001), or 
instead disrupt the existing status quo for these incumbents (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Kogut, Urso, 
& Walker, 2007) by introducing network heterogeneity. By establishing a clearer link between node 
turnover and technology dynamics, we make its role in network dynamics more explicit. 
 Second, despite many calls for research on interorganizational network dynamics (Brass et 
al., 2004; Freeman, 1991; Gulati, 1998; Johnston, Peters, & Gassenheimer, 2006; Kilduff & Tsai, 
2003; Parkhe, Wasserman, & Ralston, 2006; Tasselli, Kilduff, & Menges, 2015; Wasserman & Faust, 
1994), research on the topic has not thrived. Indeed, at first sight our research question (do 
technology networks differ in their development?) seems rather trivial. This simplicity is intentional, 
as answering this question turns out to be far from simple or trivial: many authors have pointed at 
the inherent difficulties involved in collecting datasets for the longitudinal analysis of complete 
networks. This is the main reason for the slow progress of research on the topic of network 
dynamics (Cattani & Ferriani, 2008; Lounsbury, 2000; Provan et al., 2007; Tsai, 2000; van den 
Ende, van de Kaa, den Uijl, & de Vries, 2012). Not only does this result in network dynamics 
studies considering only limited time frames (e.g. Gay and Dousset (2005); Orsenigo et al. (2001); 
Powell et al. (2005)), it also means that, to the best of our knowledge, none of these studies has 
investigated more than one technology field. This renders a comparison across networks in 
different technology fields and hence differentiation of innovation policy based on technology 
fields impossible. Using a dataset that tracks the network development of 7 distinct field networks 
over a longer period allows us to describe and compare technology field network dynamics in this 
study. Consequently, we offer insights in network dynamics across a broad array of different field 
networks, as well as over many years within each of these networks. 
 Our research also yields useful insights for those involved in innovation policy. The 
networks studied in this chapter emerge because of a governmental funding system. Given the 
importance of networks for both organizational and network-level outcomes21, there is an 
important governmental stake in setting up policies in such a way that these networks are steered 
towards modes of organization that make them as effective as possible. In this light, getting insight 
in the predictability with which such networks develop over time and the duration of different 
developmental stages is fruitful and necessary in order to develop a more targeted and differentiated 
                                                 
21 Whereas we have considered the effect of network structure on the outcome of individual nodes in Chapter 2, the 
effect of network structure on network-level outcomes will be considered in Chapter 5 of this dissertation. 
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approach towards steering such networks (Ahuja et al., 2012; Clegg, Josserand, Mehra, & Pitsis, 
2016; Dagnino, Levanti, & Mocciaro Li Destri, 2016; Provan et al., 2007). Hence, our study marks 
a first step towards the more targeted management of these networks, by providing insights in their 
developmental patterns and parameters that drive these patterns. 
4.2 Theoretical framework 
The existing literature on the topic of network dynamics does not offer a solid hold for describing 
and comparing the dynamics of interorganizational technology field networks. In this chapter we 
will therefore develop a framework that can be used for describing network dynamics and specify 
the parameters that will be considered. In turn, by applying this framework to different networks, 
a comparison between these networks can be made. We build forth on the work on network 
dynamics by Ahuja et al. (2012) and the industry dynamics literature in developing this framework: 
it will first be shortly described, and then the phenomenon it will describe, network dynamics, is 
linked to technology dynamics. 
 Ahuja et al. (2012) propose that the dynamics of any network can be conceptualized in 
terms of change in the nodes that comprise the network and change in the structure that results 
from the ties that connect those nodes (Ahuja et al., 2012, p. 435). Both aspects are included in our 
conceptual model in Figure 8. Central to this model is the heuristic of a network state. This state 
includes both the dimension of network structural features (i.e. network density and degree 
centralization) and the dimension of features related to the set of nodes that comprise the network 
(i.e. size, node entry and node exit). Network states are bounded by a state space, which is the space 
of all possible states of a network. Hence, all possible state sequences of a network will trace a path 
in this state space (Bickhard & Campbell, 2003; Kauffman & Oliva, 1994).  
FIGURE 8 
Conceptual model depicting network state features and the state space 
 
Whereas different conceptual approaches towards explaining network formation and development 
exist (e.g. focusing on developmental processes (Doz et al., 2000; Ring & van de Ven, 1994) or 
using structuration theory (Berends et al., 2011)), we apply an empirical approach to discern distinct 
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developmental phases. Movement of a network through the state space is determined by initial 
conditions of the network itself, as well as various constraints on dynamics operating in the state 
space (Bickhard & Campbell, 2003; Makadok & Walker, 2007). As our focus is on describing the 
dynamics of technology networks, we propose these constraints are posed mainly by the 
technology field in which nodes in a network operate. 
Technology dynamics and network dynamics 
Existing literature suggests that the dynamics of interorganizational innovation networks and 
technological development are closely intertwined. Various innovation scholars have elaborated on 
the importance of interaction for the process of innovation (Freeman, 1991; Lundvall, 1992; 
Martin, 2012; Meeus et al., 2001; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Pavitt, 1984; von Hippel, 1988). Indeed, 
many scholars have described the joint development of networks with a variety of technologies 
and bodies of knowledge, such as those focused on flight simulators (Rosenkopf & Tushman, 
1998), biopharmaceuticals (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Gilsing, Cloodt, & Roijakkers, 2016; Orsenigo 
et al., 2001; Powell et al., 2005), batteries (Kulve & Smit, 2003), industrial process technologies 
(Luiten, van Lente, & Blok, 2006), industrial and consumer goods (Lin, Chen, Sher, & Mei, 2010) 
and standards with respect to consumer electronics (van den Ende et al., 2012). Hence, 
interorganizational R&D networks form around technologies, and the dynamics of such networks 
consequently are linked to the development of these technologies. 
 In earlier chapters we conceptualized technological development as the process of search 
in a technology landscape by network nodes. This chapter adds a dynamic perspective to this 
heuristic: the technological development that results from search in a technology landscape 
subsequently changes that landscape. New search directions might emerge and become more 
dominant. This makes existing search directions less salient or even obsolete. Before we can explore 
how this change in the technology landscape affects the selected network dynamics parameters, we 
first need to delve deeper into the nature of technological development and the link between 
technological development and network dynamics. 
 With respect to the nature of technological development, such development can be 
characterized in terms of technological paradigms and technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982). A 
technological paradigm embodies heuristics with respect to aspects and functions of a technology 
that should be the object of search, and aspects and functions of that technology that should be 
left unchanged or sacrificed. This includes the extent to which technological opportunities are 
present, the level of innovation cumulativeness, and the extent to which knowledge is codified 
(Safarzyńska, Frenken, & van den Bergh, 2012). With that, it reduces the relevant design space, and 
guides search in the remaining design dimensions (Frenken, 2006). The cumulative series of 
innovations within a technological paradigm create a technological trajectory. Along such a 
trajectory, dominant designs are incrementally improved to raise performance in certain functional 
attributes. Hence, technological development can be conceived as the progress along a 
technological trajectory that is defined by a technological paradigm (Bakker, van Lente, & Meeus, 
2012; Dosi, 1982). 
 Inherent to this characterization of technological development is that this development has 
a natural tendency to converge to a dominant design. Technological breakthroughs, however, make 
that existing trajectories ultimately run into decreasing returns (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Dosi, 
1982; Drazin & Schoonhoven, 1996). Scholars have generally acknowledged that after such 
technological breakthroughs a period of technological ferment takes place. During this period, 
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different designs compete with one another. What follows is a maturation stage, where selection 
among competing designs often leads to convergence on one dominant design that can be further 
elaborated on (Agarwal, Sarkar, & Echambadi, 2002; Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Grodal, 
Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 2014; Schumpeter, 1934; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Hence, for some 
time it is not clear which technological aspects and functions are viable for further development, 
and it is unclear which directions in the search space are viable to pursue. Once a new dominant 
design is established, future discontinuities start a new cycle from breakthrough, via ferment and 
maturation to dominant design (Ehrnberg, 1995). 
 With respect to the link between technological development and network dynamics, it must 
be recognized that often the described developmental cycle focuses on single technologies such as 
cars (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978), aircrafts (Frenken, 2006), or electronical components (Wade, 
1995). Yet, the literature suggests a role of technological development in network dynamics as well 
(Capone, Malerba, & Orsenigo, 2013). At this level, however, the focus is on clusters of rather than 
single technologies (Castellacci, 2008; Teece, 2008). Hence, network dynamics are an aggregate 
reflection of the developmental cycles of all technologies that are developed in a network. How 
this is reflected in networks is an empirical question, yet this link will be tentatively explored for 
each of the selected network dynamics parameters in the remainder of this chapter. 
 An important assumption that we make is that on the aggregate network level as well, 
technological development tends towards the emergence of dominant designs. After all, the 
prevalence of breakthrough innovations is low. For example, in a study on the origins of 
breakthrough innovations, Kelley, Ali, and Zahra (2013) describe that out of the 29,195 patents the 
authors consider in the time frame 1987 and 1991, 298 patents are qualified as breakthrough 
patents. This is about 1% of the total sample. Hence, even on the aggregate network level, the 
likelihood for breakthrough innovations and subsequent eras of technological ferment to occur is 
low and most technologies that are developed will be in the subsequent maturation and dominant 
design stages. We expect this relative predictability in overall technological development (Dosi, 
1982; Peine, 2006) to be reflected in networks that do not display considerable movement through 
the state space. In describing the tentative link between network dynamics and technology 
dynamics, we therefore will take the dominant design stage as a starting point and explain how 
parameters change should a technological breakthrough with its subsequent stage of ferment and 
maturation occur. 
Network size. This dimension refers to the number of nodes that comprise a network (Ahuja et 
al., 2012). Network size in general reflects the attractiveness of a technology field (Afuah, 2013; 
Rosenkopf & Schilling, 2007; Suarez, 2005). This attractiveness is determined by, for example, the 
amount of resources available in a network (Brass et al., 2004; Meeus et al., 2008; Salavisa, Sousa, 
& Fontes, 2012), and available technological opportunities (Capaldo, 2007; Rodan & Galunic, 2004; 
Tang, Mu, & Maclachlan, 2008). 
 In the phase of established dominant designs, we expect network size in this situation to 
be stable over time (Malerba, 2002): the relevant design space of each technology is known, as well 
as the remaining search directions. Incumbent nodes will build forth on established dominant 
designs and the relative certainty in this situation can be expected to fill each possible position in 
the search space by incumbents. Uncertainty induced by a technological breakthrough, however, 
might lead to a change in size and a period of fluctuation because a period of technological ferment 
and subsequent maturation begins. The entry and exit dynamics associated with this fluctuation 
will be discussed next. 
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Node entry. Node entry (i.e. the number of new nodes that enter a network) is considered an 
important aspect in the generation of network dynamics (Hakansson, 1992; Mowery, 1988). In a 
technology field in which mainly dominant designs are further improved, low levels of node entry 
can be expected (Kogut et al., 1995; Kulve & Smit, 2003; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Owen-Smith, 
Riccaboni, Pammolli, & Powell, 2002; Powell et al., 2005). Under this condition, node entry is 
discouraged due to the presence of high entry barriers, for example steep learning curves and 
economies of scale due to standardization (Agarwal et al., 2002; Malerba, 2002). Yet, some level of 
node entry can be expected, either through coordination of incumbents that search for co-
specialization when further developing their established dominant designs (Lévesque, Minniti, & 
Shepherd, 2013; Orsenigo et al., 2001), or because some level of incumbent inertia that is inevitable 
as time progresses creates opportunities for node entry (Agarwal et al., 2002; Dercole, Dieckmann, 
Obersteiner, & Rinaldi, 2008). 
 Node entry levels change in the face of a technological discontinuity. In the event this 
discontinuity leads to a new technology field, new entrants behave like first movers in the initial 
stages of technological development. When successful as carriers of the field, these entrants later 
attract others as time progresses (Owen-Smith et al., 2002). Later entrants, however, can become 
technology field carriers as well. A common pattern when a disruptive technology is introduced in 
an existing technology field is that incumbent nodes react slowly with the result that leadership 
passes to pioneering new nodes that have embraced the new technology (Dosi, Faillo, & Marengo, 
2008; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Malerba, 2002; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Wade, 1996) and challenge the 
existing paradigm (Gilsing et al., 2016; Kash & Rycoft, 2000; Lin et al., 2010; Rosenkopf & 
Tushman, 1998). These later entrants do not necessarily have to be pioneers: some authors have 
suggested that incumbents from other technology fields can overtake an emerging one (e.g. 
chemistry-based pharmaceutical companies that enter the field of biotechnology (Roijakkers & 
Hagedoorn, 2006) with the aim of technological integration (M’Chirgui, 2009). 
 Hence, node entry levels increase after a technological discontinuity as it opens new search 
directions in the technology landscape. The subsequent period of technological ferment still offers 
opportunities as well, which means that node entry level remains high (Agarwal et al., 2002). As 
technological development progresses further to the state of maturation and new dominant 
designs, we expect node entry levels to dampen. 
Node exit. In comparison with node entry, research pays less explicit attention to node exit from 
networks in relation to technology dynamics, although it is reported by several studies (Gay & 
Dousset, 2005; Orsenigo et al., 2001; Owen-Smith et al., 2002; Powell et al., 2005). In networks in 
which mainly dominant designs are developed, node exit is associated with increased competition 
resulting from technological crowding and specialisation (Lin et al., 2010; Powell et al., 2005; Stuart, 
1998), failure (Casper, 2007; Ingram & Torfason, 2010) or mergers (Powell et al., 2005): despite the 
presence of dominant designs, no best search direction can be determined a priori and therefore 
the creation of new applicable artefacts is far from a sure outcome of R&D (Drejer & Jørgensen, 
2005; Hung & Tu, 2014; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, we expect the level of node exit in 
this situation to be relatively low. 
 We expect node exit to follow the same pattern as that of node entry when a technological 
discontinuity with its subsequent stage of ferment occurs. Incumbent nodes might drop out of the 
network if they do not adjust or cannot contribute on time to the new technology (Dosi et al., 
2008; Malerba & Orsenigo, 1999; Powell et al., 2005). In the subsequent stage of technological 
ferment, nodes that leave a network are the result of selection processes in the underlying 
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technology field: better alternatives are selected and poorer ones are rejected (Baum & McKelvey, 
1999; Mohrman, Gailbrath, & Monge, 2006). Node exit levels dampen as technological 
development progresses further to the state of maturation and a new dominant design. 
Network density. This aspect denotes the cohesion of the relational structure in a network. As 
such, it cements nodes in a network and involves mutual awareness between network members of 
what others are doing. This facilitates mutual understanding and insight in knowledge 
interdependencies (Erikson & Bearman, 2006; Fagerberg et al., 2012; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 
2009; Hollenstein, 2003; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Oh & Jeon, 2007). 
 Network density relates to technology field development in the following way. Under 
conditions of incremental improvement, preservation of a relatively dense network can be 
expected, as the fruitfulness of research directions and with that insight in knowledge 
interdependencies is clear (Gay & Dousset, 2005). In situations of technological discontinuities and 
ferment, however, we expect density to drop. In such situations, existing paradigms are 
overthrown. As we have seen, this results in higher attrition of incumbents from the field network, 
and the attraction of new entrants to the network. Together with this shift in direction of 
technological development, old relations disappear and new relations form (Mohrman et al., 2006), 
yet the uncertainty regarding fruitful directions hampers mutual awareness in the network. 
Network degree centralization. Degree centralization refers to the extent to which one or few 
nodes in the network are more central compared to other nodes in that network. This indicates the 
presence of a small amount key players in the network that introduce common thematic foci 
(Fagerberg et al., 2012) and undertake continuous efforts to integrate the knowledge available in 
the network (Ata & Van Mieghem, 2009; Burt, 2007; Fagerberg et al., 2012; Fagerberg & 
Verspagen, 2009). This enhances the collective perception of network members of viable 
technological alternatives and possible future developments, and focuses their commitment to a 
limited amount of core technologies (Afuah, 2013; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Soh, 2010) developed by 
central players (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Powell et al., 2005). 
 Under conditions of incremental technological change, technological development is in the 
hands of few incumbents. The literature suggests persistence in innovative activities by such nodes 
once roles are established (Cefis & Orsenigo, 2001; Triguero & Córcoles, 2013) and we therefore 
expect network centralization to remain stable over time in conditions of stability. In a situation of 
technological discontinuity and ferment, existing paradigms are overthrown. This results in a 
disruption of the network structure, as node turnover is likely to increase. The resulting uncertainty 
and the associated loss of key players will temporarily lead to lower levels of network centralization. 
 The dimensions of state change model seem to be loosely associated with technological 
developments and therefore we propose that for rather distinct technological fields we expect 
distinct and therefore heterogeneous field network dynamics. This is our main proposition for this 
chapter.  
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4.3 Data and methods 
Research setting and data 
The data that is used to study network dynamics in this chapter is drawn from a dataset that was 
developed in the context of a larger overarching research project (see, for example, the other 
chapters in this dissertation, Mannak (2015) and Mannak et al. (2012)). This dataset was built using 
evaluation reports that in total cover 1,928 Dutch R&D consortia, funded by a Dutch technology 
foundation22. The aim of this foundation is to realize knowledge transfer between the technical 
sciences and industry. In each consortium, an academic researcher designs a research and 
development project, and gathers one or more industrial organizations that see potential 
application value of the research results. Committed organizations are part of the ‘users committee’ 
that takes part in the research as from its early stages. Not only do these organizations discuss 
research progress and results in the light of potential application, they also contribute in kind and 
act as a testing-ground for the technlogy that is developed. A tie between two consortia is 
constituted by joint membership of one of the participating organizations or consortium leader in 
two consortia in the same year. 
 The first consortia started in the spring of 1981, and the most recent starting year that is 
included in the dataset is the year 2004. Because of joint membership in multiple consortia by both 
consortium leaders as industrial organizations, consortia are linked to one another (see Appendix 
I of this chapter for an elaboration). In Appendix I of Chapter 5, we describe the network boundary 
specification procedure that was followed. Following this approach, seven technology field 
networks were constructed, each on a yearly basis. Of the 1,928 consortia in the dataset, 153 
consortia did not have any member reported. In addition, 141 consortia were present as an isolate 
in one or more networks, and 40 were present as a dyad. These consortia were all excluded from 
the dataset, resulting in a total of 1,594 consortia spread across 7 technology fields. Depending on 
the year in which a consortium network emerged for the first time, the number of observations for 
each network ranges from 21 to 23 years, resulting in a total of 156 technology field networks. The 
consortium networks that emerge as a result can be considered a reflection of the organization of 
knowledge flows in the larger innovation system. Hence, investigating this organization is especially 
important for a targeted specification of innovation policy measures. 
 The framework that we developed in this chapter is geared towards answering the research 
question if the dynamics of field networks differ between technological fields. The composed 
consortium networks suit this network states framework for two main reasons. First, contrary to 
for example alliance networks, the consortium networks studied in this chapter do not emerge 
merely serendipitously: given that the funding agency has an explicit focus on stimulating 
interaction, relationships within and across consortia are explicitly seeded through the funding 
scheme and driven by a desire to optimize innovative outcomes at the country rather than at the 
individual node level. On the other hand, the networks studied in this chapter are fundamentally 
self-organizing (i.e. joint consortium links are not mandated top-down). Hence, network dynamics 
are driven on the one hand bottom-up by the choices of individual consortium members to pursue 
a certain technological trajectory, and on the other hand by top-down management interventions 
such as integrating communities and creating intermediaries across research domains (Mohrman et 
                                                 
22 As indicated in the general introduction of this dissertation, several topics regarding the construction of this dataset 
are elaborated on in the different appendices to the different empirical chapters in this dissertation. The topics covered 
are (1) data sources and database construction (Chapter 2), (2) node specification (Chapter 3), (3) tie and network 
specification (Chapter 4) and (4) network boundary specification (Chapter 5). 
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al., 2006). This makes the question regarding differences in network dynamics between technology 
fields especially salient, as insight in these differences opens the road for specifying network 
interventions that suit the developmental stage of a network. 
 Second, we noted earlier that collecting longitudinal network data is a time-intensive and 
even daunting task. Consequently, many studies on network dynamics –despite the tremendous 
effort put in collecting data– still fall short in generating results that allow for comparisons and 
generalizations across sectors. With a focus on seven different technology fields that each span 
time frames ranging between 21 and 23 years, our study is an important step forward on this 
dimension. Not only does our data allow us to study extensive time frames within technology fields, 
it also allows for comparing developmental patterns between a wide array of different field 
networks. 
Measurements 
Network size. This variable is expressed as the number of consortia in a network. We did not 
consider nodes that were isolated in the network, or part of a dyadic structure that was not 
connected to one of the network components. 
Node entry. Taking t as the reference year, node entry is determined as the number of new 
consortia that entered the network at t. A consortium was considered “new” when its leader was 
not involved in any other consortium three years preceding t. Node entry was expressed as a count 
variable. 
Node exit. Taking t as the reference year, node exit from a network was determined as the number 
of consortia that left the consortium network just before the network was observed at t. Following 
the same reasoning as with node entry, a consortium was considered to exit the network when its 
leader did not appear again in the three years after t. Node exit, too, was expressed as a count 
variable. 
Network density. Cohesion through inter-consortium ties was captured in the measure of 
network density. This measure was calculated for all 156 networks by dividing the actual number 
of ties present in each network by the total number of theoretically possible ties in that network, 
taking into account that the joint member ties in the consortium network considered are undirected 
(Scott, 2000). Networks that consisted of multiple components were accounted for by calculating 
network density for each component individually, and then determining the weighted density 
average based on component size. We made use of the functionality available in the statnet suite 
(Goodreau et al., 2008) available in the R statistical environment (R Development Core team, 2016) 
in these calculations. 
Network degree centralization. The extent to which joint member ties are organized around one 
or few nodes in the network –indicating joint foci on few technological trajectories– is expressed 
by the measure of degree centralization (Freeman, 1978). We calculate this measure with the 
normalized degree centrality scores of each consortium, to account for differences in network size. 
Networks that consisted of multiple components were accounted for by calculating degree 
centralization for each component individually, and then determining the weighted average based 
on component size. We made use of the functionality available in the statnet suite (Goodreau et 
al., 2008) available in the R statistical environment (R Development Core team, 2016) in these 
calculations. 
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Control variables. In addition to the parameters derived from the two key aspects of the network 
architecture concept, we included a year variable as a control in our analysis. As noted earlier, the 
movement of a network through the state space is –amongst others– determined by initial 
conditions of the network itself (Bickhard & Campbell, 2003; Makadok & Walker, 2007). Including 
a year variable in our analyses accounts for this, as it assumes path-dependence in the effect of time 
(Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
Data analysis 
Different authors have pointed at the complexities and challenges involved in the development of 
methods needed for analysing longitudinal network data, especially because of the path-
dependency of subsequent network observations (Emirbayer, 1997; Faust & Skvoretz, 2002; 
Stokman & Doreian, 1996; Tsai, 2000). The dominant approach that has emerged in the context 
of research on tie formation, is to represent network dynamics as a stochastic process (Carpenter, 
Li, & Jiang, 2012; Gargiulo & Sosa, 2016; Lusher et al., 2013; Rose Kim, Howard, Cox Pahnke, & 
Boeker, 2016; Snijders, 2001). Yet, the ERGMs and SAOMs involved in these approaches are less 
suitable for analysing complete interorganizational network dynamics for several reasons. First, one 
of the strengths of these models, namely their ability to distinguish between closely related 
structural processes (i.e. transitive closure, cyclic closure, closure due to having either a shared 
incoming or outgoing partner for triadic predictors of tie formation (Butts, 2008) requires the data 
to be directed. Only then, one unleashes the full potential of these models. Our data on 
interorganizational networks is undirected, which is often the case for such data (Sytch & 
Tatarynowicz, 2013b). Second, considerable technical challenges are faced when handling large 
networks (Kleinbaum, Stuart, & Tushman, 2013; Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2013b) as well as networks 
that are characterized by node entry and exit (Huisman & Snijders, 2003; Krivitsky, Handcock, & 
Morris, 2011). Both are salient aspects of the networks that are studied in this chapter. In practice, 
these issues result in the need for a considerable amount of computational power and time. The 
current state of technology does not allow this 
 Given that the use of these sophisticated techniques currently is impossible for the network 
data focused at in this chapter, we resort to an approach that allows us to capture the movement 
of a network through the state space, albeit that some detail must be dropped. The strength of this 
analytical step consists of an overview of a sequence of state changes over time within technology 
fields. To achieve this, we employ the statistical technique of latent profile analysis. This is an 
exploratory technique that we use to probe whether the consortium networks systematically align 
in such a way that they form distinct states. Although in the past clustering methods such as 
hierarchical or k-means clustering were used to derive latent groupings from data (Kassambara, 
2017; Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008), latent profile analysis provides a comparatively more reliable 
estimation of distinct states. 
 Latent profile analysis is a model-based approach that offers various model selection tools, 
and results in a probability-based classification through estimating a posterior probability of 
membership that can be evaluated using goodness of fit indices (Ebers & Oerlemans, 2013; 
Haughton, Legrand, & Woolford, 2009). In its essence, latent profile analysis can be thought of as 
addressing a missing data problem (Oberski, 2016). In the current chapter, we have observed 
several parameters and a control variable for 156 networks, and suspect that these cluster in distinct 
states. Our expectation is that, if our states are defined well (i.e. all relevant parameters are 
specified), subsequent network states generally will form smooth trajectories within the state space 
(Bickhard & Campbell, 2003). These states, however, are not observed when model estimation 
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starts. As estimation progresses23, parameters are devised that seek to identify the smallest number 
of unobserved states that is sufficient to account for the relationships among the observed 
indicators (Ebers & Oerlemans, 2013). An important –and unverifiable– assumption is that each 
state has a certain prior distribution –with an a priori unknown mean and variance– of its estimates. 
This assumption about what the hidden states look like enables us to obtain a posterior likelihood 
of a network belonging to a certain state (Oberski, 2016). Hence, although the estimates per state 
differ, the distribution of these estimates is the same across states. In this chapter we employ a 
Gaussian approach, meaning that state estimates are assumed to follow a normal distribution. 
Different packages are available for latent profile analysis (i.e. the commercially available package 
Latent Gold® (Vermunt & Magidson, 2016), and two packages available in R, MCLUST (Scrucca 
et al., 2016) and poLCA (Linzer & Lewis, 2011). A comparison of these packages (Haughton et al., 
2009) concluded that MCLUST is most suitable for continuous data, which is characteristic of the 
parameters we focus at in this chapter. Hence, the MCLUST package is used for our analysis. 
 The a priori assumption that the estimates in each state follow a normal distribution should 
not be made light-heartedly (Oberski, 2016), especially in the case network data is modelled. As we 
already saw in Chapter 3, node-level network data (i.e. betweenness centrality) tends to follow a 
non-normal distribution. This also applies to complete network-level data. We addressed this issue 
in our analytical strategy in the following way: an important cause for our network data following 
a non-normal distribution, is that especially in the early stages of network development the 
networks observed are rather small. This leads to high scores on all indicators, which are much less 
likely to be observed once the networks are past the initial formation stage. Should outliers occur 
in these post-formation stages, however, this could point at shocks (i.e. a technological 
discontinuity) that profoundly affect network structure and population dynamics. Using a 
multivariate outlier analysis based on the approach described by Filzmoser, Maronna, and Werner 
(2008) and which is available in the ‘mvoutlier’-package (Filzmoser & Gschwandtner, 2017) in R 
(R Development Core team, 2016), both types of outliers are identified and taken into account in 
our analysis. 
4.4 Results 
Descriptives and correlations 
Table 17 shows the descriptives and correlations for the state parameters and the control variable. 
Although not included in the analysis, we also included different technology field dummies in this 
Table because these are used for grouping the results of the latent profile analysis. Means of these 
dummies are similar, indicating that network observations are equally spread across technology 
fields. Marked differences between technology fields can be seen when one considers the 
correlations between field dummies and state parameters. Most correlations between the dummy 
for Electrical engineering and these parameters are non-significant, indicating that networks in this 
field –except for their density scores– can be considered the ‘average’ case. Compared to this field, 
network size is bigger for the Chemistry, Instruments and Life sciences fields, and smaller for the 
 
                                                 
23 Direct maximisation of the number of states is complicated, so iteration based on maximum likelihood estimation 
takes place in order to obtain maximisation (Hagenaars & McCutcheon, 2002). The expectation maximization (EM) 
algorithm is often used for this, due to its stability and reliable global convergence under most conditions (Scrucca, 
Fop, Murphy, & Raftery, 2016). Model fit then can be determined using a log-likelihood criterion which in latent profile 
analysis is the Bayesian information criterion (BIC), with the lower the BIC, the better the fit of the model. 
 




Descriptives and correlations24 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Chemistry……………. .14 .35 0 1 -            
2. Civil engineering…….... .14 .35 0 1 -.16* -           
3. Electrical engineering… .15 .36 0 1 -.17* -.17* -          
4. Instruments…………... .13 .34 0 1 -.16* -.16* -.16* -         
5. Life sciences………….. .15 .36 0 1 -.17* -.17* -.17* -.16* -        
6. Mechanical engineering. .14 .35 0 1 -.16* -.16* -.17* -.16* -.17* -       
7. Medical technology…... .15 .36 0 1 -.17* -.17* -.17* -.16* -.17* -.17* -      
8. Year………………….. 1993.35 6.47 1982 2004 .01 .01 -.02 .04 -.02 .01 -.02 -     
9. Network size…………. 47.71 32.36 3 141 .31** -.35** .10 .23** .36** -.41** -.25** .50** -    
10. Node entry………….. 7.26 5.68 0 31 .25** -.30** .14 .10 .33** -.29** -.24** .22** .69** -   
11. Node exit…………… 5.17 5.06 0 26 .23** -.22** .05 .12 .27** -.24** -.20* .52** .70** .41** -  
12. Density…………….... .25 .11 .07 .67 -.13 .27** .42** -.36** -.32** .13 -.02 -.13 -.42** -.30** -.26** - 
13. Degree centralization... .33 .14 .08 1 .12 .03 .01 -.27** -.24** .26** .09 -.23** -.35** -.32** -.21** .59** 
                                                 
24 n = 156. **p < .01; *p < .05. 
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others. The correlations for node entry and exit harmonize with the correlation for network size 
when it comes down to technology fields, except for the field of Instruments: for this field, both 
the level of node entry and node exit are equal to that of the field of Electrical engineering. Hence, 
compared to other technology field networks that are larger than the field of Electrical engineering, 
the node entry and exit intensity in the Instruments field is low. Given the operationalization of 
both node entry and node exit (i.e. both require the consortium leader to be absent from the 
network for at least three years), this does not necessarily have to indicate that absolute levels of 
node entry and exit are lower for this field. A tendency for consortium leaders to disappear from 
the network yet being absent for less than three years before returning, or a stable set of consortium 
leaders that initiate consortia over the years could also be a plausible explanation. Correlation 
patterns between technology fields and parameters for structural dynamics sketch a more 
heterogeneous picture. For most fields that significantly correlate with the density parameter (i.e. 
Civil engineering, Instruments and Life sciences), the direction of the sign mirrors that of the 
correlation with size. This makes intuitive sense: larger networks are less dense because there are 
physical limits to the amount of joint member ties individual consortia can maintain. It is here 
where the field of Electrical engineering deviates from its average status. Its positive correlation 
with density indicates a higher level of mutual awareness across consortia, especially compared to 
the technology fields of Chemistry, Mechanical engineering and Medical technology, which are not 
significantly correlated with density. The parameter of the presence of a limited number of central 
players, degree centralization, displays more similar patterns across technology fields, as only the 
Instruments and Life sciences fields are relatively less centralized, and the field of Mechanical 
engineering is more centralized. Again, size is the explanation here, as smaller networks are more 
easily centralized compared to larger ones. More salient correlations with degree centralization are 
the ones that are not significant, as those indicate that –despite the substantial differences in size 
across networks– these networks tend to have the same level of network centralization. 
 With respect to the correlations between parameters that do not denote technology fields, 
one can deduct a clear growth pattern when assessing the correlations between the year variable 
and the variables for size, node entry, node exit and degree centralization. This is not the case for 
density, which appears to develop independently from the progress of time. Correlations among 
size, node entry and node exit show a consistent pattern: larger size means more entry as well as 
exit, and more entry as such also implies more exit. The behaviour of these parameters in relation 
to density and degree centralization, as well as the correlations between the latter two sketch a more 
intriguing picture: while one intuitively would expect these measures to move in opposite 
directions, the found correlations suggest this is not the case. Instead, both move in the same 
direction and are negatively associated with node entry and exit: more density is associated with 
more centralization of the network, and this structure emerges under conditions of low node 
turnover. 
Results of Latent Profile Analysis 
As explained in more detail earlier, we performed a latent profile analysis to delineate distinct 
network states. First, a posterior probability of membership was estimated, based on the specified 
parameters. This probability in turn was evaluated using goodness of fit indices. After several 
iterations, the analysis resulted in a probability-based classification of the cases observed (Ebers & 
Oerlemans, 2013; Haughton et al., 2009). Classification of observations is done by the algorithm 
in the MCLUST-package in such a way that the goodness of fit value of the total model -reflected 
in the BIC-score- is minimised. 
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TABLE 18 




State I State II State III State IV State V 
Formation 
(n = 28, 17.9%) 
Growth 
(n = 51, 32.7%) 
Stagnation 
(n = 20, 12.8%) 
Stability 
(n = 48, 30.8%) 
Disintegration 
(n = 9, 5.8%) 
Year 1985 (1.74) 1994 (5.86) 1995 (4.51) 1997 (4.92) 1999 (2.58) 
Size 20 (16.66) 35 (12.03) 17 (5.36) 77 (11.41) 119 (20.12) 
Node entry 5 (6.53) 6 (3.68) 2 (2.15) 11 (3.97) 16 (6.19) 
Node exit 1 (1.47) 4 (2.53) 2 (1.55) 9 (4.73) 13 (6.55) 
Density .26 (.16) .27 (.10) .30 (.10) .22 (.07) .10 (.01) 
Degree centralization .39 (.24) .33 (.08) .33 (.15) .32 (.07) .18 (.02) 
 
Table 18 shows the average scores and standard deviations of the parameters in our framework for 
each found class. In addition to the Formation-state, which we constructed based on observations 
of outliers in the early years of the development of each network, four distinct states were identified 
by the conducted latent profile analysis. The covariances of each state have ellipsoidal distributions 
that are equal in both volume and shape but vary in orientation. The BIC of the final model was 
1,840, which was the lowest of all 14 models considered. Hence, this model (the so-called EEV-
model, see Scrucca et al. (2016) for an explanation of this model as well as the other 13 possible 
models) was selected25. Considerable data exploration preceded the estimation of this final model. 
As expected, multivariate outliers were detected both in the initial stages of network development 
(28 observations) and the post-formation stages (28 observations). After careful deliberation26, we 
decided to leave out from the final model those networks causing outliers due to being in the initial 
stages of network development, and separately label the state of these networks upfront. The label 
used for this additional state was ‘Formation’. Post-formation outliers were included in the dataset, 
and an auxiliary variable denoting outlier status (i.e. outlier or no outlier) was included as one of 
the latent profile predictors. 
                                                 
25 Although the BIC is a popular choice in the context of gaussian-based latent profile analyses, it tends to select the 
number of components needed to reasonably approximate the density instead of the number of clusters as such 
(Scrucca et al., 2016). For this reason, other criteria have been proposed for model selection, like the integrated 
complete data likelihood (ICL) criterion. Using this criterion for our data yields the same conclusion regarding the 
model that fits the data best (EEV, 4 components, ICL = 1,843). 
26 Model estimation that includes all networks and outlier-status (0 = formation-based outlier, 1 = no outlier, 2 = other 
outliers) as an auxiliary variable resulted in 8 distinct states. The overlap of these states with the states presented in this 
section is considerable: 5 out of 6 networks are classified the same. With respect to the networks that are classified 
differently, especially the state of Stagnation showed different results. Of the 20 networks that are now presented as 
belonging to this stage, 10 were classified differently when including all networks in the model: 4 networks were 
grouped in a stage that is similar to the current Formation stage, and 6 networks were grouped in a stage that could be 
classified as a mild exacerbation of the current Decline state. Given (i) the match between our ex ante expectations of 
a distinct Formation stage and the identification of this state by the model including all networks, (ii) the argument 
that the Formation and Decline stage are rather similar, except for their timing and (iii) the marginal difference between 
the two Stagnation states identified by this model, we decided for an ex ante specification of a Formation stage and 
leave the corresponding networks out of our final model estimation. 
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Networks in the Formation state occur early in time and are relatively small on average. The large 
standard deviation (16.66), however, indicates that considerable variation in size exists across 
networks in this state. Except for the number of nodes leaving, this large variation in network size 
is also reflected in standard deviations of the other predictors. The most salient signs that networks 
in this state fit the formation state are the high entry/exit ratio (5:1 = 5.00) as well as the 
turnover/size ratio ((5+1)/20 = .30): compared to network size, relatively many consortia are 
attracted, yet only few have left. Contrary to the other states, which need to be interpreted in 
temporal relation to one another to deduct underlying technology dynamics, this is the only state 
that can be classified directly in terms of our theoretical description, as it reflects node entry in the 
event a new technology field network is established. 
 With respect to the most frequently observed state of Growth, we observed that networks 
classified in this state are somewhat bigger compared to the Formation state. This is associated 
with similar average density levels, and relatively less centralized networks, at least on average (the 
large standard deviations of this predictor for state I makes a direct comparison difficult). 
Generally, the averages of the latent profile predictors of networks in this state have smaller 
standard deviations, indicating less variability between parameters of networks in this state. 
Compared to the Formation state, networks in this state show a drop in the entry/exit ratio (6:4 = 
1.50), even though the turnover/size ratio ((6+4)/35 = .29) remains the same. Hence, more nodes 
have left compared to the Formation state, but this does not outweigh the level of node entry in 
consortium networks that are in the state of growth. This combination of a generally increased 
level of stability and more nodes entering than leaving against the background of relatively high 
levels of node turnover has yielded the ‘Growth’ label for this state. 
 The state of Stagnation is the third state that we identified. This is one of the two states 
that we observed less frequently, and the state where many of the outliers that could not be 
attributed to the Formation state tend to cluster (71.43% (20 networks) of all 28 networks labelled 
as outliers). Clustering of outliers in this state is exclusive: none of the networks that were labelled 
as a non-outlier belong to this state. The state is characterized by the lowest entry/exit ratio (1:1 = 
1.00) of all states identified. In addition, networks in this state are on average the smallest compared 
to networks in other states and are characterized by a relatively low turnover/size ratio ((2+2)/17 
= .24). Hence, the development of networks in this state comes to a halt. What is salient about this 
state, however, is that density and degree centralization on average remain at the same level as those 
of both the Formation state and the Growth state. Although this can be attributed to the smaller 
sizes of the networks classified in the Stagnation state, it does suggest that network stagnation takes 
place in a way that preserves overall network structure. 
 The fourth state displays the characteristics of a Stability state. The choice for this label 
derives from the comparison with the Growth state. First, except for size, networks in the Growth 
and Stability state are relatively comparable in terms of node entry, node exit, and degree 
centralization. Differences are observed, though, in the entry/exit ratios between both networks 
and the turnover/size ratio: with ratios of (11:9) 1.22 and ((11+9/77) .26, networks in the Stability 
state display a relatively lower level of compensation for nodes that leave the network. Still, network 
growth occurs, but at relatively low levels. In addition, networks in the Stability state show a marked 
drop in the level of density, implying that the amount of joint member ties between consortia in 
networks in this state has declined.  
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TABLE 19 
States and movement through the state space over time per technology field27 
Year 
Technology field 
CH CE EE IN LS ME MT 
1982   Formation  Formation  Formation 
1983 Formation Formation |  | Formation | 
1984 | | | Formation | | | 
1985 | Growth Growth | Growth | | 
1986 Stability | | | | | | 
1987 | Stagnation | | | | | 
1988 | | | Growth | | | 
1989 | | | | | Growth Growth 
1990 | | | | Stability | | 
1991 | | | | | Stagnation | 
1992 | | | Stability | | | 
1993 | Growth | | | | | 
1994 | | | | | | | 
1995 | | Stability | Disintegration | | 
1996 | Stagnation | | | | | 
1997 | | | | | | | 
1998 | Growth | | | Growth | 
1999 | | | | | | | 
2000 | Stagnation | | | Stagnation | 
2001 | | | | | | | 
2002 | | | | | Growth | 
2003 | Growth | | | | | 
2004 | | | | Stability | | 
 
We observed the state of Disintegration most seldom. Networks that were classified as 
disintegrated are marked by a significant structural deterioration: roughly speaking, both density 
and degree centralization have almost halved in this state compared to the other four states. 
Although this can be partially attributed to the increase in network size, this marked decrease in 
scores stands in no proportion to the differences between the other states when size is controlled 
for. Like the Stagnation state, this is one of the states in which almost all networks (8 out of 9) 
were labelled as non-formation related outliers in our preliminary analysis (28.57% of all 28 
networks labelled as outliers). Indeed, the state of Disintegration shows similarities with the state 
                                                 
27 Key to the abbreviations: CH = Chemistry, CE = Civil engineering, EE = Electrical engineering, IN = Instruments, 
LS = Life sciences, ME = Mechanical engineering and MT = Medical technology. 
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of Stagnation when considering the node turnover ratio, which is .24 for both states (see earlier for 
the calculation of this ratio for the state of Stagnation. The calculation for the state of 
Disintegration is (16+13)/119). Hence, compared to network size, about 24% of consortia either 
entered or just have left the network. The state of Disintegration also exhibits features of the 
Stability state, especially when we consider the entry/exit ratio (16/13 = 1.23). Although absolute 
levels differ between these states, both can be characterized as network growth coming to a halt. 
For networks in the stagnation state, this seems to be a less hard landing compared to networks in 
the disintegration state, however. 
 Table 19 provides an overview of the movement of the found states through the state space 
per technology field on the basis of the yearly calculation of the network state based on the five 
dimensions. We infer three main observations. First, we deduce that considerable differences exist 
in network dynamics between technology fields. Yet, a common pathway can be identified: despite 
variations, this pathway starts from the Formation state, via the state of Growth, to the state of 
Stability. This exact pathway can be observed for the fields of Electrical engineering and 
Instruments. Variations on this pathway are seen in the developmental patterns for the fields of 
Chemistry (where the Growth state is skipped, and networks move right away to the state of 
Stability), Life sciences (where the state of Stability is interrupted by a 9-year episode of 
Disintegration) and Medical technology (which starts with the Formation and Growth stage but 
does not transition to the state of Stability). The first two stages can also be seen in the network 
development of the fields of Civil engineering and Mechanical engineering. However, instead of 
transitioning to the state of Stability, both field networks start alternating between the states of 
Growth and Stagnation after they have first reached the Growth state. 
FIGURE 9 
Prevalence of states and common pathways through the state space28 
 
Second, considerable variation exists between field networks when we consider the duration of 
states. The fields shown in the first five columns of Table 19, for example, are 
characterized by a Formation stage that takes at most four years. The other two fields (i.e. 
                                                 
28 Key: I = Formation, II = Growth, III = Stagnation, IV = Stability, V = Disintegration. 
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Mechanical engineering and Medical technology), on the other hand, reside in this state for six and 
seven years, respectively. No clear patterns can be deciphered from these state durations. Whereas, 
for example, the fields of Electrical engineering and Life sciences have Formation states that last 
an equal number of years, the latter field network remains considerably shorter in the subsequent 
Growth state compared to the first. This insight is important, because as we will describe shortly 
the nature of each state differs considering our expectations regarding technology dynamics. For 
this specific comparison, we described earlier that except for network size, the Growth and Stability 
state are relatively comparable with respect to the parameters of node entry, node exit, and degree 
centralization, yet networks in the state of Stability have lower density levels compared to networks 
in the state of Growth. 
 Third, certain state sequences are observed more often compared to others, and some 
sequences are not observed at all. Figure 9 summarizes the prevalence of, and common pathways 
between states, with node size denoting state prevalence and arrows denoting the direction in which 
state changes can take place. This figure clearly shows the earlier described common pathway from 
Formation, via Growth to Stability. It also shows the mentioned shortcut from the Formation state 
directly to the Stability state. State changes from the Growth state to the state of Disintegration, 
however, are not possible: networks do not instantly quadruple in size and reconfigure profoundly. 
Other unobserved state changes are the state change from the Stability state back to the state of 
Growth or to the state of Stagnation. This implies lock-in: none of the networks that get into the 
stability state subsequently move to one of the other states, except for the Life sciences network, 
which disintegrates for some time before switching back to the stability state. We will discuss in 
the next section how the frequent observation of some state changes and the infrequent 
observations (or lack thereof) of others can be interpreted considering the underlying technology 
field dynamics. 
 Earlier, we linked the Formation state to the establishment of a new technology field 
network. Figure 9 also offers insights regarding the link between network dynamics and the other 
stages of technological development. Theoretically, we expect stability over time in the population 
parameters as well as high levels of network density and degree centralization which reflects that 
few consortia have obtained a dominant position in the network, guiding the efforts of other 
consortia around few technologies. The relative long uninterrupted time frames with which the 
Stability state sustains indicates that this could be the network state in which this occurs in the 
network, although especially network density is lower compared to the other states. The occurrence 
of a technological discontinuity is reflected in the state of Disintegration: its low prevalence and 
considerable increase in network size in combination with drops in the structural parameters and 
changes in the population parameters reflects all characteristics of such a breakthrough innovation. 
The states of Growth and Decline are more difficult to align with our theoretical expectations: 
even though the frequent alternating occurrence of these states, suggesting periods of technological 
ferment and maturity, these states are not preceded by the network state we associated with 
technological discontinuities, Disintegration. 
4.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Whereas the existing literature suggests a heterogeneous development of different technology field 
networks, innovation policy aimed at the formation and development of such networks is 
surprisingly homogeneous. As networks might develop in different ways and with different speeds, 
this homogeneity can be problematic. The question if network dynamics differ between technology 
fields, however, has hitherto remained unanswered. Through incorporating the two aspects of the 
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definition of network dynamics by Ahuja et al. (2012) in a conceptual model that revolved around 
the heuristic of a network state, and linking this state to technology field dynamics, we mapped 
network dynamics in terms of the pathway followed by a network through the space state. The 
network dynamics of 7 technology field were described using this model. This allowed us to identify 
the five states of Formation, Growth, Stagnation, Stability and Disintegration. 
 Describing the dynamics of networks using state changes suggests the existence of a basic 
pathway from formation, via growth, to stability. Alternations of this pathway do occur, however, 
for example shortcuts from formation to stability, a network going back and forth from growth to 
decline, or networks switching from a state of stability to disintegration. This is the first indication 
that network dynamics indeed differ between technology fields. Our analysis also reveals 
considerable differences between networks with respect to the duration of different states. For 
example, whereas networks in the field of Chemistry and Medical technology can be characterized 
by few states that last for longer time periods, the fields of Electrical engineering and Instruments 
display more variation. The sequence of states for the fields of Civil engineering, Life sciences and 
Mechanical engineering deviates even more from this basic pathway, as none of these networks 
reach the state of Stability. This is the second indication that network dynamics indeed differ 
between technology fields. 
 In addition to these core findings, we demonstrate the importance of considering the 
aspects proposed by Ahuja et al. (2012) other than antecedents of tie formation (i.e. network size, 
node entry and node exit, network density and degree centralization) for comprehensively 
describing network dynamics. Taken together, both our research approach as findings provide a 
point of reference for existing and future research on the topic of the hitherto relatively anecdotal 
field of research on complete interorganizational network dynamics. 
Theoretical and practical implications 
The number of distinct states revealed by our analysis is limited, and the sequences of state changes 
followed through the state space do fit our tentative theoretical expectations regarding the link 
between technology dynamics and network dynamics. Both are an indication that most of the 
relevant parameters needed for the identification of states are specified (Bickhard & Campbell, 
2003). Indeed, even a direct comparison is impossible, overlaps are detected when we compare our 
findings regarding the duration of states and state transitions in the field of Electrical engineering 
and Life sciences with the existing literature. For example, in one of the major sub sectors of the 
field of Electrical engineering, the information technology industry, Hanaki, Nakajima, and Ogura 
(2010) show that the IT network shows considerable growth from 1991 to 1995, with a trend 
towards a structure characterized by increasing density and local centralization (i.e. a small-world 
network). This trend coalesces with the evolutionary growth state in which our Electrical 
engineering network is from 1985 until 1995, before it switches to the state of stability. Indeed, this 
state is characterized by high density and centralization levels, and it would be interesting to extend 
the network analysis of Hanaki et al. (2010) to years beyond 1995 in order to see if that network 
also transitioned to this state of stabilization around that time. 
 Several authors have investigated the evolution of networks in the Life sciences field. Their 
findings match well with ours, even though a discrepancy in explanations exists. The global trend 
in this field described by others is that it shows a steady growth as from 1975, with increasing 
density levels (Orsenigo et al., 2001; Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006). Whereas the field is 
dominated by its originators (small dedicated biotech firms) in the 1980s, the 1990s are marked by 
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the entry of large, established pharmaceutical companies that tend to get more and more dominant 
as this decade progresses (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Gilsing et al., 2016; Orsenigo et al., 2001; 
Roijakkers & Hagedoorn, 2006). This is in line with the sequence of formation states that we 
observe for this field from 1982 to 1994. The pharmaceutical sector underwent a period of 
consolidation in the mid to late 1990s, marked by mergers and acquisitions (Powell et al., 2005). 
Our analysis reveals the state of Disintegration in this period. As we explained in the theoretical 
section of this chapter, later incumbents from other technology fields can overtake an emerging 
one. Hence, a possible explanation for the state of Disintegration in the field of Life Sciences is 
that a consolidation wave took place from incumbents from other technology fields that overtook 
this field. 
 Another issue that makes the link between the Disintegration state and technological 
discontinuity tentative at best is that said state does not transition towards the Growth and 
Stagnation states, which we associated with technological ferment and maturation. In addition, the 
state of Stability seems to imply network lock-in. A possible explanation is that even though most 
of the relevant parameters for describing network dynamics are specified, this set should be further 
expanded. For example node competencies play an important role in technology dynamics, as they 
determine the ability of individual nodes to adapt to discontinuities (Leiponen, 2006; Uzunca, 
2017). Also, a consideration of the subfields of each technology field should be considered: 
Murmann and Frenken (2006) discuss that technology dynamics are not the same at different levels 
of field aggregation. This can be related to our findings with respect to the field of Electrical 
engineering: M’Chirgui (2009) finds a considerable growth in the number of inter-firm agreements 
as from 1999 until 2001, which is not reflected in the pattern we find for the field of Electrical 
engineering. It indicates that the seemingly homogeneous technology field network development 
masks subtle differences when one considers subfields. 
 In this chapter we applied an empirical approach towards discerning distinct developmental 
states and find that states can be predicted using relevant parameters, yet state changes are 
unpredictable. This raises the question to what extent theorizing regarding change can take place. 
Scholars have classified the question if technology indeed changes through a cyclical process 
marked by stages of discontinuity, ferment, maturation and dominant design as important, as it has 
major ramifications for the competencies of incumbent firms (Murmann & Frenken, 2006). van de 
Ven and Poole (1995) propose four distinct approaches towards theorizing about change in 
organization studies: life-cycle, teleological, dialectical and evolutionary (van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). The life-cycle theory depicts development as a predictable pattern of change towards a 
known final state. An example of this is the development and commercialization of a new drug 
(van de Ven & Poole, 1995). The teleological approach describes change as a developmental 
progress towards a certain goal or end state. An example of such an approach are the different life 
cycle stages proposed in the organizational growth model by Greiner (1972). Key in this approach 
is that no necessary sequence of events is needed to reach the goal, and that this goal can be adjusted 
based on new insights obtained. Hence, teleological theories cannot specify the trajectories that 
will be followed (van de Ven & Poole, 1995). In the dialectical theory, change is explained as a 
process in which a disruption in the status quo because of opposing forces is resolved through 
creative synthesis. Processes that aim at resolving conflicts are an example of such dialectical 
processes (van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Lastly, the evolutionary approach describes change in terms 
of a recurrent, cumulative and probabilistic progression of variation, selection and retention, for 
example changes in organizational populations (Hannan & Carroll, 1992; van de Ven & Poole, 
1995). 
 
- 131 - 
None of these change patterns are clearly revealed by our analysis. The common pathway that we 
found and that leads from Formation, via the state of Growth to the State of Stability suggests 
linearity (i.e. life cycle) in network dynamics, yet the differences between fields are too large to be 
conclusive about this. In addition, our theoretical arguments propose a cycle (evolutionary), yet 
this is revealed for none of the field networks as well. This suggests that theories of change can 
only be developed fruitfully for shorter time frames, and the topic should be approached 
empirically once these time frames, and with the associated uncertainty, get longer. 
 We claimed in the introduction that a major practical implication of our work is that it 
allows for a more targeted specification of policy measures directed at external network 
orchestration. According to Mohrman et al. (2006), policy can affect field networks in two distinct 
ways. First, it can impact variation, selection and retention processes in the technology field through 
regulating node entry and exit levels. Obviously, the direction in which network change should take 
place depends on which network states are most conducive for joint innovation. In general, 
however, we can say that our model provides clear levers for inducing state transitions. Should one 
desire to get a network out of its state of Decline, allowing more consortia to enter through making 
more funds available for that specific technology field would be a strategy. In a similar vein, 
networks can be taken out of a state of disintegration by reducing both node entry and node exit. 
The latter can be achieved by for example funding consortia that follow-up consortia that have not 
generated substantial results (and could be considered a failure), yet simply might need more 
gestation time to generate these results. Given a fixed budget, making more resources available for 
one technology field implies that less resources become available for other fields with its 
corresponding impact in network dynamics, however. 
 The second way in which policy can shape networks is through affecting linkages in the 
network via requirements for research proposals and through funding of various kinds of cross-
over or within-field institutes (Mohrman et al., 2006). In this area we see opportunities in particular 
with respect to funding consortia that function as bottom-up network orchestrators, or network 
“weavers” (Ingram & Torfason, 2010) should one desire to get networks in the relative centralized 
state of Growth, for example. This could also aid the reliability of networks (Berthod, Grothe-
Hammer, Müller-Seitz, Raab, & Sydow, 2016), even in times of turmoil, such as the state of 
Disintegration. Lastly, network structure can be affected through mandating specific joint 
consortium ties, although here the question is to what extent these mandated ties will be activated. 
 The most important insight of this study for policy is that indeed, policy should be 
differentiated based on the different state sequences and developmental paces of technology field 
networks. As stipulated in the introduction, rational design of networks is not always possible, and 
it is hence important to map the development of a network before deciding if policy measures 
should be devised, and if so which policy measures are most effective given the developmental 
history of the network. 
Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research 
Despite the strong data basis that has driven our research, it is not without limitations. A recent 
critique on interorganizational network research that has been voiced is that not enough is done to 
overcome the implicit assumption of knowledge circulating freely within these networks (Ghosh 
& Rosenkopf, 2015). Frictions in interorganizational networks exist, for example due to the nature 
of knowledge and the composition of ties. An important limitation of the current study is that we 
do not consider properties of ties in our analysis. For example, even though ties in the networks 
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studied are valued (i.e. the number of joint member ties between any two consortia), tie strength is 
binarized in our analysis in order to avoid additional complexities with respect to calculating density 
and degree centralization for valued graphs (Scott, 2000). One could argue, however, that switches 
between states become more difficult at higher average levels of tie strengths in the networks under 
consideration. Hence, a fruitful extension of our model would be to consider the role of tie 
strength. For example, can we delineate different states if we consider average tie strength in the 
latent profile analysis, and what is the relation between average tie strength in a network and the 
number of dominant designs focused at in a technology field network? 
 Another general issue in research on interorganizational networks related to ties is that not 
much attention is given to the changing states of these ties as such: not all ties are alive and equally 
available at a given point in time. Instead, they could for example be activated periodically, or 
remain in a dormant state for long periods prior to activation (Maclean & Harvey, 2015). It is hard 
to get data on these aspects from secondary data, but one strategy could be to scan minutes of 
meetings of the users committee, for example. Such a strategy has been employed successfully by 
Chappin (2008). In addition, a process-based approach to studying network dynamics could at least 
bring more general insight in the way consortium members perceive these joint member ties and 
in the reasons for, and frequency of activation of these ties. For example, antecedents of tie 
activation or tie deactivation could be studied, or the relation between the state of a tie and the type 
of knowledge that is being transmitted through it. 
 A third issue regarding ties that is specific to our study is that we focused on a specific type 
of tie. Other authors already have raised questions about the relation between the nature of the 
cooperative relationships and network dynamics (Park, 1996), as well as the effect of the funding 
programme on the types of linkages that are formed (Hayashi, 2003; Park & Leydesdorff, 2010). 
Future studies could focus on other types of relations to assess if similar network states and state 
sequence emerge in different collaborative settings or under different funding schemes. 
 A last issue we identify regarding tie specification in our study is that the funding scheme 
that is considered focuses on the Dutch context. Even though foreign organizations are allowed in 
the users committee, most members are Dutch. Because technology dynamics are not bound by 
country borders, especially considering the wave of internationalization that we have witnessed as 
from the 1980s, this means that the networks considered in this chapter are a cut out of a larger, 
global network that we do not fully observe. Future studies should incorporate this international 
focus. 
 Another limitation of our study is related to the specification of network boundaries (see 
Appendix I of Chapter 5). Usually, this is not as explicitly addressed in studies as we do in this 
chapter. An important reason for this is that system boundaries in most studies are already specified 
in the study design. In the introduction, we mentioned that most studies on network dynamics 
focus on the general field of Life Sciences (Powell et al., 2005), or a major sector within this field, 
such as the antibody sector (Gay & Dousset, 2005) or the pharmaceutical sector (Orsenigo et al., 
2001). As this was not the case with our design, ex post classification was needed, which is 
inherently a subjective and not at all evident activity. This can be illustrated with the quote “All 
science is either physics or stamp collecting” that has been attributed to Ernest Rutherford (Bernal, 
1939). As irony would have it, he was later awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry. Although we 
are no proponents of the rather binary “Rutherfordian” approach to classification, classification in 
general involves the risk that the empirical reality is reduced too little, too much or in a non-
representative way. For example, not allowing for cross-technology main field links in this chapter 
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could be disputed: competition between technology fields is much less salient compared to within 
technology fields, which could facilitate knowledge flows and hence make for stronger, more 
persistent joint consortium ties. Hence, we strongly encourage future studies on alternative 
boundary specifications, including a comparison with the results of the analysis presented in this 
chapter. 
 The last issue that has lingered throughout especially the discussion of the practical 
implications this research is that of the link between network dynamics and network effectiveness. 
In general, the link between networks and outcomes is an important motivation for studying 
network dynamics (Ahuja et al., 2012; Clegg et al., 2016; Dagnino et al., 2016). For example, 
Grabher (1993) has argued for regional industrial networks that the very conditions that made these 
networks stand out against the rest also led to the lock-in of these networks and their subsequent 
decline. It is interesting to assess for the networks studied in this chapter to what extent the duration 
with which a network remains in a certain state affects network outcomes. Other authors have 
suggested that different states might have different performance implications (Greve, 1999). 
Related to this, some authors have suggested that networks need to go through certain states in 
order to be fully developed (Carroll, Delacroix, & Goodstein, 1988; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). It 
would be an interesting research exercise to compare outcomes of networks that went through 
certain states (e.g. the growth state) with networks that did not go through these states. The relation 
between the duration of network states and network outcomes will be considered in the last chapter 
of this dissertation. 
 Lastly, at the start of this paper, we mentioned that our research question was simple, yet 
difficult to answer. Although we fruitfully applied the idea of network states and their pathway 
through state spaces, such descriptions should be subject to questions and further analysis 
(Bickhard & Campbell, 2003). Indeed, our research findings raise many more questions, as reflected 
in the above discussion. Even though the challenge in studying network dynamics will remain 
requiring sufficient data, future research that builds forth on our approach should especially focus 
more on the link between the movement of a network through the state space and the development 
of its underlying technology base.  
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Appendix I: Tie and Network Specification 
Figure 10 displays the schematic that shows network construction approach in this dissertation. 
Panel (a) in Figure 10 shows the members of consortium I, which is the focal consortium in this 
example. This panel is constructed using the information provided on a consortium’s evaluation 
(see Table 6 in Appendix I of chapter 2 for an example). The consortium leader is denoted with 
the letter a, whereas the organizational members are denoted by numbers. As indicated, no 
information regarding the internal relational structure of the consortium is available. Given the 
focus of the consortium on knowledge sharing, however, we assume that all consortium members 
are connected to one another. 
FIGURE 10 
Approach to network construction. Focal consortium I (panel (a)) is linked to two other 
consortia (II and III) through a joint project leader tie (a) and joint organization ties (2) 




(a) (b) (c) 
 
Panel (b) zooms out from consortium I and includes the links to other consortia through joint 
membership. From this panel, one can deduct that consortium leader a is also leading another 
consortium, labelled with the Roman numeral II. Besides consortium leader a, also organizations 
3 and 4 are member of this consortium’s user committee. In addition to this consortium leader-
based joint member tie with another consortium, panel (b) shows that consortium I is also linked 
to a third consortium (III) through an organization-based joint membership tie via organization 2. 
In addition to organization 2, also consortium leader b and organizations 5 and 6 are member of 
this consortium’s user committee. 
 Within certain constraints (Krackhardt, 1994), members of consortium II and III can be 
involved in other consortia as well. When added to the network in panel (b), this would create a 
second layer of consortia around the focal consortium. In the same vein, higher order layers can 
be added, and one can easily imagine how, for each technology field and year, the complete network 
emerges when members of all active consortia are included. The resulting complete network 
consists of a blend of interconnected consortium leaders and organizations. This network can 
neither be classified as a 2-mode network (ties between organizations are possible), nor as a 1-mode 
network (no ties between project leaders can exist). Consequently, calculation and interpretation of 
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network measures based on this network would be tricky. In alliance research the methodological 
issue of having multiple nodes operating under the same collaborative umbrella is usually dealt with 
rather pragmatically, either by excluding these multi-partner collaborations from the analyses (Hu 
et al., 2017; Kavusan et al., 2016; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012), or reducing them to dyadic relations 
(Ranganathan & Rosenkopf, 2013). In addition, instead of consortium leaders, the organizational 
affiliations of these leaders could be used instead. Neither of these approaches is desirable, 
however, as this would lead to severe information loss by ignoring the unique nature of multi-
partner collaborations, as well as reducing hundreds of consortium leaders to about 12 research 
organizations with which these consortium leaders are associated. 
 The approach taken in this dissertation is shown in panel (c) of Figure 10: instead of project 
leaders and organizations, nodes are specified at the level of the R&D consortium. Ties between 
nodes represent joint member ties, either forged by project leaders, or the organizations involved 
in the consortium. Because multiple entities can create a link to another consortium (e.g. both 
organization 3 and 4 link to project leader a in panel (b) of Figure 10, values are attached to each 
tie, creating a valued graph. The networks that result from this procedure are used for determining 
the network measures described in the measurements section of this paragraph.  
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5. Variation, Selection and Retention of Knowledge and Network 
Innovative Performance: The Effect of Node Turnover, 
Network Integration and Field Stability29 
Abstract 
Although several scholars have addressed the issue of explaining the outcomes of 
interorganizational networks at the network level, the role of knowledge in the generation of these 
outcomes, especially in the case of publicly funded R&D networks is still understudied. The 
urgency of this topic derives from the observation that despite the many advantages of networks 
as flexible forms of organizing, studies have shown that overall system change can be detrimental 
for network outcomes. Building on the preliminary theory of network effectiveness as suggested 
by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Sebastian (1998), we develop a model in which 
network innovative performance is explained by the level of node entry, stayers and node exit, and 
network integration. These act as proxies for mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and 
retention. In addition, we consider the role of technology field stability. Using a sample of 93 R&D 
networks in the Dutch context, our analysis suggests an important role of said predictors in 
explaining network innovative performance. The effect of node entry (enabling knowledge 
variation) on innovative outcomes is found to be negative in the short run. This effect, however, 
switches to positive in the longer run. In addition, the effect of stayers (enabling positive knowledge 
selection) is positive on the short run. Lastly, our results suggest a crossover interaction between 
network integration (enabling knowledge retention) and field stability. We offer several levers for 
policy regarding the top-down management of publicly funded R&D networks. 
5.1 Introduction 
Whereas most research on interorganizational relationships has focused on the organizational 
antecedents and outcomes of network involvement (Brass et al., 2004; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; 
Zaheer et al., 2010), in the past two decades more and more attention has been given to the 
outcomes of networks as a whole (Provan et al., 2007; Provan & Milward, 1995; Turrini et al., 
2009). This focus on explaining network-level outcomes is fruitful, especially for networks that 
address issues that cannot be solved by the actions of individual organizations alone. In this light, 
recent societal and academic calls for more attention to and research on so-called “grand 
challenges” (i.e. societal problems that only can be solved through the coordinated and sustained 
effort from multiple and diverse stakeholders (George et al., 2016)) makes research on the 
antecedents of whole network outcomes more timely than ever, as such challenges can only be 
solved through the well-orchestrated joint action of multiple organizations, rather than the actions 
of individual organizations (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Provan & Milward, 1995). 
 Studies on interorganizational network outcomes have predominantly focused on public 
networks (Turrini et al., 2009). Driven by the conviction that clients will benefit from a reduced 
fragmentation and better coordination of services, service professionals, policy-makers and 
researchers alike have advocated the organization of public service delivery through a network form 
of organization (Turrini et al., 2009). The models proposed by Provan and Milward (1995) and 
Provan and Sebastian (1998) often have functioned as a benchmark in this area of research (Turrini 
                                                 
29 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the 30th EGOS Colloquium (Rotterdam, July 2014) and the 
DRUID Academy 2015 Conference (Rome, June 2015). The paper presented at the EGOS Colloquium was awarded 
the Andreas Al-Laham Best Paper Award by the Standing Working Group on Organizational Network Research. 
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et al., 2009). Both models explain network outcomes as a function of (1) network structural 
organization and (2) network contextual factors. For example, based on a study of four mental 
health care networks in the United States in the early 1990s, Provan and Milward (1995) develop 
propositions in which a positive relation between the level of centralized network integration and 
network outcomes is contingent on the level of system stability: said positive relationship will be 
less likely under conditions of instability compared to conditions of system stability. 
 Although the work on antecedents of network outcomes has generated a sizeable body of 
knowledge, we identify two aspects that are open for further research. First, compared to structural 
antecedents and network contextual characteristics as predictors of network outcomes, the role of 
knowledge in especially the generation of network innovative outcomes has been rather absent in 
the existing literature (Turrini et al., 2009). In the past, various scholars have stressed the 
importance of interaction and knowledge sharing for innovation (Freeman, 1991; Grant, 1996; 
Meeus et al., 2001; von Hippel, 1988). However, the subsequent wave of research that has been 
conducted on the topic has focused either at the role of networks for organizational innovativeness 
(Meeus et al., 2008; Perkmann et al., 2013; Pittaway et al., 2004), or on systems of innovation, in 
which the role of interorganizational relations is not explicitly considered (Edquist & Hommen, 
1999; Lundvall, 1992). 
 Addressing the role of knowledge in the generation of network outcomes is especially 
relevant for publicly funded research and development (R&D) networks, as R&D is generally 
recognized by governments as a key driver for economic growth (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; 
Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Meeus et al., 2008). Although the stimulation of collaboration 
between actors -and with that network formation- through public funding is considered a laudable 
goal (Defazio et al., 2009), the question regarding the role of knowledge and the organization of 
knowledge flows in such a way that these networks generate innovative outcomes is open for 
further investigation (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Klerkx & Aarts, 2013; McDermott et al., 2009; 
Peterman et al., 2014; Provan & Lemaire, 2012; Sydow & Windeler, 1998; Turner et al., 1990). 
 The second aspect that is open for further research is the role of technology field stability. 
Networks are generally advocated as adaptable, flexible forms of organizing (Provan et al., 2007; 
Provan & Kenis, 2008). Slotte-Kock and Coviello (2010), for example, have suggested that 
purposeful changes and crises in networks might bring more benefits compared to stability. 
However, as indicated earlier, the study by Provan and Milward (1995) suggests that change in the 
environment of a network is detrimental for its functioning, and hence stability is an important 
aspect in the generation of network effectiveness (Provan et al., 2007; Provan & Milward, 1995). 
Therefore, stability might play a larger role in the generation of effective network outcomes than 
initially conceived (Schreyögg & Sydow, 2010), and a focus on field stability will guide us toward a 
better understanding of the requirements for building effective networks. 
 In this chapter, we build on the preliminary theory of network effectiveness that was 
suggested by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Sebastian (1998) to develop a model that 
is applicable to public-private R&D networks. In addition, we focus on the role of knowledge in 
publicly funded R&D networks. More specifically, we are interested in the in- and outflow of 
knowledge from, as well as the retention of knowledge in these networks. We therefore use the 
variation, selection and retention mechanisms that initially were proposed by Campbell (1960). 
Derived from biological evolutionary theory, the use of mechanisms of variation, selection and 
retention has gained ground in many areas in the field of organization science (Baum & McKelvey, 
1999). Our research question is twofold, and reads as follows: 1) to what extent is network 
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innovative performance explained by node entry, stayers, node exit and network integration (which 
are indicative of mechanisms such as knowledge variation, selection and retention respectively), 
and 2) to what extent is the relation between said predictors and network innovative performance 
moderated by the level of technology field stability? 
 We analyse our research questions using 93 network observations from 7 distinct 
interorganizational technology networks in the Dutch context, each covering about 13 years. Nodes 
consist of R&D consortia, and the links between these nodes consist of joint membership ties. 
These networks differ from the networks studied by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and 
Sebastian (1998): whereas they focus on consciously created networks, in which interdependent 
members -even though autonomous- strive to achieve a common goal and jointly produce an 
output (Raab & Kenis, 2009), the networks focused at in this chapter have a more emergent nature, 
as they form as a consequence of joint member ties between consortia. Even though the networks 
differ, we believe drawing on the literature on network effectiveness mentioned above makes sense: 
first, a theoretical body has been developed in which the underlying mechanisms can be applied 
for the networks under investigation here as well. These mechanisms therefore can be tested. In 
addition, even though the collective outcomes of the R&D networks are slightly different, the 
generation of such outcomes is nonetheless important and recognizable for the networks 
considered in this chapter. Through performing the technique of beta regression and using 
different time lags between the independent variables and dependent variable in this analysis. This 
enables us to explore immediate and delayed effects (Monge, 1990) across the time window of five 
years, which is generally considered to be an appropriate time frame that can be explored when 
assessing the technological impact of R&D (Griliches, 1979; Hall et al., 1984; Pakes & 
Schankerman, 1984; Stuart, 2000; Vanhaverbeke et al., 2009). We show that these mechanisms can 
be fruitfully applied to explain complete network innovativeness, as they allow for incorporating 
the role of knowledge dynamics in the generation of network innovative outcomes. 
 In addition, the focus on node entry, stayers, node exit and network integration in this study 
offers a way towards solving the conundrum regarding flexibility and stability. We propose that, in 
addition to being able to retain knowledge, networks require a continuous rate of knowledge inflow 
through node entry and, up to a certain level, selection from this knowledge inflow through stayers 
and node exit. This helps in keeping networks adaptable and flexible, which is vital for network 
innovative performance. However, our theoretical model proposes that this is only the case when 
networks operate against the backdrop of a stable technology field, as field instability leads to the 
need for a reconfiguration of the network’s ability to retain knowledge, which takes time and 
temporarily leads to lower levels of network innovative performance. 
 Our aim with this chapter is to provide levers for top-down network managers for 
optimizing the innovative performance of publicly funded R&D networks. The key insights that 
we deliver with this chapter is that mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and retention do 
matter in explaining network innovative performance. We find that the effect of node entry on 
network innovative performance switches from negative in the short run, to positive in the very 
long run. In addition, our results tentatively suggest that node exit and stayers have a positive effect 
on network innovative performance in the short run. Lastly, we find that, compared to retention 
sparked by high levels of density-based network integration, low levels of network integration lead 
to higher levels of network innovative performance in the short run in unstable fields. As field 
stability increases, however, higher levels of density-based integration lead to higher levels of 
network innovative performance in the short run, compared to low levels of structural integration. 
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These insights are important, because they provide scholars and policy makers with a more refined 
insight in levers that could be used for optimally setting up networks for innovation. We therefore 
contribute to research on public-private innovation networks. Through stressing the importance 
of knowledge variation, selection and retention, we demonstrate that there is a need to sustain a 
certain level of node entry, stayers and node exit, while anticipating negative consequences of 
possible instabilities in a network’s technological context. In addition, we contribute to the 
literature on networks and innovation more generally, as the importance of knowledge variation, 
selection and retention and system stability is likely to extend beyond publicly funded R&D 
networks as they might also hold for networks that emerge without governmental involvement. 
For example, Schilling and Phelps (2007) have suggested that alliance network structure affects the 
performance of firms embedded in such networks. Although it is well-known that the structural 
organization of such networks is sensitive to environmental instabilities (Madhavan, Koka, & 
Prescott, 1998), our results suggest that in addition to the role of network structure and field 
stability, knowledge variation and selection through node entry, stayers and exit play a key role in 
affecting the performance of such networks. 
 Regarding the relevance of our results for policy makers, public policies related to the 
funding of R&D through collaboration are currently rather unrelated to the network structure they 
generate, as discussed in the previous chapter (Meeus et al., 2008). Our results suggest that such 
networks are an object that are worth organizing themselves, and we offer several levers for policy 
regarding the top-down management of such networks by public funding agencies. In addition, the 
formation of the public-private R&D networks that are studied in this chapter results from a 
sampling exercise performed by a funding agency. By focusing on network innovative 
performance, we offer a criterion to benchmark the extent to which this sampling exercise -
performed on the one hand by reviewers (which accepted some consortia and rejected many 
others), and on the other hand consortium leaders (who selected members) and the funding 
agency’s programme management- has been fruitful. After all, if no innovative outcomes are 
generated, one could claim that this sampling exercise has not accumulated in a competent group 
of actors that can deliver innovative results. 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
An important assumption underlying our research question is that it is sensible to consider 
interorganizational networks as systems that are worth studying in themselves, especially in the 
context of scientific and technological development. Taking knowledge and knowledge 
development as key ingredients for progress in these areas, Mohrman et al. (2006) argue that a sole 
focus on organizations might lead one to overlook where the knowledge that is needed for R&D 
actually is produced and leveraged. Indeed, in their seminal work on interorganizational 
collaboration in the biotechnology sector, Powell et al. (1996) argue that in industries with a 
complex, expanding and dispersed knowledge base, innovation takes place between rather than 
within organizations. Hence, it is only through focusing on the full network that one captures the 
system that is responsible for the generation of innovative outcomes. 
 Scholars have provided several arguments for this point. First, technological development 
is a collective endeavour (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011; Mohrman et al., 2006). Knowledge is 
constructed by individuals in a social context, and influences these individuals at the same time 
(Mohrman et al., 2006). For example, with respect to the phenomenon of network dynamics -
focused at in the previous chapter- Orsenigo et al. (2001) have pointed out that scholars coming 
from different disciplines focus at this phenomenon, but from different perspectives. In general, 
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this creates different academic groups that revolve around the same phenomenon even though 
members of these groups approach that phenomenon differently. Second, knowledge creation and 
leverage are enabled by knowledge sharing and knowledge recombination (Mohrman et al., 2006). 
This implies interaction between individuals that each have a unique set of experiences and 
knowledge (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Koschmann et al., 2012). The publication of Wicaksono, 
Zhang, Pandraud, French, and Vincent (2006) is an illustrative example of such recombination: 
scientists from the discipline of microelectronics and mechanical engineering join forces, drawing 
on insect physiology in order to develop a strain sensor that can gauge the health of mechanical 
structures at both the micro- and macro-scale. Third, technological development is often carried 
out in service of and in close relation to application, as in the end technological development is 
geared towards meeting societal needs (Mohrman et al., 2006). The growing body of literature on 
the role of users in the innovation process (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 2010) clearly reflects the 
importance of establishing a close relation between technological development and application. 
Lastly, technological development takes place at an increasingly large scale (Mohrman et al., 2006). 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research (also known as CERN) is an illustrative example 
of this, not only in terms of size (its Large Hadron Collider has a circumference of 27 kilometres), 
but also in terms of members (CERN had 22 members (states) in 2017). The complexity that comes 
with such scale underscores the necessity of linkages that allow knowledge to be shared (Cowan & 
Jonard, 2009; Gittell & Weiss, 2004). Hence, linkages between actors make knowledge available for 
multiple purposes and combine to yield novel frameworks and solutions as well as new meanings. 
Actors group around common bodies of knowledge and technology, and often multiple 
technologies are being developed within the resulting networks (Mohrman et al., 2006). 
FIGURE 11 
Conceptual model depicting the effect of node entry, stayers and node exit, and network 
integration on network innovative performance, including the moderating role of 
technology field stability 
 
The question then becomes how to create and maintain network innovativeness. Figure 11 presents 
the conceptual model that guides our theorizing in this respect. Using node entry, stayers and node 
exit, and network integration as proxies for the variation, selection and selection of knowledge at 
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the network level. Next, we develop hypotheses that predict the level of network innovative 
performance using the mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and retention. In addition, 
we consider the moderating role of the stability of the technology field in which a network is 
embedded. 
Network innovative performance. Different approaches for specifying network-level outcomes 
exist, for example outcomes as perceived by multiple stakeholders in the network, outcomes for 
the community, outcomes in terms of network sustainability (Provan & Milward, 1995, 2001; 
Turrini et al., 2009) or outcomes in terms of positive externalities for network members (Lavie, 
2006b; Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996; Schilling & Phelps, 2007). With network innovative 
performance, we refer to the capacity of a network to generate new products or processes that add 
value and are successfully adopted by the market (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010; Goes & Park, 1997; 
Turrini et al., 2009). Hence, we conceptualize and measure network-level innovation as the 
aggregate of nodal-level innovative outcomes. 
 As generally few scholars have focused on explaining network-level outcomes (Provan et 
al., 2007), few theoretical models are available for explaining network-level innovativeness. For our 
model, we therefore took one of the few models available as a starting point. Originally proposed 
by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Sebastian (1998), this model explains the 
effectiveness of public health service networks by focusing on network structure and the systemic 
context of a network. This model has subsequently been explored and further expanded by various 
scholars in the field of public administration and public innovation (Turrini et al., 2009). Expansion 
of this model included adding more structural attributes as explanatory variables, as well as adding 
a new set of network functioning characteristics, which are all behavioural aspects that are at play 
in a network. It is especially the combination of these functioning characteristics with the systemic 
context of a network that hitherto have shown to be useful predictors for network-level innovation 
(Turrini et al., 2009). Taking these insights as our main source of inspiration, and acknowledging 
that knowledge and mechanisms of variation, selection and retention play an important role in the 
context of technological innovation and collaboration (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Mohrman et al., 
2006; Turrini et al., 2009), we propose a model in which network innovativeness is reached through 
knowledge variation through node entry, knowledge selection through nodes that stay in a network 
and node exit, and knowledge retention through network integration. 
 Scholars that use explanations involving variation, selection and retention depict the three 
mechanisms as a process (e.g. Murmann (2013); Volberda, Van Den Bosch, and Mihalache (2014); 
Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd (2008)). When focusing at specific technological trajectories, this 
is a fruitful approach, as it allows for showing how technologies go through cycles of discontinuity 
and ferment (variation), the emergence of a dominant design (selection) and subsequently 
incremental change (retention) (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Bakker et al., 2012). In our model, 
however, we consider knowledge variation, selection and retention as independent mechanisms 
that serve a purpose at the systemic level: the R&D networks studied in this chapter contain many 
consortia that work on a multitude of technologies, each in their own stage of development. Hence, 
for each cycle to move forward, knowledge variation, selection and retention generally are key 
mechanisms that need to be present. In addition to these mechanisms, we focus at the role of 
system stability (Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015; Provan & Milward, 1995) in order to spell 
out under which conditions of stability nodes in the network are most able to seize the 
opportunities provided by knowledge that is retained in the network. 
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Node entry. In the previous chapter, we explained that node entry especially occurs when 
incumbent nodes get more inert, and when technological breakthroughs occur (Agarwal et al., 
2002; Dercole et al., 2008). In both events, new entrants are considered as pursuers of new 
opportunities, and with that node entry increases the likelihood of new knowledge being introduced 
in a network (Lewin, Massini, & Peeters, 2011; Meeus et al., 2008; Mohrman et al., 2006; Murmann, 
2013; Romanelli, 1999; van de Ven, 1992; Wooldridge et al., 2008), for example through new 
approaches, techniques or practices (Mohrman et al., 2006), experimentation (Volberda et al., 
2014), trials (Romanelli, 1999) or recombination and adaptation of existing knowledge (Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2007; Rao & Singh, 1999). 
 We propose a positive relationship between the level of node entry and network innovative 
performance. As indicated, when the node set of a network does not change over time, nodes can 
become subject to what Grabher (1993) calls the trap of ‘rigid specialization’: despite a clear focus 
of each single node, overall technological development might not gravitate to an optimum. This is 
because existing knowledge of incumbent nodes is not confronted with the new insights and 
practices needed to adapt to their dynamic environment (March, 1991). Hence, the network as a 
system will become less innovative. The negative consequences of this lock-in effect for the 
innovative performance of a network will be avoided by knowledge variation caused by node entry. 
The result of this variation is that the different members in a network continuously will differ to a 
certain extent with respect to the knowledge held (O'Reilly, Harreld, & Tushman, 2009). This 
results in a viable, adaptable network (Grabher, 1993; Grabher & Stark, 1997; Pentland, Feldman, 
Becker, & Liu, 2012), which is considered to be key for network effectiveness (Romanelli, 1999). 
 Hence, node entry enables the exploration of new technological options within a network. 
It therefore indicates that the state of knowledge in this network advances (Mohrman et al., 2006), 
which is needed for network innovativeness. We therefore hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1: As the level of node entry in a network increases, the network’s innovative performance increases as 
well. 
Node exit. In the context of innovation, different knowledge elements flowing into the network 
are linked to different, sometimes alternative technological trajectories (Dosi, 1982; Malerba & 
Orsenigo, 1997). Given scarce resources (Baum & McKelvey, 1999), knowledge variation thus 
introduces rivalry between these alternatives (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; McGrath, Macmillan, 
& Tushman, 1992; Murmann, 2013; van de Ven, 1992), with the result that some alternatives will 
be selected, and some alternatives will not be selected. In this study, we capture both forms of 
selection with positive and negative selection respectively. 
 Hence, negative selection refers to the selection of alternatives that is reflected through 
nodes that leave a network (Baum & McKelvey, 1999; Mohrman et al., 2006). Node exit sparks a 
process of knowledge selection through the disappearance of knowledge from the network that 
does not fit with prevailing technological trajectories that are developed in the network (Baum & 
McKelvey, 1999; Bridoux, Coeurderoy, & Durand, 2016; Davis et al., 2007; McKendrick, 2001; 
Mohrman et al., 2006; Murmann, 2013; Volberda et al., 2014). We propose a curvilinear relationship 
between the level of node exit and the level of network innovative performance. Just like the 
mechanism of knowledge variation, knowledge selection through node exit is critical for the change 
that is needed for a network to adapt (Pentland et al., 2012). Low levels of nodes that exit a network 
indicate that no convergence towards prevailing technological trajectories takes place. Instead, both 
useful and non-useful knowledge variations will be randomly retained or discarded, without the 
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network moving into a more innovative direction (Romanelli, 1999). As the level of nodes that exit 
a network increases, knowledge that does not fit with prevailing technological trajectories 
disappears from the network or is no longer used, focussing the efforts of the remaining network 
members, as well as the use of scarce resources (Murmann, 2013; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). In 
addition, consortia that leave a network mark non-viable paths for the consortia that remain and 
future entrants. This keeps these consortia from pursuing those paths again (Rao & Singh, 1999). 
 These aspects (i.e. focus of efforts and resources and marking non-viable paths) positively 
affect network innovative performance. This effect, however, takes place up to a certain point. 
Even though in general, selection is treated as purely informational in the literature (i.e. accurate 
information is obtained on which a decision is based (Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013)), the outcome of 
the knowledge selection process is uncertain (Murmann, 2013), as one of the key issues at “the 
heart of the R&D-innovation problem is that reasonable people will disagree about what 
technologies will be best when” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, pp. 186; Grodal, Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 
2014). Yet, knowledge selection will not be completely blind, but guided by the preferences and 
prior knowledge of those actors that remain in the network as a result of the selection process 
(Volberda & Lewin, 2003), as well as earlier successes (Miller, 1999). These actors can be member 
of the network (e.g. industrial organizations involved in science-industry networks (Mohrman et 
al., 2006)), or operate outside of the network (e.g. consumers, regulators, or social movements 
(Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982). The point is that targeted knowledge 
selection decisions made by those involved can become myopic (Levinthal & Posen, 2007; Reitzig 
& Sorenson, 2013). Hence, knowledge selection is not necessarily an optimizing force (Barnett & 
Burgelman, 2007). This can be especially detrimental in the event knowledge selection takes place 
through adoption and imitation of a select number of incumbent nodes at the expense of many 
nodes that leave the network. Given that selection does not necessarily imply viability (Aldrich & 
Kenworthy, 1999; Grabher, 1993; Miller, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Romanelli, 1999), even 
when knowledge variation is high, excessive levels of knowledge selection through node exit might 
therefore lead nodes to become subject to the earlier explained trap of ‘rigid specialization’ 
(Grabher, 1993), decreasing the network’s adaptability. This has detrimental effects on network 
innovativeness. For this reason, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 2: Networks with moderate levels of node exit will be more innovative compared to networks with very 
low or very high levels of stayers and node exit. 
Stayers. In addition to negative selection between alternatives that results from the inflow of 
different knowledge elements into a network, we propose that positive selection between 
technological alternatives occurs through nodes that stay in a network (Baum & McKelvey, 1999; 
Mohrman et al., 2006). Such consortia are indicative of the extent to which knowledge is selected 
by consortia that fits with prevailing technological trajectories through adoption of or imitation 
(Bridoux et al., 2016; Calori, Baden-Fuller, & Hunt, 2000; Lewin et al., 2011; McKendrick, 2001; 
Miner & Raghavan, 1999; Mohrman et al., 2006; Romanelli, 1999; Volberda et al., 2014). We 
propose a curvilinear relationship between the level of stayers in a network and the level of network 
innovative performance. Just like the mechanism of knowledge variation, knowledge selection is 
critical for the change that is needed for a network to adapt (Pentland et al., 2012). Low levels of 
nodes that stay a network indicate that no convergence towards prevailing technological trajectories 
takes place. Consequently, both useful and non-useful knowledge variations will be randomly 
retained or discarded, without the network moving into a more innovative direction (Romanelli, 
1999). As the level of nodes that stay in a network increases, knowledge that fits with prevailing 
technological trajectories stays in the network, which focuses the efforts of the remaining network 
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members, as well as the use of scarce resources (Murmann, 2013; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). This 
positively affects network innovative performance. 
 Similar to knowledge selection through node exit, this effect takes place up to a certain 
point. Our arguments for the mechanism that drives this effect runs in parallel with the arguments 
used for knowledge selection through node exit: the outcome of the knowledge selection process 
through nodes that stay in the network is uncertain, even though the literature treats selection as a 
purely informational phenomenon (Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013). This uncertainty is driven by the 
inherent uncertainty of the outcomes of R&D, as it involves different views between actors about 
which solution is most appropriate, and when (Nelson & Winter, 1982, pp. 186; Grodal, 
Gotsopoulos, & Suarez, 2014). Consequently, knowledge selection through nodes that stay in a 
network is steered by the preferences, prior knowledge and successes of those nodes that remain 
in the network (Miller, 1999; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). As such actors drive future knowledge 
selection decisions, myopia (i.e. through collaborating with certain consortia whilst not 
collaboration with other consortia) could become a decisive element (Levinthal & Posen, 2007; 
Reitzig & Sorenson, 2013), which means that knowledge selection is not necessarily an optimizing 
force (Barnett & Burgelman, 2007). When knowledge selection takes place through adoption and 
imitation of a select number of incumbent nodes at the expense of many nodes that leave the 
network, this can be especially detrimental. Hence, selection does not necessarily imply viability 
(Aldrich & Kenworthy, 1999; Grabher, 1993; Miller, 1999; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Romanelli, 
1999), even when knowledge variation is high. As a result, excessive levels of knowledge selection 
might therefore lead nodes to become subject to the earlier explained trap of ‘rigid specialization’ 
(Grabher, 1993), which decreases the network’s adaptability. For this reason, we hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 3: Networks with moderate levels of stayers will be more innovative compared to networks with very low 
or very high levels of stayers. 
Network integration. As explained in chapter 2, network integration refers to the organization of 
knowledge flows in a network. We propose that network integration aids the retention and 
integration of selected knowledge (Abrahamson & Fairchild, 1999; Baum & McKelvey, 1999; 
Calori et al., 2000; McGrath et al., 1992; McKendrick, 2001; Murmann, 2013; van de Ven, 1992; 
Volberda & Lewin, 2003; Volberda et al., 2014; Wooldridge et al., 2008). Network integration 
supports the transmission of selected knowledge, as well as the transmission of this knowledge 
over time from one generation of nodes to another (Davis et al., 2007; O'Reilly et al., 2009). 
 Similar to knowledge selection, a mechanism of knowledge retention is critical for the 
innovative performance of a network, as without a system for retaining selected useful variations, 
there is no way for the network to improve (Rao & Singh, 1999; Romanelli, 1999). Contrary to 
both knowledge variation and selection, however, knowledge retention counteracts the self-
reinforcing loop between variations and selection (van de Ven, 1992; van de Ven & Poole, 1995): 
without knowledge retention, the process of knowledge variation and knowledge selection will go 
on endlessly, without any knowledge becoming ingrained in the network for a longer period. 
 As explained in chapter 2, we propose that network integration aids the retention of 
knowledge in a network in two related ways. The first way is through a cooperative process that 
cements nodes in the network and involves mutual awareness among network members of what 
others are doing. This, in turn, facilitates the retention of knowledge through mutual understanding 
and insight in knowledge interdependencies (Erikson & Bearman, 2006; Fagerberg et al., 2012; 
 
- 146 - 
Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2009; Hollenstein, 2003; Koza & Lewin, 1999; Oh & Jeon, 2007). The 
second way of achieving network integration involves the presence of a small amount of key players 
in the network that introduce common thematic foci (Fagerberg et al., 2012) and undertake 
continuous efforts to integrate the knowledge available in the network, leading to knowledge 
retention (Ata & Van Mieghem, 2009; Burt, 2007; Fagerberg et al., 2012; Fagerberg & Verspagen, 
2009). This enhances the collective perception of network members of viable technological 
alternatives and possible future developments, and focuses their commitment to a limited amount 
of viable core technologies (Afuah, 2013; Gay & Dousset, 2005; Soh, 2010) developed by central 
players (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Powell et al., 2005). Hence, knowledge retention is enabled by 
network integration, allowing network members to build forth on this knowledge by further 
developing selected variations (Davis et al., 2007). We therefore propose that: 
Hypothesis 4: As the level of network integration increases, the network’s innovative performance increases as well. 
Field stability. This concept refers to the absence of marked change in the technology field in 
which a network operates (Provan & Milward, 1995; Turrini et al., 2009). Such change can be 
manifest in what is called an ‘environmental jolt’ or ‘exogeneous shock’. Examples of such jolts are 
scientific or technological breakthroughs (Cattani, Ferriani, & Lanza, 2017; Madhavan et al., 1998; 
Tushman & Nadler, 1986). It is important to recognize the conceptual difference between field 
stability and the concepts of node entry, stayers, and node exit. In this light, it is useful to make a 
distinction between network stability and field stability (Turrini et al., 2009). Node entry, stayers 
and node exit refer to knowledge dynamics within a network, in terms of knowledge variation, 
selection and retention. These dynamics lead to the network being stable but in a specific way 
(Farjoun, 2010; Kilduff, Tsai, & Hanke, 2006): even though network structure is preserved over 
time, node turnover occurs at a stable rate (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Sasovova, Mehra, Borgatti, 
& Schippers, 2010). Complete convergence is never possible in such a network (McKendrick, 
2001). Yet, when given enough time, network members can build up effective search routines that 
allow them to manage and exploit the status quo (Kim et al., 2006; Lavie, 2006a; Lewin et al., 2011; 
McKendrick, 2001; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Patel, Kohtamäki, Parida, & Wincent, 2015; Zollo, 
Reuer, & Singh, 2002), which can be maintained in networks that reside in stable systems. However, 
exogeneous shocks represent significant turning points in the evolution of a technology field 
(Cattani et al., 2017; Tushman & Nadler, 1986). Instead of knowledge in the network being subject 
to variation and selection, the network itself is now subjected to selection pressures (MacKay & 
Chia, 2012). This disruption leads to a shift in the rate of node entry, stayers and node exit, as well 
as the content of knowledge. In addition, search routines need to be adapted (Feldman, 2000). A 
scientific breakthrough, for example, might both attract a larger number of new nodes to the 
network in pursuit of new paths that are opened in the knowledge space, whereas others are pushed 
out of the network due to obsolescence of old paths (Geels, 2010; Lazzarini, 2015). 
 We propose a positive moderation effect of field stability in the relation between network 
integration and innovative performance. Network integration reflects the extent to which 
knowledge can be retained in a network. Especially the mechanism of knowledge retention has 
been suggested to need time to come into effect (Murmann, 2013). The consequence of an 
exogeneous shock is that new windows of opportunity are created (Geels et al., 2016; Guennif & 
Ramani, 2012; Shane & Venkataraman, 2003) and new dominant players might emerge in the 
network (Cantwell & Vertova, 2004; Meyer-Krahmer, 1992). In addition, networks might need high 
levels of flexibility to adapt to the new status quo, temporarily reducing the salience of network 
integration and its related mechanism of knowledge retention (Cattani et al., 2017; Wiegmann, de 
Vries, & Blind, 2017; Yin & Shanley, 2008). As such, the underlying network structure needs time 
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to adapt and support network innovation again (Hermelo & Vassolo, 2010). In line with other 
scholars (Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Levén, Holmström, & Mathiassen, 2014; Provan & Milward, 
1995; Turrini et al., 2009), we therefore hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 5: The positive relationship between knowledge integration and network effectiveness is positively 
moderated by the level of field stability 
5.3 Data and methods 
Research setting and data 
We test our hypotheses using data that was collected as part of a larger research endeavour (for 
example, see the other chapters in this dissertation and (Mannak, 2015; Mannak et al., 2012). This 
dataset contains information on 1,928 Dutch R&D consortia, and was built using 23 evaluation 
reports issued by a technology foundation from 1985 until 201030. These reports contain 
evaluations of consortia that existed somewhere in the time frame 1981-2004. The foundation aims 
at realizing knowledge transfer between industry and the technical sciences. In light of that aim, it 
funds R&D consortia designed by academic reseachers that have formed a committee of interested 
industrial organizations that see potential application possibilities of the consortium’s results. 
Members of the committee meet at least twice a year during the consortium, and discuss the 
progress of the research and possible application areas of the results so far. Members can also 
contribute in kind to the consortium, for example by providing machines, materials and know-
how. In additon, they might function as a testing-ground for the technology that is being developed. 
 The approach of this funding organization is a clear reflection of the von Hippel-agenda, 
in which a prominent role in the process of R&D and innovation is reserved for users (von Hippel, 
1988). The benefit of doing so is twofold: for researchers, involving users is a test of the viability 
of their research programme, and for industrial participants it is a relatively accesible way to keep 
up to date with the most recent scientific developments. The funding programme is one of the few 
programmes in the Netherlands that organizes research in this way (Velzing, 2013), and leads to 
network formation: as explained in chapter 3, joint membership by consortium participants in 
multiple consortia simultaneously leads to the forging of joint member ties between consortia and 
with that, the emergence of consortium networks (see chapter 4 for the boundary specification 
approach regarding these networks. Out of the 156 networks studied in that chapter, 93 networks 
had outcome data available and hence were suitable for analysis in this chapter). 
 It is the innovative performance of those networks that is of primary interest in this chapter, 
as these networks are exemplary reflections of networks that should be considered at the system 
level: the funding system was established because of the recognition that research and development 
is one of the key drivers for economic growth (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Branstetter & Sakakibara, 
2002; Meeus et al., 2008). Hence, the networks that emerge as a result from this system reflect the 
organization of knowledge flows between industry and academia in the Netherlands. Seeing that 
public administration and innovation research suggests that the outcomes of such networks are 
influenced by their structure and functioning (Mohrman et al., 2006; Provan & Milward, 1995; 
Turrini et al., 2009), studying such networks is suitable and relevant for specifying more targeted 
                                                 
30 As indicated in the general introduction of this dissertation, several topics regarding the construction of this dataset 
are elaborated on in the different appendices to the different empirical chapters in this dissertation. The topics covered 
are (1) data sources and database construction (Chapter 2), (2) node specification (Chapter 3), (3) tie and network 
specification (Chapter 4) and (4) network boundary specification (Chapter 5). 
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innovation policy. In addition, the networks studied in this chapter are deliberately created selection 
environments for new technologies. Involvement of industry acts as a selection mechanism that 
delineates feasible technologies from less feasible ones. Hence, knowledge variation, selection and 
retention need to take place in these networks. Lastly, due to the ex-ante measurement of outcomes 
by the funding agency, a time lag exists between measurement of the network structure and 
measurement of its outcomes, which meets the requirement of temporal separation between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable for making causal claims (Antonakis et al., 2010). 
Measurements 
Network innovative performance. Different measures of network outcomes have been 
proposed, but most of these measures focus on the effectiveness of information transmission 
through the network (Ahuja, 2000a; Kajikawa et al., 2010; Pitt, Merwe, Berthon, Salehi-Sangari, & 
Barnes, 2006). In our definition, we focus on the capacity of a network to generate new products 
or processes. Ideally, one would have a measure that captures the synergetic effect of networks. 
Such measures do exist, for example in the team literature where team synergy is expressed as team 
performance that exceeds the solo performance of even the best team member (Larson, 2007). 
Measuring network-level outcomes, however, is problematic (Provan & Milward, 1995) and a 
synergistic measure of network-level innovative performance is difficult to develop as it would 
imply separate performance measures for each node involved as well as for the network as a whole. 
 Our measurement approach in this chapter is as follows. As from the year 1989, the funding 
organization has developed a uniform evaluation method for each consortium it has funded. This 
evaluation is performed five years after the start of a consortium and carried out by an external 
committee of specialists. Focusing on the technological outcomes of the consortium, four distinct 
scores can be assigned: 0 (failure), A (further research is necessary), B (a prototype has been 
developed) and C (substantial results were generated). Similar to our approach in chapter 2, we 
consider the last score to reflect a consortium that has generated a succesful innovation. For each 
year, we determined the innovative performance of a network by dividing the count of consortia 
that received a ‘C’-evaluation and that finished in that year by the total number of evaluated 
consortia in that year. The result is a ratio between 0 and 1, with a 0 indicating that the network 
did not generate any innovations at all in a certain year, and a 1 indicating that the network 
generated nothing else than innovations in that year. 
Node entry. This proxy reflects the introduction of new knowledge to the network. We 
operationalized it by measuring the number of new entrants in a network in each year. Taking t as 
the reference year, node entry is determined as the number of new consortia that entered the 
network at t. A consortium was considered “new” when its leader was not involved in any other 
consortium three years preceding t. Hence, node entry is expressed as a count variable, ranging 
from 0 (the level of node entry is nil) to the maximum network size (representing the maximum 
level of node entry). This maximum score, however, is not likely to be observed. 
Node exit. This proxy reflects the mechanism of negative knowledge selection. Node exit was 
determined by counting the number of consortia that left the consortium network just before the 
network was observed at t. Following the same reasoning as with node entry, a consortium was 
considered to exit the network when its leader did not appear again in the three years following t. 
We focus on consortium leaders as in this specific funding system, these leaders are the knowledge 
anchors. It is the consortium leader that has in-depth academic knowledge regarding the topic at 
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hand, as well as knowledge regarding potential industrial collaboration partners. This knowledge 
flows out of the network the moment such a consortium leader leaves. 
Stayers. This proxy reflects the mechanism of positive knowledge selection. The proxy was 
measured by determining the number of stayers in a network at t. This number was calculated by 
subtracting the sum of node entry and node exit from total network size at t. Like the measurement 
of node entry, the measurement of this proxy resulted in a count variable. 
Network integration. This proxy reflects the mechanism of knowledge retention in a network. It 
captures both the integration and further development of selected knowledge. As we explained the 
underlying mechanisms using a structural lens, we use a similar operationalization as the one used 
for network integration in chapter 2. Hence, we use the two complementary measures of network 
density and degree centralization (Provan & Milward, 1995). Network density represents the 
“connectedness” of consortia through joint members (indicating mutual awareness) and degree 
centralization expresses the extent to which these joint member ties are organized around one or 
more central consortia (indicating common thematic foci). Both measures were calculated for each 
consortium network. Network density was calculated by dividing the actual number of ties present 
in a network by the total number of theoretically possible ties in that network (Scott, 2000). Ties 
in the consortium networks studied in this chapter were undirected. Network centralization was 
measured using the degree centralization measure (Freeman, 1978), which is based on the degree 
centrality scores of individual consortia in the network. These scores were all normalized before 
calculating degree centralization, to account for differences in network size. When a network 
consisted of multiple components, we first calculated degree centralization for each component 
individually. Then, a weighted average based on component size was calculated. For all calculations, 
we used the functionality available in the statnet suite (Goodreau et al., 2008) available in the R 
statistical environment (R Development Core team, 2016). 
 Contrary to the operationalization used in chapter 2, a simplified measure of network 
integration is used because in this study we have a relatively small sample. Instead of classifying the 
density and centralization scores using three groups (i.e. lower than the mean minus one standard 
deviation, in between the mean ± one standard deviation and larger than the mean plus one 
standard deviation), we construct measures based on a mean-split: all scores on the network 
variable smaller than the mean of that score in the technology field are considered to be low, 
whereas all scores larger than or equal to the mean of that variable in the technology field are 
considered to be high. As a result, four classes are constructed: low retention (both density and 
centralization scores are smaller than the mean), retention through density-based integration 
(density is equal to or larger than its mean and centralization is smaller than the mean), retention 
through centralization-based integration (comparable approach as for density-based integration) 
and high retention (opposite approach as the one followed for low integration). These four classes 
were captured using two dummies, with the class of low integration being the reference category. 
Field stability. In the previous chapter, we determined distinct network dynamic states using a 
latent profile analysis. Five distinct states were identified (i.e. formation, growth, stagnation, 
stability and disintegration), and the sequence of states was linked to the development of the 
underlying technology field. The concept of field stability, which refers to the absence of marked 
technological change in the technology field in which a network is embedded, was operationalized 
using these network states. Using the sequence of dynamic states, system stability is operationalized 
by determining for each network the number of years that have passed since the last state change. 
This resulted in a count variable, with a possible range from 0 (the network has undergone a state 
 
- 150 - 
change in the transition from the previous year to the current year) to the maximum number of 
years we observed a given network. Given the fact that each network was characterized by some 
state changes in each year, this maximum score is not reached for any of the networks we observed. 
Control variables. In addition to the independent variables derived from our conceptual model, 
we include three control variables. First, although the first consortia started in 1981, a uniform 
evaluation method was implemented as from 1989. This means that for several networks, not all 
consortia in these networks received an evaluation. We calculated the innovative performance of 
these networks nevertheless, assuming that the outcomes of those consortia that did receive an 
evaluation are representative for all consortia in the network. By doing so, however, observations 
of the dependent variable are split in two groups: one group in which network innovative 
performance is calculated using complete information, and one group in which network innovative 
performance is calculated using incomplete information. To control for possible differences 
between both groups, we include a variable labeled “% Complete outcomes”. This variable is a 
ratio between consortia that received an evaluation and all consortia that should have received an 
evaluation in a network, and can obtain values in the range (0,1]. Second, we controlled for 
technology fields. It is known in the literature that collaboration propensity varies between sectors, 
for example because of differences in reliance on scientific knowledge among technologies 
(Hagedoorn, 2002; Peri, 2005; Tamada et al., 2006). In addition, marked differences between 
technology fields exist, for example in terms of primary motivations (Martin, 2003), institutional 
contexts (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983), or innovation speed. Given a limited number of observations 
in our data, including all 7 technology fields as dummies in our analysis would cost too much in 
terms of statistical power. We therefore reduced the number of distinct technology fields by 
constructing a dummy Engineering technology fields that indicates if a network belongs to a 
technology field that is mainly science-dominated (i.e. Chemistry and Life sciences, score = 0), or 
to a technology field that is mainly engineering-dominated (i.e. Civil engineering, Electrical 
engineering, Instruments, Mechanical engineering and Medical technology, score = 1). Lastly, we 
included a year variable in our dataset. This accounts for possible path-dependencies in the effect 
of time (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). 
Data analysis 
Two considerations drove our choice for an appropriate analytical model and strategy. First, the 
dependent variable in this study is proportional. A traditional OLS approach is not appropriate for 
such data: by nature, proportional data is bound at 0 and 1, and running an OLS may yield fitted 
values of the dependent variable that exceed these lower and upper bounds (Ferrari & Cribari-
Neto, 2004). One could transform the dependent variable such that the transformation assumes 
values on a real line that goes beyond 0 and 1, yet this leads to interpretation issues (Cribari-Neto 
& Zeileis, 2010). In addition, distributions of proportional data are often asymmetrical and 
regression models based on such data suffer from heteroskedasticity, especially when small sample 
sizes are considered31 (Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010). Hence, we resorted to the technique of beta 
regression. Beta regression models assume that the dependent variable is beta-distributed. This is 
a continuous probability distribution that is defined on the interval between 0 and 1. The 
distribution can assume a number of different shapes, depending on the parameterization of both 
the mean and a precision parameter (Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010). As a result, beta regression 
                                                 
31 Indeed, when we fit our data using an OLS and check if the resulting model meets the requirements (using the 
approach as outlined by Pena and Slate (2006)), data skewness and the model exhibiting heteroskedasticity are indicated 
as issues. 
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models are heteroskedastic by nature, and conveniently accommodate asymmetries in the data 
(Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010). As the beta distribution does not include the scores 0 and 1 and 
our dependent variable contains these scores, we apply a transformation on the dependent variable 
that has been suggested by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006): taking y as the dependent variable and 
n as the sample size, this transformation is (y × (n - 1) + 0.5) / n. 
 The second consideration regarded the choice of the lag structure between the independent 
variables and the dependent variable. Depending on the type of relationship studied, the time frame 
for innovative payoffs may vary dramatically (Saxton, 1997). As discussed in chapter 3, the literature 
suggests that exploring a time window of five years for assessing the technological impact of R&D 
is appropriate, as knowledge has been demonstrated to lose most of its economic value within five 
years (Griliches, 1979; Hall et al., 1984; Pakes & Schankerman, 1984; Stuart, 2000; Vanhaverbeke 
et al., 2009). In addition, exploring a time window of five years allows for exploring immediate and 
delayed effects (Monge, 1990). Hence, we implement this explorative approach in our analysis by 
including three distinct lag structures. The first lag structure explores a time lag of 1 year between 
the predictor variables and outcome variable. In other words: we assess the extent to which 
consortia that will finish at t are affected by the level of knowledge variation, selection and retention 
in the network at t-1. This lag structure therefore considers the short-term effect of our 
independent variables on the level of innovative outcomes of a network. The second lag structure 
links predictor variables measured at t-3 to network innovative performance measured at t. As such, 
it models the effect of our independent variables on network innovative performance in the long 
run. In the third lag structure, predictor variables measured at t-5 are related to network innovative 
performance measured at t. This structure models the effect of the independent variables on 
network innovative performance in the very long run. 
 For all models, 93 observations are available. Three models are estimated per time lag. In 
the first model, only the dummy variables are included. This model is the same for all time lags, as 
this model does not contain lagged independent variables. The second model adds the direct 
effects, whereas we add interaction effects in the third model. As our sample size is relatively small 
compared to the number of predictors, results will be relatively non-generalizable. Given the 
difficulty in collecting longitudinal network data as well as data regarding network performance, 
we nevertheless run these models to get some first insights. All variables except for the dummies 
are scaled in our analyses. The ‘betareg’-package (Cribari-Neto & Zeileis, 2010) is used for 
estimating the models, which is available in R (R Development Core team, 2016). Similar to the 
other chapters in this dissertation, all visualizations are made with the ‘ggplot2’ package (Wickham, 
2009) also available in R, unless indicated otherwise. 
5.4 Results 
Descriptives and correlations 
Means, standard deviations, the minimum and maximum observation per variable as well as 
correlations are displayed in Table 20, Table 21, and Table 22. Given our analytical strategy, proxies 
for knowledge variation, selection and retention mechanisms, as well as technology field stability 
were related to network innovative performance at three distinct points in time: one year before 
consortia in the network finished and were evaluated, three years before these consortia finished 
and five years before these consortia finished. The data used for each time lag can be found in 
Table 20, Table 21 and Table 22 respectively. As reflected in the similar descriptives with respect 
 
 




Descriptives and correlations – 1 year before evaluation32 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Network innovative performance……….. .31 .25 0 1 -          
2. % Complete outcomes………………….. .88 .24 .09 1 .24* -         
3. Engineering-based technology fields……. .71 .46 0 1 .36** .04 -        
4. Year…………………………………….. 1997.81 3.91 1991 2004 .14 .69** .01 -       
5. Node entry (knowledge variation)………. 8.40 5.54 0 31 -.21* .05 -.51** .03 -      
6. Node exit (knowledge selection)……….... 6.84 5.35 0 26 -.01 .22* -.48** .32** .45** -     
7. Stayers (knowledge selection……………. 44.97 26.05 4 113 -.03 .11 .58** .16 .65** .52** -    
8. Density-based integration (retention)......... .13 .34 0 1 -.01 -.10 .25* -.04 -.15 -.12 -.17 -   
9. Centralization-based integration (retention)….. .11 .31 0 1 .19 .04 .15 -.00 -.08 -.04 -.08 -.13 -  
10. High integration (retention)……………. .30 .46 0 1 -.08 -.26* -.10 -.23* .12 -.02 .03 -.25* -.23* - 
11. Field stability…………………………... 5.49 4.67 0 18 .04 .19 -.27** .36** .18 .29** .33** .02 -.06 .01 
  
                                                 
32 n = 93. **p < .01; *p < .05. The reference category for the ‘Engineering-based technology fields’-dummy is the category of ‘Science-based technology fields’. The reference category 
for the ‘Knowledge retention’-dummies is the ‘Knowledge retention (low)’-category. 
 




Descriptives and correlations – 3 years before evaluation33 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Network innovative performance……….. .31 .25 0 1 -          
2. % Complete outcomes………………….. .88 .24 .09 1 .24* -         
3. Engineering-based technology fields……. .71 .46 0 1 .36** .04 -        
4. Year…………………………………….. 1995.81 3.91 1989 2002 .14 .69** .01 -       
5. Node entry (knowledge variation)………. 7.95 5.55 0 31 -.13 -.06 -.55** -.04 -      
6. Node exit (knowledge selection)……….... 6.04 4.49 0 18 -.09 .10 -.47** .23* .39** -     
7. Stayers (knowledge selection……………. 42.14 25.41 3 113 .02 .21* -.54** .31** .61** .54** -    
8. Density-based integration (retention)......... .13 .34 0 1 .17 -.23* .25* -.10 -.05 -.03 -.05 -   
9. Centralization-based integration (retention)….. .12 .32 0 1 .21* .12 .16 .06 -.11 -.04 -.10 -.14 -  
10. High integration (retention)……………. .29 .46 0 1 -.13 -.03 -.27** -.27** .20 .03 .09 -.25* -.23* - 
11. Field stability…………………………... 4.66 3.95 0 16 .09 .22* -.28** .38** .15 .30** .35** .13 -.10 .01 
  
                                                 
33 n = 93. **p < .01; *p < .05. The reference category for the ‘Engineering-based technology fields’-dummy is the category of ‘Science-based technology fields’. The reference category 
for the ‘Knowledge retention’-dummies is the ‘Knowledge retention (low)’-category. 
 




Descriptives and correlations – 5 years before evaluation34 
Variable Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Network innovative performance……….. .31 .25 0 1 -          
2. % Complete outcomes………………….. .88 .24 .09 1 .24* -         
3. Engineering-based technology fields……. .71 .46 0 1 .36** .04 -        
4. Year…………………………………….. 1993.81 3.91 1987 2000 .14 .69** .01 -       
5. Node entry (knowledge variation)………. 7.68 5.56 0 31 .08 .19 -.54** .18 -      
6. Node exit (knowledge selection)……….... 5.71 4.44 0 18 -.16 .11 -.48** .30** .41** -     
7. Stayers (knowledge selection……………. 38.13 23.90 4 113 -.01 .23* -.48** .38** .64** .53** -    
8. Density-based integration (retention)......... .15 .36 0 1 .12 -.08 .27** -.16 -.08 -.11 -.11 -   
9. Centralization-based integration (retention)….. .15 .36 0 1 -.03 -.06 .20 -.02 -.16 -.04 -.13 -.18 -  
10. High integration (retention)……………. .29 .46 0 1 .08 -.37** -.05 .26* .11 .21* -.53** -.27** -.27** - 
11. Field stability…………………………... 3.89 3.31 0 14 .07 .17 -.24* .34** .22* .31** .27** .16 -.20 .11 
 
                                                 
34 n = 93. **p < .01; *p < .05. The reference category for the ‘Engineering-based technology fields’-dummy is the category of ‘Science-based technology fields’. The reference category 
for the ‘Knowledge retention’-dummies is the ‘Knowledge retention (low)’-category. 
 
- 155 - 
to network innovative outcomes, the % of complete outcome data available for each network and 
the technology field dummies across the correlation tables, and different descriptives with respect 
to the other predictors across the correlation tables, the same vector of network outcome data is 
regressed on different vectors of the explanatory variables. We now will compare the three resulting 
correlation tables. 
 With respect to the descriptives regarding network innovative outcomes in Table 20, one 
can see that its average level across networks is 31% (i.e. on average, 31% of consortia that finish 
in a network receive the highest evaluation possible in the funding scheme). Compared to the range 
of the variable, observations tend to be skewed to the left. In addition, the large standard deviation 
indicates considerable variation across networks with respect to the level of innovative 
performance. Earlier we explained that not all outcome variables of consortia that finished in a 
certain year were available for all networks, and that we assumed that network innovative 
performance based on the outcome data that was available was representative for all consortia. The 
positive correlation between network innovative performance and % of complete outcomes (r = 
.24, p < .05) indicates that as more outcome data is available for determining network 
innovativeness, the % of complete outcomes variable is higher. This effect is controlled for in all 
analyses. The positive correlation between the technology field dummy and network innovative 
performance (r = .36, p < .01) shows that engineering-based fields on average have a higher level 
of innovative performance compared to science-based technology fields. Lastly, the negative 
correlation with node entry (r = -.21, p < .05) shows that less innovative networks are associated 
with less knowledge variation in terms of new nodes entering the network. 
 The control variable that denotes the % of outcomes available for determining network 
innovativeness has an average score of 88%. This means that for most networks, outcome data for 
all consortia were available for calculating a network effectiveness score. The control variable is 
strongly correlated with the year control (r = .69, p < .01), which means that over time, the data 
available for determining network innovativeness got more complete. This time effect also explains 
the positive correlation of this control variable with node exit (r =.22, p < .05) and its negative 
correlation with high network integration (r =-.26, p < .05): as networks mature, node exit is more 
likely, and networks need time to get integrated. 
 Most networks (71%) are embedded in engineering-based technology fields. The various 
correlations in Table 20 indicate that marked differences exist between both types of fields in terms 
of node entry, stayers, node exit and network integration. Correlations of the year control with 
other variables are almost similar to the earlier discussed correlations with the control variable % 
of complete outcomes, except for field stability: as time progresses, technology fields get more 
stable (r =.36, p < .01). Large correlations exist between the proxies for knowledge variation and 
knowledge selection. Intuitively this makes sense: as more new knowledge enters the network, 
more selection takes place (r =.45, p < .01 and r =.65, p < .01 respectively). In addition, knowledge 
selection through nodes exiting and through nodes staying are highly correlated, as knowledge 
selection always implies retaining knowledge at the cost of other knowledge, which disappears from 
the network (r =.52, p < .01). None of these correlations are in excess of .8 though, which usually 
is considered to be a serious problem for the reliable estimation of coefficients with small standard 
errors (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Pallant, 2005). 
 Interesting is the positive correlation between node exit and field stability (r =.29, p < .01): 
more nodes leaving a network are indicative of a more stable technological environment. Lastly, 
from the means of the knowledge retention proxies we deduce that almost half of all networks (i.e. 
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46%) belong to the ‘low integration’ category. The remainder is assigned to knowledge retention 
through centralization-based integration, and to a lesser extent retention through density-based 
integration and high network integration. 
 With respect to differences between correlations over the years, we observe a marked 
change over time in the correlation between network innovative performance and centralization-
based network integration. This correlation is about .20 one and three years before network 
innovative performance is measured and drops to 0 five years before this measurement takes place. 
This indicates that the association between knowledge retention through centralization-based 
integration and network innovative performance fades in the long run. Some shifts take place in 
the correlations between the % of complete outcomes: correlations with this control variable shift 
from knowledge retention through exits to knowledge selection through stayers as the time lag 
increases. The earlier mentioned time effect also is at play here: in earlier observed networks, it is 
likely to observe more stayers compared to networks that are observed at a later point in time. 
Lastly, we observe a negative correlation with density-based integration in the third year (r =-.23, p 
< .05), as well as a positive correlation with field stability (r =.22, p < .05) in the same year. 
 With respect to correlations between the technology field dummy and other variables, no 
differences are observed except for high network integration which becomes negative three years 
before innovative performance is measured (r =-.28, p < .01). Correlations between year and other 
variables follow similar patterns across lags except for a shift from negative to positive with respect 
to the correlation with high network integration: in earlier years, networks are get more integrated 
as time progresses, whereas in later years this is the opposite. Lastly, differences with respect to 
field stability can be seen: five years before network innovative performance is measured, we see a 
positive correlation with node entry (r =.22, p < .05). Similar correlations exist between node exit 
and high network integration five years before network innovative performance is measured (r 
=.21, p < .05), and between stayers and high network integration five years before network 
innovative performance is measured (r =-.53, p < .01). 
Results of beta regression analysis 
The results of the beta regression analyses are shown in Table 23. Visualisations of relevant results 
are provided in Figure 12. As indicated in the methods section, in addition to an estimation of the 
intercept, the technique of beta regression yields a precision parameter for each model. Taking the 
inverse of this parameter results in an indicator of the dispersion of the dependent variable. As can 
be deduced from Table 23, all models have significant precision parameters. This indicates that the 
dependent variable indeed follows a non-normal distribution and justifies the use of a beta 
regression model. 
 As explained earlier, different time lags between the dependent and independent variables 
are considered: 1 year, 3 years and 5 years. Hence, Model 2 and Model 3 show the effect in the 
short run (1 year), Model 4 and Model 5 for the long run (3 years) and Model 6 and Model 7 for 
the very long run (5 years). By specifying the time lags in this way, we gain additional insight in the 
timing of salient effects on network innovativeness. Whereas models 2 to 7 relate to different time 
lags, Model 1 includes controls that are not time-variant. Hence, this model is the same for all time 
lags specified. With respect to these controls, we see the same behaviour of the % Complete 
outcomes control variable as the behaviour seen in the correlation matrix: networks for which the 
outcome data used in determining network innovative performance is more complete generally are 
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TABLE 23 
Results of beta regression models predicting network innovative outcomes 
Variable 
Model 1 
lag = 1 year lag = 3 years lag = 5 years 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept………………………………… -1.11*** (.22) -1.49*** (.29) -1.44*** (.29) -1.41*** (.30) -1.61*** (.31) -1.45*** (.31) -1.46*** (.32) 
1. % Complete outcomes…………...……. .32* (.16) .39* (.16) .35* (.16) .35* (.16) .36* (.17) .30† (.16) .31† (.16) 
2. Engineering technology fields……...…... .50* (.25) .97** (.34) .76* (.34) .77* (.34) 1.04** (.36) 1.10** (.35) 1.13** (.37) 
3. Year…………………………...…….… -.03 (.16) -.12 (.16) .07 (.17) -.19 (.18) -.27 (.19) -.08 (.18) -.13 (.19) 
4. Node entry (knowledge variation)……....  -.34* (.16) -.38* (.16) -.10 (.16) -.04 (.16) .50** (.16) .51** (.16) 
5. Node exit (knowledge selection)………..  .00 (.36) .09 (.34) -.13 (.43) -.04 (.43) -.83* (.42) -.67 (.44) 
6. Node exit (knowledge selection)2………  .08 (.33) -.03 (.32) .05 (.41) -.06 (.41) .71† (.39) .55 (.43) 
7. Stayers (knowledge selection)…………..  1.31** (.47) 1.04* (.52) .99* (.47) .51 (.52) .63 (.43) .43 (.48) 
8. Stayers (knowledge selection)2………….  -.81† (.43) -.61 (.46) -.50 (.43) -.07 (.47) -.52 (.39) -.34 (.43) 
9. Density-based integration (retention)…..  -.24 (.37) -.19 (.36) .40 (.39) .31 (.42) .05 (.35) -.06 (.39) 
10. Centralization-based integration (retention)..  .37 (.39) .48 (.37) .73† (.37) .65† (.38) -.35 (.34) -.31 (.43) 
11. High integration (retention)…………...  .06 (.28) .14 (.27) -.16 (.30) -.16 (.30) -.26 (.29) -.27 (.30) 
12. Field stability………………………….   -.23 (.18)  .37* (.19)  .17 (.20) 
13. 9 × 12……………….……………..…   2.07*** (.51)  -.23 (.46)  .05 (.36) 
14. 10 × 12………………..……………....   .22 (.36)  -.65 (.42)  -.05 (.60) 
15. 11 × 12……………….………………   .26 (.26)  -.06 (.26)  -.14 (.26) 
Precision parameter 1.93*** (.25) 2.36*** (.32) 2.93*** (.40) 2.33*** (.31) 2.50*** (.34) 2.42*** (.33) 2.46*** (.33) 
Log likelihood 33.67 42.75 52.53 42.13 44.73 43.32 43.85 
Residual df 88 80 76 80 76 80 76 
χ2 - 16.468* 34.133*** 17.235* 23.233* 20.747** 21.395* 
note: n = 93. ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; †p < .1. Standard errors are displayed between parentheses. The reference category for the engineering technology field dummy is the 
science-based technology field. The reference category for the knowledge retention dummies is low knowledge retention. 
 




Marginal effects for selected coefficients 
Node entry (knowledge variation), all lags, Models 3, 5 and 7 
(a) 




- 159 - 
 
 
FIGURE 12 (CONTINUED) 
Marginal effects for selected coefficients 
Stayers (knowledge selection), lag = 1 year, Model 3 
(c) 
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assigned a higher score on the measure of network innovative performance. In addition, we see 
that engineering-based technology fields generate higher levels of innovative performance 
compared to science-based technology fields. 
 Several interesting findings emerge from our analyses. First, hypothesis 1 predicted a 
positive relation between the level of node entry in a network (reflecting knowledge variation) and 
the innovative performance of this network. When one compares the different models across the 
different time lag specifications, a switch in the effect over time can be seen. This is illustrated with 
marginal effect plot (a) in Figure 12. The effect of node entry on network innovative performance 
is significantly negative for the one-year lag, absent for the three-year lag and significantly positive 
for the five-year lag. Hence, whereas in the short run node entry leads to lower levels of network 
innovative performance, in the very long run node entry leads to higher levels of network 
innovative performance. Hence, hypothesis 1 is supported with respect to the long-term effect of 
node entry on network innovative performance, and not supported for the other two lag 
specifications. Instead, a negative effect of node entry is found for the short run. 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that networks with moderate levels of node exit were more 
innovative compared to networks with very low or very high levels of said proxy. This curvilinear 
effect represents the mechanism of knowledge selection. The analysis results do not convincingly 
support this hypothesis: Model 2 and Model 6 suggest weakly significant curvilinear relations 
between knowledge selection through exits in the very long run. Marginal effect plot (b) in Figure 
12 illustrates this effect. From this plot one can deduce that a u-shaped relation between knowledge 
selection through exits and network innovative performance is suggested in the long run. The effect 
disappears, however, when interactions are added in Model 3 and Model 7. Hence, hypothesis 2 is 
not supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that networks with moderate levels of stayers were more innovative 
compared to networks with very low or very high levels of stayers. Like node exit, this curvilinear 
effect represents the mechanism of knowledge selection. The analysis results do not convincingly 
support our hypothesis: Model 2 and Model 6 suggest weakly significant curvilinear relations 
between knowledge selection through stayers and network innovative performance in the short 
run. Marginal effect plot (c) in Figure 12 illustrate this effect. The plot suggests a marginal return 
from increasing levels of knowledge selection through stayers and network innovative performance 
in the short run. The effect disappears, however, when interactions are added in Model 3 and Model 
7. The net effect that remains in the full models is a positive effect of knowledge selection through 
stayers on innovative outcomes in the short run (Model 3). Hence, hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Instead, we find a positive effect of knowledge selection by consortia that stay in a network and 
the innovative performance of this network. 
 The predictors in Table 23 that relate to network integration (reflecting the mechanism of 
knowledge retention) test our fourth hypothesis. This hypothesis predicted that at higher levels of 
network integration, the innovative performance of this network increases as well. Although Model 
4 and Model 5 indicate a weakly significant effect of centralization-based integration on the level 
of network innovative performance, our analysis results do not convincingly support this 
hypothesis. Hence, the level of innovative performance is not affected by the way in which 
knowledge is integrated and with that retained in a network, and hypothesis 4 is not supported. 
 Models 3, 5 and 7 consider the interaction effect as specified by hypothesis 5. With this 
hypothesis, we predicted that as knowledge retention mechanisms through network integration 
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have more time to be expressed, the effect of network integration on the level of innovative 
outcomes increases. The significant positive interaction effect between density-based network 
integration and field stability in Model 3 indicates that this hypothesis is partially supported. The 
visualization of this effect (see marginal effect plot (d) in Figure 12)35 shows a cross-over effect 
between knowledge retention through density-based integration and field stability: at low levels of 
system stability, knowledge retention through density-based integration leads to lower levels of 
network innovative performance compared to knowledge retention through low network 
integration. As the level of field stability increases, however, higher levels of innovative 
performance can be expected in networks characterized by knowledge retention through density-
based network integration. Full support for hypothesis 5 would be found if all three interaction 
effects were significant. This would indicate that, compared to low network integration, networks 
with higher levels of integration consistently would be more innovative. Our analysis, however, 
only suggests an interaction effect involving density-based network integration and field stability, 
especially in the short run. Hence, hypothesis 5 is partially supported. 
Robustness checks 
One of the concerns with the existing analysis is that the observations of the independent variables 
are not independent from one another because of the longitudinal nature of the data. To address 
this issue, a multi-level model could be estimated, with one level being the technology fields and 
the other level being the observation years. However, to the best of our knowledge, multilevel beta 
regression models have not been developed at present. We therefore addressed this concern by 
estimating multi-level fractional logistic regression models. Such models can be estimated for the 
dataset under consideration, since the dependent variable can be thought of as a proportion of the 
number of successes from a total number of trials (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). The results of 
these models are predominantly the same as the results presented in this chapter. Notable 
differences are that in the multilevel model, a direct negative effect of density-based integration in 
Model 3 is observed. In Model 5, none of the variables are significant any longer, whereas in Model 
7 the effect of node entry becomes weakly significant (alpha = .10). 
 Another concern with the current analysis is the lack of statistical power. Ideally, we would 
at the very least need about twice as much observations as the number of observations used in the 
current analyses. This is an issue that is hard to address, yet we conducted the same analyses without 
the % complete outcomes control variable, as the correlation tables suggested this variable behaves 
similar to the year control. If we leave this control variable out, the results are similar: instead of 
the complete outcomes control, year now is significant in most models. The effect of stayers in 
Model 3 becomes weakly significant (alpha = .10), whereas the terms that represent the effect of 
knowledge retention through exits become significant. This suggests a u-shaped curvilinear effect. 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
Getting insight in the antecedents of network-level outcomes is fruitful, especially for networks 
that address issues that cannot be solved by the actions of individual organizations alone. In this 
chapter, we have extended and tested the preliminary theory of network effectiveness that was 
                                                 
35 It is common to display interaction effects with the main effect on the x-axis, which in turn is differentiated in the 
plot by different values of the moderator. Considering that the main effect is measured with a dummy variable, and 
the moderator is continuous, this approach would lead to loss of information: including all scores of the moderator 
would make the plot impossible to interpret. Hence, we decided to switch the direct effect and the moderator effect 
in plot (d) in Figure 12. 
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proposed by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Sebastian (1998). Driven by the research 
question to what extent network innovative performance is driven by node entry, stayers, node exit 
and network integration (causing mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and retention 
respectively), and to what extent the relation between said predictors and network innovative 
performance is moderated by the level of technology field stability, we focused on the role of 
knowledge in publicly funded R&D networks. Through using different time lags between the 
independent variables and dependent variable in our analysis, we show that the role of knowledge 
variation, selection and retention can be fruitfully considered when explaining complete network 
innovativeness. 
 Through inviting industry participation in publicly funded R&D networks -that in turn are 
more demand driven and geared to industry issues- the expectation behind the public funding of 
joint R&D is that positive externalities are generated, both for members of the network and society. 
Our study suggests that such externalities are more likely to be generated under certain conditions 
of node entry, stayers, node exit and network integration and that these conditions change over 
time. The effect of node entry, for example, switches from negative in the short run, to positive in 
the very long run. In addition, the mechanism of knowledge selection was found to result in higher 
levels of network innovative performance in the short run. Lastly, we found that, compared to high 
levels of network integration, low levels of network integration lead to higher levels of network 
innovative performance in the short run in unstable technology fields. As field stability increases, 
however, higher levels of network integration lead to higher levels of network innovative 
performance in the short run, compared to low levels of network integration. 
 Our findings refine our understanding of the antecedents of the innovative performance 
of public innovation networks by providing novel insights. Through building on existing network 
outcome models by using the perspective of knowledge variation, selection and retention, we 
provide a deeper understanding of the effect of a continuous rate of knowledge renewal in 
networks and its role for network innovation. Our research findings might extend beyond the 
context of public innovation networks, and bear relevance for, for example, alliance networks as 
well. It has been suggested by other authors that alliance network structure affects the performance 
of firms embedded in such networks (Schilling & Phelps, 2007). Although it is known that the 
structural organization of such networks is sensitive to environmental instabilities (Madhavan et 
al., 1998), our results suggest that in addition to the role of network structure and system stability, 
knowledge variation and selection are key mechanisms in the generation of innovative outcomes 
by such networks as well. 
Theoretical and practical implications 
The results this study provide interesting insights. First, we found that the effect of node entry 
switches over time, from a negative effect on network innovative performance when a time lag of 
1 year is considered, to a positive effect on innovative performance when a time lag of 5 years is 
considered. This result suggests that the mechanisms we described (i.e. high levels of node entry 
avoid a situation in which network members fall in the trap of rigid specialization) especially holds 
for network members that are in the early stages with their R&D consortium. These consortia are 
aided by the varied inflow of knowledge: in the first year, searching the knowledge space is key for 
defining the consortium’s goal, and this is facilitated by high levels of knowledge variation in the 
network in which the consortium is embedded. 
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This inflow, however, is detrimental for consortia that are close to finishing, as reflected in the 
negative effect of node entry on network innovative performance when a time lag of 1 year is 
considered. Here, the competitive effect of high levels of knowledge variation might lead to a 
devaluation of older variations that already have been further developed by incumbent consortia. 
A larger variation of technological possibilities being explored in a network and the promise these 
possibilities hold might lead to the perception that relative older knowledge is not relevant any 
longer and hence, consortia developing such knowledge are less attractive. In addition, high levels 
of node entry might dilute the attention of members of older consortia as they become involved 
in new consortia. This involves getting to know and understand new consortium members, which 
makes less time available for involvement in existing consortia. Hence, turbulence in the knowledge 
environment might make the results of older consortia obsolete and distract the members of these 
older consortia. 
 This negative effect of node entry on network innovative outcomes in the short run is 
counteracted by the positive effect in the short run of the selection of knowledge through stayers. 
Hence, whereas incumbent nodes suffer from high levels of node entry shortly before the 
consortium results should be delivered, these same incumbents benefit from high levels of this 
varied knowledge being selected. Although this presents a bit of a conundrum, one explanation 
might be that higher levels of network integration offer more opportunities for incumbent nodes 
to seek for the common ground with newer consortia so that they are better able to demonstrate 
where and how their results still bear relevance and might be further build upon. 
 The cross-over interaction between knowledge retention through density-based network 
integration and field stability shows that a specific mode of knowledge retention leads to higher 
levels of network innovative performance compared to low levels of knowledge retention as from 
a certain level of field stability. At lower levels of field stability, however, network integration leads 
to lower levels of network innovative performance compared to low levels of network integration. 
This demonstrates that networks need several years to reorganize after an environmental jolt before 
the benefits of the mechanism of knowledge retention through density-based integration can be 
reaped. In early years after an environmental jolt, it is better to have no mechanism of knowledge 
retention at all, possibly because in this situation future viable pathways are too opaque for 
consortia to effectively build mutual understanding and insight in knowledge interdependencies. In 
addition, the crossover interaction supports one of the propositions developed by Provan and 
Milward (1995), namely that system stability is a necessary yet insufficient condition for networks 
to be effective. Our results suggest that field stability in combination with knowledge retention 
through density-based network integration leads to innovative outcomes when this stability has 
persisted for several years. 
 Regarding the relevance of our results for policy makers, public policies related to the 
funding of R&D through collaboration at present are rather undifferentiated as to the networks 
that result from such funding (Meeus et al., 2008). Our results suggest that such networks are an 
object that are worth organizing themselves, and we offer several levers for policy regarding the 
top-down management of such networks by public funding agencies. First, recognizing the need 
for active network management and gaining insight in the organization of such networks and 
assessing the potential for an exogeneous shock are critical steps. Our findings indicate that funding 
R&D collaboration between science and industry is more complex than simply striving for 
collaborations. Funding agencies that fail to consider the complexities involved in the generation 
of innovative outcomes by networks may waste resources and perhaps might even frustrate the 
innovative outcomes of a network. 
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One way in which more targeted top-down network management could be shaped is through the 
establishment of a dedicated network management unit (Chiaroni, Chiesa, & Frattini, 2011; 
Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Provan & Kenis, 2008). Studies have shown that employing such a unit 
significantly improves network performance (Heidenreich, Landsperger, & Spieth, 2016). 
However, scholars also have suggested that networks may not be as malleable as theory might 
suggest (Hite & Hesterly, 2001; Siu & Bao, 2008). The implication of this is that a dedicated 
network manager should aim at steering the network through a combination of path-dependence 
and targeted intervention. This requires a thorough understanding of the development of the 
technology field, as well as the impact of, for example increasing the level of knowledge variation 
in a network which could be achieved through allowing more new members to enter the network. 
Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research 
In the context of research on the innovativeness of complete interorganizational networks, one of 
the strengths of our study is that we employ a relatively large dataset for testing our hypotheses. 
From a statistical point of view, however, the n in this study is not big enough to generate 
statistically robust results. For example, even though we find a rather strong effect of knowledge 
retention through density-based integration, this effect is based on relatively few networks in our 
sample that could be characterized by such integration. Hence, results from this study are not 
readily generalizable to other publicly funded R&D networks or any other interorganizational 
network in which the focus is on innovation. Hence, although this is a considerable task, future 
research should aim at increasing the number of cases to improve statistical power, as well as trying 
to replicate the findings of this research in other network innovation contexts. 
 Another limitation of our study concerns some of the measures that we have used. First, 
although we strongly believe that focusing on networks rather than individual organizations is 
pivotal for studying the innovativeness of a network, the measurement of our dependent variable 
does not neatly delineate between network-level and node-level outcomes. Hence, we are not able 
to convincingly claim a synergistic effect of networked innovation. Second, our proxies for 
knowledge variation (i.e. node entry) and knowledge selection (in as far as it concerns nodes that 
leave a network) do not fully capture variation and selection within the funding system. It might 
very well be that new nodes come from or end up in other networks that we do not observe. In 
addition, node exit does not necessarily imply knowledge loss. Exit could also occur because of 
consortium leaders retiring or making a career switch. To the extent that knowledge is transferred 
to possible successors, this does not reflect knowledge retention. Third, our measure of field 
stability is derived from substantial switches in the level of especially knowledge variation and 
selection. Although correlations between said measures are not concerningly high, a more 
independent measurement of field stability, for example changes in the funding scheme (i.e. specific 
programs) over time would be more convincing, as well as a broader conception of field stability 
(i.e. a conception that goes beyond marked technological change). Again, even though refining the 
measurements used in this paper is a challenging task, future research should address these 
measurement issues.  
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Appendix I: Network Boundary Specification 
Given our focus on the dynamics and innovativeness of different technology field networks, it is 
important to consider the approach we followed in specifying network boundaries. Network 
boundary specification, or deciding which consortium is part of a network and which consortium 
is not, is seen as an important first step in each network analysis (Laumann, Marsden, & Prensky, 
1983). It revolves around the specification of the standard of common relevance (Newcomb, 1961) 
across consortia, for which it is reasonably assumable that joint member ties between consortia are 
regularly activated. Although few objective criteria for establishing these boundaries exist, two 
approaches towards the specification of network boundaries have been analytically distinguished 
in the past: the realist and the nominalist approach (Laumann et al., 1983). 
 In the realist approach, one treats networks as social facts only in that they are consciously 
experienced as such by the nodes that constitute the network. This approach therefore uses group 
membership as the basis for network boundary specification (for example, membership of the same 
school class or football team). The underlying proposition that underlies this approach is that the 
specification of the group that is used for including actors has subjective meaning to those actors36. 
The match between group specification and the subjective awareness of these groups by the 
network members becomes an empirical question rather than an underlying proposition that is 
made in the nominalist approach. In this approach, network boundaries are relative to the purpose 
of the researcher, which makes that the group or groups that are specified usually have no clear 
ontological status for its members. For example, studies in which a nominalist approach is adopted 
use geographical proximity or activity in the same industrial sector as the basis for network 
inclusion. Instead of studying the relational structure that emerges in a certain social context (as 
one does when using the realist approach), studies that adopt a nominalist approach focus on the 
question to what extent similarity in one or more node features induces relations between these 
nodes. 
 We follow a stratified approach in specifying network boundaries in this chapter. First, a 
realist approach is followed by including all consortia that have received funding. This is a direct 
result from using the evaluation reports of the funding organization that gives a comprehensive 
overview of all consortia funded as from 1981 to 2004. The group can be assumed to have 
subjective meaning to the actors involved: in addition to the meetings of the user committees, 
consortium members meet one another at yearly congresses, as well as other more topic-oriented 
conferences during the year that are organized by the funding agency. Events like conferences are 
an established form of inter-organizational interaction (Lomnitz, 1983) and several studies suggest 
that participation in conferences is an important informal mechanism of knowledge transfer 
between organizations (Berends et al., 2011; Henn & Bathelt, 2015; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; 
Maskell, Bathelt, & Malmberg, 2006; Stam, 2010; Vlasov, Bahlmann, & Knoben, 2017). 
 The second step in specifying network boundaries follows a nominalist approach and 
refines the assumption that all actors involved belong to the same group simply because they 
received funding by the same funding organization. The general focus of this organization implies 
a great variety in terms of the research topics that are covered in the funded consortia. This, in 
turn, attracts researchers from different academic disciplines, as well as organizations from various 
industrial sectors. These differences in background do not evidently translate into a standard of 
common relevance among actors, and –when consortia are left undifferentiated– large variations 
                                                 
36 Laumann et al. (1983) speak of a ‘we’-feeling that should somehow be present among the group members. 
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in the likelihood of activation of joint membership ties exist. As this would be at odds with our 
theoretical model in which actors are assumed to develop technology within a certain technological 
paradigm and its corresponding trajectories, we mitigate this issue by specifying several subgroups 
based on technology fields. 
 The focus on potential application in the R&D consortia and consortium invites a 
classification of consortia based on the technology that is being developed. Technology 
classification schemes can be divided in two types. The first type classifies technology based on 
criteria that are external to the technology under consideration (Horner, 1992). One of the 
approaches here, for example, is to classify an artefact based on the branch of production where it 
is applied. Based on this main classification, further sub-classifications can be made on for example 
the natural law embodied in the artefact (Horner, 1992). Following this approach, a cement mixer 
would be classified under the main category of building and construction, and then sub-classified 
in the category of convective mixing. A related approach is to classify a technological artefact based 
on the purpose for which it was developed (Horner, 1992). Following this approach, a cement 
mixer, would be classified under the category of processing machinery. Various other approaches 
that use external criteria exist, and they all share the tendency to be biased towards the aim they are 
developed for, such as mapping industrial or innovative activity (Horner, 1992). For example, the 
patenting classification system is designed to meet the needs of searching for claims in patents, and 
hence this system is biased towards areas of greatest patenting activity (Horner, 1992). Moreover, 
the schemes need to be updated on a regular basis to facilitate results from an ongoing changing 
scientific and technological knowledge base, which causes the number of categories to expand over 
the years. This affects classification consistency (Schmoch, 2008). 
 The second type of technology classification focuses on the internal technological structure. 
These approaches are driven from the observation that schemes that use external criteria lack ‘the 
bigger picture’ and unifying concepts regarding technological development. They therefore do not 
allow for pinpointing the position of artefacts on a technological roadmap, nor the position of 
these roadmaps on a global technological atlas (Van Wyk, 2002, 2017). One of the approaches here 
is to develop a technological taxonomy, like taxonomies that exist in the field of biology. An issue 
with developing technological taxonomies, however, is that mapping technological development is 
less straight-forward compared to biological taxonomies and hence, valid classifications based on 
this principle have not yet emerged (Horner, 1992). Another approach that starts from the idea of 
the existence of an internal technological structure specifies two dimensions: technological function 
(i.e. transformation, transport and storage) and output (i.e. matter, energy and information) 
(Ropohl, 1999). Under this classification scheme, a cement mixer would be classified in the category 
of technologies that transform matter. A machine for mixing dough, however, would be classified 
in this category as well –an observation made by Teichmann (1974)– and hence one could question 
the ratio behind this approach, as both artefacts in the end clearly are a result of distinct 
technological trajectories. 
 Even though classification schemes that start from the existence of an underlying 
technological structure might be sounder theoretically, these schemes are currently underdeveloped 
and lead to rather generic technology classifications. Moreover, it is the question to what extent 
actors involved in the consortia that we focus on in this dissertation –academics and industrial 
organizations– are aware of these internal technological structures and can see, for example, the 
relevance of a machine for mixing cement for the further development of a machine for mixing 
dough. Classification schemes that use external criteria, subjective as they might be, at least have 
the benefit that they are developed by and for the community that participates in the development 
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of technology. For specifying network boundaries, we therefore use a scheme that uses external 
rather than internal criteria. This involved classifying all 1,928 projects in the dataset, triangulating 
patent information and consortium descriptions by two researchers separately, who later 
harmonized their classifications through extensive discussion of classification differences. 
 About every one out of five consortia at least had one patent as its outcome. These patents 
were looked up using Espacenet and key information, amongst which the international patent 
classification (IPC) code, was registered in a data file. Patent classification codes are rather fine-
grained and cannot be used directly for setting network boundaries. Hence, the classification codes 
found for each consortium were translated to a more general technology field classification. For 
this, a concordance table that translates patent codes to broader technology fields as proposed by 
Engelsman and van Raan (1994) and Schmoch (2008) was used37. These fields, including keywords 
that characterize them, can be found in Table 24 in Appendix II of this chapter. The insights that 
were obtained by classifying the first 20% of all consortia formed the basis for classifying the 
remaining consortia that could not be linked to a patent classification code. These consortia were 
categorized directly in one of the technology fields. It should be noted that each consortium was 
classified using the subfields listed in Table 24. Network boundary specification, however, took 
place using the main technology fields that include several subfields. This was done to allow for 
cross-disciplinary ties without stretching the assumption of actual knowledge flowing through these 
too much. Hence, whereas joint member ties between main technology fields (e.g. ties between a 
consortium active in the field of Civil engineering and a consortium active in the field of Chemistry) 
are not included in the final dataset, joint member ties between subfields within a technology field 
(e.g. ties between the subfields biotechnology and pharmaceuticals in the main Life sciences field) 
are included.  
                                                 
37 In line with the evolving nature of using external classification criteria, this table was adjusted to match the specifics 
of the consortia in the dataset used. First, an important share of the projects classified in the main field of Instruments 
was classified in the subfield Medical Technology. Because the field of Instruments is mainly focused at measurement 
and control of industrial processes and the field of Medical Technology is more directed towards extending and 
improving life conditions (artificial livers, for example, are also part of the field of Medical Technology) their 
application areas differ and hence we decided to make a distinction between both fields. Second, the general field of 
Chemistry and Pharmaceuticals was split in the fields Chemistry and Life Sciences for similar reasons. Third, the generic 
field ‘Consumption’ mainly consisted of projects that were focused at Civil Engineering, and the name of this field was 
therefore changed accordingly. 
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Appendix II: Technology Field Classification 
TABLE 24 
Main fields, subfields and illustrative keywords38 




paints, petroleum, gas, detergents 
Chemical engineering 








chemical aspects of polymers 
Materials, metallurgy 




micro-structural devices or systems, nanostructures 
Organic Fine Chemistry cosmetics, non-pharmaceutical oriented organic chemistry 
Surface technology, 
coating 
metal coating, electrolytic processes, crystal growth and 




development of materials used in the construction of 
buildings, roads, bridges 
Geotechnics 
exploration of mining opportunities and development of 
mining techniques 
Hydraulic engineering 
development of devices and constructions to control water 
fluids, such as dams or groynes 
Structural engineering 
construction of roads and buildings, as well as elements of 
buildings such as locks, plumbing installations, or strong-





generation, conversion and distribution of electric power, 
electric machines, electronic elements such as resistors, 






oscillation, modulation, resonant circuits, impulse technique, 
coding/decoding 
Computer technology 
arrangements for controlling programmes, methods and 
arrangements for data conversions, e.g. image data 
processing, recognition of data, speech analysis 
 
                                                 
38 based on Engelsman and van Raan (1994) and Schmoch (2008). 
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TABLE 24 (CONTINUED) 
Main fields, subfields and illustrative keywords 
 
Main field Subfield Subfield keywords 
Instruments 
Control 
elements for controlling and regulating electrical and non-
electrical systems, test arrangements, traffic control, 
signalling systems 
Measurement 
measurement techniques and applications, e.g. measurement 
of mechanical properties such as oscillation, speed, length 
Optics 
optical elements and apparatus, laser technology, optical 
switching 
Life Sciences 
Analysis of biological 
materials 
analysis of blood for medical purposes, using 
biotechnological methods 
Biotechnology non-pharmaceutical oriented biotechnology 
Food Chemistry seed and crop optimization, food innovation 
Pharmaceuticals 






non-electrical engines for all types of application, especially 
those for the automobile industry 
Thermal processes and 
apparatus 
steam generation, combustion, heating, refrigeration, 
cooling, heat exchange 
Transport 





products used in diagnosis and treatment of individuals, 
such as operating tables, massage devices, bandages 
Measurement 
development of tools for measuring bodily functions or 
parameters, as well as measurement parts used in treatment 
(e.g. sensors used in surgery robots) 
Prostheses and 
implants 
development of replacement organs, such as artificial livers, 
orthoses. Sometimes, use of animal organs is explored as 
well 
Imaging 
development of imaging techniques such as echography, x-
rays, magnetic resonance imaging scanners 
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6. Management or Muddling Through: Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
We started this dissertation with the observation that even though collaboration between science 
and industry is of key importance for both groups and for those actors who stimulate such 
collaboration, the network effects at multiple levels (i.e. the consortium- and network-level) that 
come with such collaboration are not fully understood. We focused on a specific form of organizing 
joint innovation: R&D consortia that pursue demand driven technical innovation, by exchange of 
scientific and technical knowledge between university and industry. Such consortia can be 
considered to specialize, as they focus on further developing a specific position in the technology 
landscape. The networks in which these consortia are embedded can be considered to mitigate 
possible risks of overspecialization by individual consortia, as links between consortia allow for 
generalization across consortia through knowledge sharing and coordination across consortia (van 
der Valk, Moors, & Meeus, 2009). In this context, this research sought to answer the following 
related research questions: 
1) To what extent does R&D consortium network structure affect innovative outcomes? 
2) To what extent does the network position of R&D consortia affect innovative outcomes? 
3) To what extent do network dynamics and technology field dynamics moderate the relationships explored in 
research question 1 and 2? 
To answer those research questions, we have pulled together explanatory mechanisms and 
arguments from a variety of research streams on complete networks, technological change, 
innovation, the knowledge-based view, interorganizational networks and network dynamics. When 
considering the relationship between network position and innovative outcomes, studies on 
alliance networks have constituted and dominated the research field to date. By introducing time 
and multiple levels of analysis in our analysis of R&D consortia, our findings suggest that the 
mechanisms underlying established relationships between key variables are quite complex and often 
time-dependent. When considering the relationship between network structure and innovative 
outcomes, the existing literature is scarce and dominated by case study designs. Performing a larger-
n study in this dissertation allowed us to provide more general insight in complete network 
dynamics and antecedents of the innovativeness of such networks. 
 Hence, using multi-level perspectives that incorporate the role of time and a unique 
longitudinal dataset comprising 156 complete field networks, and 7 technology fields, with 1,928 
consortia served as an important asset of this dissertation, and enabled us to formulate an answer 
to the research questions. Our findings contribute to the existing literature on R&D consortia 
because this literature to date has not considered ties between consortia because of consortium 
members that are involved in multiple consortia simultaneously. As a result, little is known about 
the extent to which consortium networks, in addition to consortium features, affect the innovative 
outcomes of consortia. In addition, little is known about the timing of such network effects. 
Understanding this relation, however, forms the basis for devising strategies for either capitalizing 
on or mitigating network effects by consortium managers. The answer to our research question 
adds to the existing literature that considers network innovativeness at the system level as well. 
This literature has predominantly focused on public sector networks and has left the question 
regarding efficient network structures for generating technological innovation at the network-level 
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and the role of the dynamics of different technology fields unaddressed. For those involved in 
formulating innovation policy, understanding this relation forms the basis for designing policy 
measures that lead to the formation and development of innovative networks. 
 In this concluding chapter we consider the theoretical and practical merits of the studies 
that constitute the empirical part of this dissertation, as well as limitations and possible future 
research avenues. In the subsequent section of this chapter (section 6.2), we will provide a summary 
of our main findings for each of the empirical chapters. In section 6.3 it will be assessed to what 
extent the expected contributions to the academic literature have been realized, after which we will 
consider the practical implications of this dissertation in section 6.4. In section 6.5, we will discuss 
the limitations of the research reported in this dissertation and address possible directions for future 
research. In section 6.6 this dissertation will be concluded. 
6.2 Summary of main findings 
Without a thorough understanding of the constraining and enabling effects of collaboration 
networks for both consortium managers and innovation policy makers, management of network 
positions and structures remains speculative and intuitive. The empirical chapters in this 
dissertation addressed the relation between networks and innovation in the following ways. In 
Chapter 2, we addressed research question 1 at the level of the consortium: which antecedents 
determined the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes. More 
specifically, we were interested in the role of the complete consortium network structure in the 
relationship between the consortium features geographical proximity and technological diversity 
and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. We tested our hypotheses 
using a dataset of 1,263 Dutch R&D consortia that each were active somewhere in the time frame 
1989-2004. We found that consortia that are embedded in networks characterized by mutual 
awareness of consortium members of what members in other consortia are doing (i.e. consortium 
networks characterized by density-based network integration), are more likely to generate 
innovative outcomes compared to consortia in networks that are characterized by other types of 
network integration. In addition, we found an inverted U-shaped relation between technological 
diversity and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovation, yet this relation only occurs in 
those networks of which the structure can be characterized by density-based integration. 
 Whereas Chapter 2 considered research question 1 on the role of the complete consortium 
network structure in R&D consortia in generating innovative outcomes, Chapter 3 considered the 
role of the position of R&D consortia in consortium networks (research question 2) over time 
(research question 3). In the existing literature on the relationship between the position in an 
interorganizational network and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes, 
no consensus has emerged with respect to the question which network position is most 
advantageous. This is especially salient in the debate that focuses on the question whether network 
brokerage or closure provides the most efficient structure for innovation. In Chapter 3, we analysed 
this issue by focusing on the effect of both global and local network position on the likelihood of 
generating technological innovation. In addition, we considered the role of time in the salience of 
both effects, as we expected a link between stages in the process of R&D and the fruitfulness of 
occupying a certain network position. We tested our theoretical predictions with a multi-level 
analysis of 814 Dutch R&D consortia, each of which started somewhere in the time frame 1989-
2004 and lasted for at least five years. Contrary to our expectations, we found that -although not 
salient across all years- global brokerage had a negative effect on the likelihood of generating 
technological innovation. We also found that local cohesion consistently enhanced the likelihood 
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of innovation over time. Lastly, a time-dependent effect was found for the interaction between 
global brokerage and local cohesion, especially in the maiden years of consortia: here, consortia 
that combined being in locally embedded networks with a brokerage position in the complete 
network were more innovative compared to consortia that had other combinations of local 
cohesion and global brokerage. 
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 considered the role of networks for the innovative outcomes of 
R&D consortia. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we moved our focus to the level of the complete 
consortium network. In Chapter 4, we started from the observation that existing literature suggests 
a differentiated development of networks in different technology fields. However, Dutch 
innovation policy tends to approach these networks as homogeneous both with respect to structure 
and in ways to ensure their viability. To explore the validity of this assumption in this policy 
approach we addressed the question if interorganizational technology field networks differ in their 
development in this chapter. By considering both network structural characteristics and the node 
set that comprises a network, we proposed an analytical framework that revolved around the 
‘network state’ concept. We conceptualized this network state as a configuration of values in a five-
dimensional state space: network centralization, network density, network size, the number of 
exiting nodes, and entrants. This model of network states was used to explore the evolution of 7 
distinct technology field consortium networks over 23 years, using a latent profile analysis. This 
method allowed a mapping of all possible dynamics of a network through tracing a sequence of 
state changes over time. Our findings revealed that network dynamics unfold over sequences of 
changes in five distinct states: formation, growth, stagnation, stability and disintegration. Although 
we found a core sequence of state changes of formation, via growth, to stability, we also found 
considerable variations on, and extensions of this pathway. In addition to suggesting a terminology 
to talk about network dynamics at the complete network level, the most important findings of this 
chapter were that (1) field network dynamics are anything but homogeneous, and (2) the duration 
of states across consortium networks in different technology fields differs considerably across such 
fields. 
 In Chapter 5, our focus was on the role of knowledge in the generation of network-level 
innovative outcomes. Although several scholars have addressed the issue of explaining outcomes 
of interorganizational networks at the network level, the role of knowledge in the generation of 
these outcomes, especially in the case of publicly funded R&D networks is understudied. In 
addition, this topic is important to consider since, despite the many advantages of networks as 
flexible forms of organizing, several studies have shown that overall change in a network’s 
environment can be detrimental for network outcomes. Hence, we used our insights regarding 
technology field network dynamics from Chapter 4 for determining technology field stability and 
considered the role of such stability in the generation of network-level outcomes (research 
questions 1 and 3). Building on the preliminary theory of network effectiveness as suggested by 
Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan and Sebastian (1998), we developed a model in which 
network innovative performance is explained by the level of node entry, stayers and node exit, and 
network integration. These acted as proxies for mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and 
retention. Using a sample of 93 R&D consortium networks in the Dutch context, our analysis 
suggested an important role of said predictors in explaining network innovative performance. The 
effect of node entry (enabling knowledge variation) on innovative outcomes was found to be 
negative in the short run. This effect however, switches to positive in the longer run. In addition, 
the effect of stayers (enabling positive knowledge selection) was found to be positive on the short 
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TABLE 25 
Overview of main findings with respect to the relation between networks and innovation 
Level of analysis Chapter Hypothesis Predictor(s) Hypothesized effect Finding(s) 
Consortium 
2 
2.2 Geographical proximity Inverted u-shape Not supported 
2.4 Technological diversity Inverted u-shape Not supported 
3 
3.1 Global brokerage (1), time (3) 
(3) negatively moderates positive 
effect of (1) 
Not supported, negative effect salient 4 
and 2 years before evaluation 
3.2 Local cohesion (2), time (3) 
(3) positively moderates positive 
effect of (2) 
Not supported, an overall positive effect 
is found over time 
3.3 (1), (2), (3) 
Positive effect of interaction 
between (1) and (2) when (3) marks 
the period in-between the start and 






Supported with respect to density-based 
network integration 
2.3 Positively moderates 2.2 Not supported 
2.5 Negatively moderates 2.4 
Not supported, an inverted u-shaped 
relation is found when network 
integration is density-based (i.e. positive 
moderation) 
Network 5 
5.4 Network integration (retention) Positive effect Not supported 
5.1 Node entry (variation) Positive effect 
Supported when a time lag of 5 years is 
used 
5.2 Node exit (negative selection) Inverted u-shape Not supported 
5.3 Stayers (positive selection) Inverted u-shape 
Not supported, a positive relation is 
found when a time lag of 1 year is used 
Technology field 
4 4.1 Technology field 
Moderates pace and nature of 
dynamics 
A basic pathway is found, yet considerable 
differences between fields are observed in 
terms of state durations. Also, alterations 
on the basic pathway across fields are 
found 
5 5.5 Technology field stability Positively moderates 5.4 
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run. Lastly, our results suggested a crossover interaction between network integration (enabling 
knowledge retention) and technology field stability. 
 The findings of each chapter are summarized in Table 25. Rows in this table are sorted by 
the ‘Predictor(s)’-column, with predictors at the lowest level of analysis (i.e. the level of the 
consortium) being listed first, and predictors at the highest level of analysis (i.e. the technology 
field) being listed last. In addition, findings regarding network integration (for which the effect on 
innovation was considered at both the consortium and the network-level) are grouped. As a general 
observation it can be said that, even though our findings were not always according to what was 
expected theoretically, networks do matter for innovation at multiple levels of organization, and so 
does a consideration of network and technology field dynamics. First, the network position of 
R&D consortia affects innovative outcomes of such consortia in the following way: the global 
brokerage position of R&D consortia in the complete network negatively affects consortium 
outcomes. When the moderating role of time is considered in this relationship, we found that this 
negative effect is especially salient in the consortium’s execution stage (i.e. after the year in which 
a consortium started, but before the year in which it ends). In addition, the local cohesion of a 
consortium’s ego network positively affects its innovative outcomes, regardless of the stage a 
consortium is in. Both global brokerage and local cohesion reinforce one another during the midst 
of a consortium, leading to a higher likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
 Second, the consortium network structure affects the innovative outcomes of R&D 
consortia in the following way: consortia that are embedded in consortium networks that can be 
characterized by density-based network integration are more likely to generate innovative outcomes 
compared to consortia that are embedded in networks that are characterized by other forms of 
network integration. In addition, we find that in consortium networks that can be characterized by 
density-based integration, the relation between technological diversity of members and the 
likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes follows an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
With respect to the relative effects of consortium features, a consortium’s position in the 
consortium network and the consortium network structure, positional effects (i.e. local cohesion 
and global brokerage) are considerably weaker compared to consortium-level effects (Chapter 3). 
Both effects are less important compared to network-level effects (i.e. network integration, Chapter 
2). Hence, in the generation of innovative outcomes by R&D consortia, network structural features 
seem to be more important than consortium features and a consortium’s position in the network. 
 As already described above, we considered the moderating role of network dynamics on 
the consortium-level by considering the moderating role of time. On the network level, the role of 
network dynamics was considered by focusing on node entry, node exit and stayers. It was found 
that entry of new nodes has a long-term (i.e. time lag of 5 years) effect on network innovative 
outcomes. Stayers positively affect network innovative outcomes within a time lag of 1 year. In 
addition, the moderating role of technology field dynamics was considered on the network level. 
Although no direct effect of network structure on the generation of network-level outcomes was 
found, we did find an interaction effect between density-based network integration and technology 
field stability. Hence, as technology fields become more stable, density-based network integration 
enables the retention of knowledge in networks, which enables these networks to reach higher 
levels of innovation.  
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6.3 Theoretical contributions 
In section 1.4 of this dissertation, we identified three overarching theoretical contributions. The 
first contribution is that in this dissertation, R&D consortia and consortium networks are 
considered as a distinct form of organization. The second contribution is that, in our quest to 
explain the innovativeness of such R&D consortia and consortium networks, we considered the 
relation between consortium and consortium network features and innovation using a multi-level 
perspective. The third contribution is that while considering said relation between features of R&D 
consortia and consortium networks, and innovation, we included the role of time, for example by 
exploring various time lags between antecedents and outcomes, but also by considering factors 
such as the building up of collaboration experience across consortium members and consortium 
leaders, and field stability. 
 Few scholars focusing on R&D consortia consider such collaborations as an emergent form 
of organizing in its own right. In addition, a scarce literature exists on complete networks and their 
dynamics. Hence, we pulled together a variety of other research streams (i.e. whole networks, 
technological change and innovation, network dynamics, knowledge-based view and 
interorganizational relations) to shed light on the main research questions that are addressed in this 
dissertation. Throughout this apparent mix of academic work, however, one seminal publication 
has recurred several times as a beacon of light throughout the chapters in this dissertation: Provan 
and Milward’s (1995) preliminary theory of network effectiveness. In this work, the authors develop 
a conceptual model that explains network effectiveness by various structural and contextual factors 
(i.e. network integration, external control, system stability and resource munificence). Many of the 
ideas that are elaborated in this dissertation pursue an extension of this preliminary theory. We 
therefore carve out the main theoretical contributions of this dissertation using the work of Provan 
and Milward (1995) as the main benchmark. 
 With respect to the first contribution (i.e. considering R&D consortia as a distinct form of 
organizing at both the consortium level and the level of the consortium network), we have applied 
the ideas of Provan and Milward (1995) and scholars that have built forth on these ideas (Turrini 
et al., 2009) to a new, rather underexplored setting. Network effectiveness has usually been studied 
in whole network research. Work in this realm considers networks as consciously created groups 
of three or more autonomous organizations in which the actors involved strive towards reaching a 
joint goal and jointly produce an output (Raab & Kenis, 2009). By applying the insights from this 
research area to R&D consortia and consortium networks, we have considered new boundary 
conditions of the existing preliminary theory of network effectiveness: although the formation and 
development of R&D consortia and consortium networks are consciously initiated and stimulated, 
the nature of the task at hand differs (i.e. technological development in R&D consortia versus 
service delivery in whole networks) and generally actors are much less aware of one another and 
joint goals, especially at the complete network level. 
 Indeed, our findings suggest that different mechanisms are at play in the relation between 
consortium and network features and innovative outcomes. For example, Provan and Milward 
(1995) propose that for networks to be effective, a necessary condition is that these networks 
should be integrated through a single core agency. In chapter 2 of this dissertation, such integration 
would resemble ‘centralization-based network integration’. We find that this form of network 
integration does not have an explicit effect in the networks studied in this dissertation. Density-
based integration, however, does. Hence, it seems that in the consortium networks studied in this 
dissertation a different source of integration is at play than the one suggested by Provan and 
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Milward (1995). In addition, our findings in Chapter 3 suggest that especially consortia that are 
embedded in locally cohesive networks (i.e. dense networks) consistently are more innovative over 
time. Lastly, the results of Chapter 5 suggest that, as the stability of a technology field increases, 
network density has a positive effect on network innovativeness when a time lag of 1 year is 
considered. Hence, in the absence of shared goals, it is not active coordination through a central 
agency that leads to innovative R&D consortia and consortium networks. Instead, a more emergent 
coordination through joint member ties is what makes these consortia and networks innovative. 
This juxtaposition that results from considering different boundary conditions makes that R&D 
consortia and consortium networks should not be treated like whole networks39, but instead should 
be considered as a distinct form of organizing. This contribution echoes other work in the realm 
of R&D consortia that stresses the importance of consciously organizing and managing consortia 
to effectively govern the jointly created pool of resources (Allarakhia & Walsh, 2012; Roelofsen et 
al., 2011; Sydow et al., 2012). 
 With respect to the second theoretical contribution of this dissertation (i.e. the use of a 
multi-level perspective), Provan & Milward (1995) explicitly moved away from a focus on relations 
between nodes and addressed the issue of the effectiveness of networks as a whole. From that 
perspective, it is sensible to focus at one level (i.e. the network-level) only, even though the 
preliminary theory of Provan & Milward (1995) has a multi-level element as it proposed the concept 
of system stability: networks that operate in an environment that is unstable due to state-wide 
changes in the funding and delivery of services are proposed to be less effective compared to 
networks that operate in a stable environment, as environmental instability leads to uncertainty 
with, in turn, “unpredictable consequences” (Provan & Milward, 1995). The nestedness of network 
phenomena, however, calls for an explicit incorporation of multiple levels of analysis in network 
research (Contractor et al., 2006; Lusher et al., 2013; Zappa & Lomi, 2015) and Zappa and Lomi 
(2015). By considering multiple levels of analysis in each chapter in this dissertation, we have 
extended the preliminary theory of network effectiveness of Provan and Milward (1995) in two 
related ways. 
 First, little consideration is given in the model of Provan and Milward (1995) to features of 
network nodes, such as geographical proximity and technological diversity. Also, scholars that have 
built on this model in the realm of public policy studies have barely touched upon this issue (Turrini 
et al., 2009). The other way round, the large and established literature on networks and innovation 
is dominated by a focus on nodes, and rarely considers the effect of node features and network 
features in tandem40 (Soda, Tortoriello, & Iorio, 2017). By considering both the node and network 
level in explaining consortium innovativeness in Chapter 2 using a large-n study, we have explored 
the boundary conditions under which certain effects occur. For example, a key finding in Chapter 
2 is that the inverted-u shaped relationship between technological diversity and consortium 
innovation only occurs under conditions of density-based network integration. Hence, only when 
a joint knowledge base is created in the network that facilitates efficient search and flexibility and 
that allows for specialization of individual nodes and mutual technological adjustment, 
technological diversity facilitates consortium innovativeness, but only up to a certain point. After 
that point, the positive effect of the varied body of knowledge and subsequent potential for 
                                                 
39 Recall that in research on alliance networks, multi-partner collaborations are usually excluded from the analysis or 
stripped down to dyadic collaborations. Hence, few studies on alliance networks have considered multi-partner 
constellations such as R&D consortia, and even fewer studies have considered the relation between complete networks 
and innovation. Hence, we focus in this discussion on comparing our results with the insights derived from the research 
field on whole networks. 
40 For one of the exceptions, see Schilling and Phelps (2007). 
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knowledge recombination is offset by collaboration difficulties and efficiency losses. In addition to 
exploring boundary conditions of certain effects, our theoretical extension also suggests that 
features at the network level (i.e. network density) that might lead to network innovativeness do 
not always lead to individual network nodes being innovative (i.e. multiple consortium 
membership). 
 Second, network studies that consider multiple levels rarely consider the environment of a 
network. We are the first that have made the mechanism that relates stability of the environment 
(i.e. field stability) in which a network is embedded to the effectiveness of such a network more 
explicit. Whereas Provan and Milward (1995) related the absence of system stability to uncertainty 
that could have unpredictable consequences, we have specified this mechanism in the context of 
R&D consortium networks that are embedded in technology fields that can have various degrees 
of stability: in stable technology fields, search routines can be build up which allow network 
members to manage and exploit the status quo. Yet, significant turning points in the underlying 
technology field necessitates an adaptation of such search routines, which takes time. Indeed, the 
positive moderation effect of technology field stability on the relation between density-based 
network integration and innovative outcomes in Chapter 5, based on a large-n study (at least relative 
to the available academic work on complete networks to date), supports the hypothesis that was 
derived from this mechanism and more generally supports one of the propositions of Provan and 
Milward (1995). 
 The third contribution of this dissertation is that the role of time is considered in the 
relation between features of R&D consortia and consortium networks, and innovation, as well as 
consortium network dynamics. The model of Provan and Milward (1995) does not explicitly 
consider time, although here as well, the concept of system stability implicitly incorporates a 
temporal dimension. Recent studies, however, have suggested that the value of a network for its 
nodes and as a whole does not remain constant over time (Ahuja et al., 2012; Gilsing et al., 2016). 
In this dissertation we incorporated the role of time in two ways: first, different time lags are 
explored in the relation between consortium and network features and innovation. Second, 
network development is considered over time. Both are extensions of the preliminary theory of 
network effectiveness: acknowledging time lags helps in understanding the boundary condition 
when a certain effect occurs (Whetten, 1989) and conceptualizing network dynamics aids in 
operationalizing and testing the effect of system stability and aids in developing a vocabulary that 
supports academic conversations about the phenomenon of complete network dynamics. 
 With respect to the first incorporation of time in this dissertation, different time lags were 
considered between consortium features and innovation in Chapter 3, and between consortium 
network features and innovation in Chapter 5. Findings in Chapter 3 suggest that consortia have a 
continuous need of being embedded in a locally cohesive network to be innovative. Being globally 
central in the network hurts innovative performance, especially during the consortium’s execution 
stage (i.e. after the year in which a consortium started, but before the year in which it ends). 
Findings in Chapter 5 suggest that node entry has a positive effect on network innovation on the 
long run (i.e. after five years). Stayers, on the other hand have a positive effect on network 
innovation on the short run (i.e. after one year). This suggests that some of the proposed 
mechanisms are not always at play in both consortia and consortium networks, and invite a further 
theoretical conceptualization for the field of network research with respect to time lags between 
predictor and outcome variables. 
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With respect to the consideration of network dynamics, Chapter 4 in this dissertation represents 
one of the first attempts to analyse network dynamics at the network level and it makes suggestions 
for a terminology that aids in talking about that phenomenon. In this chapter, the focus is on the 
role of node turnover, which is rarely done even though it is essential for a better understanding of 
network dynamics. This importance is demonstrated in Chapter 5, in which it is suggested that for 
complete networks to sustain their innovativeness, both knowledge variation through node entry 
and knowledge selection through stayers needs to be ensured. By focusing on technology field 
dynamics, we contribute to the literature on interorganizational network dynamics by providing a 
more explanatory narrative of such dynamics (as opposed by the often rather descriptive accounts 
of such dynamics that are provided in the existing literature (Gay & Dousset, 2005; Orsenigo et al., 
2001; Powell et al., 2005), and demonstrate the importance of considering system stability that has 
been proposed in the literature on whole networks (Provan & Milward, 1995; Provan & Sebastian, 
1998). 
6.4 Practical implications 
In addition to the theoretical merits of the studies reported in this dissertation, our findings also 
bear significance for practice. In the introduction of this dissertation, we posed that both 
consortium managers as policy makers simultaneously manage and muddle through with respect 
to R&D collaborations. With respect to consortium design, consortium managers can manage 
several inputs, such as selecting the most suitable partners, setting up a clear collaboration structure 
and organizing a filing system that allows for sharing knowledge embedded in documents such as 
minutes, research reports and white papers in order to deliver a certain innovative output. Network-
level effects stemming from network volatility, complete network structure and the partners of 
one’s partners, although also acting as an input for the consortium, are more difficult to control 
and hence make generating a certain output more challenging. It is at especially this level at which 
one is convicted to muddle through. 
 When we consider Table 25, several implications for consortium managers as well as 
innovation policy can be derived. First, for managers of R&D consortia, it is important to recognize 
the importance of not only features of potential individual members, but also features of the 
consortium that emerge as the aggregate of individual member features. For example, our findings 
suggest an important role for technological diversity for the generation of consortium innovative 
outcomes in dense networks. Hence, consortium managers should at least be aware of the role of 
both aspects: although it would go too far to claim that one can only start a consortium the moment 
technological diversity is at the optimal in-between level (one can think of many situations in which 
this simply is impossible), at least being aware of possible detrimental effects of low or high levels 
of technological diversity helps to mitigate such effects. 
 In addition, our findings demonstrate that the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia are 
partly determined by network-level as well as network positional features (i.e. local cohesion and 
global brokerage). Yet, the agency of consortium managers does not extend to the network-level, 
which leaves little room for changing this network once a consortium is embedded in it. In addition, 
our results in Chapter 3 suggest that the position of R&D consortia remains rather stable over time 
in terms of centrality. Even though one could set-up a “network migration” strategy that aims at 
aligning the network position of a consortium with the different stages in the process of R&D, 
such a strategy involves orchestrating joint memberships with other consortia, which is something 
that might not always be in the realm of control of the consortium manager. Hence, we suggest 
that it is especially important for consortium managers to consider potential network positions and 
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structures upfront (i.e. before starting a consortium): it is in the partner selection strategy where we 
see most room for determining the final position of a consortium in an R&D network. Considering 
network structure also helps in selecting viable future avenues for research: parts of the network 
that are characterized by high density levels imply that many different consortia revolve around a 
certain topic, and hence chances for success for those initiating new consortia might be lower in 
those parts. Determining in which R&D consortium network a consortium becomes embedded is 
much more difficult to control by individual consortium managers, as this is often determined by 
the technology field in which such a consortium leader is active. Similar to anticipating possible 
detrimental effects of technological diversity, however, consortium managers can strive to 
anticipate possible detrimental effects of network position and network structure: forewarned is 
forearmed. 
 With respect to organizing complete network structures, we see a prominent role for 
innovation policy. Our findings suggest that both R&D consortia as consortium networks are most 
likely to be innovative under conditions of density-based network integration. This source of 
network integration resembles a mode of network governance that has been proposed by Provan 
and Kenis (2008): density-based integration resembles shared participant-governed networks, in 
which network members typically have ongoing and jointly coordinated interaction on a relatively 
equal basis in the process of innovation (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Such governance can be 
stimulated through organizing regular meetings of consortium managers or organizing symposia 
during which consortium managers and members interact with one another and exchange findings 
across consortia. Regardless of the choice of governance mode, network mapping by the funding 
agency should be a key first step and different paces of network formation and development across 
technology fields should be considered. 
6.5 Limitations and directions for future research 
Despite the contributions of the research reported in this dissertation, several key limitations and 
future research avenues can be identified. First, the data used throughout this dissertation stems 
from a specific funding scheme that is active in the Netherlands. This raises the question to what 
extent the findings reported in this dissertation are applicable to other settings. Although we expect 
our findings to hold in other networks that involve industry-university interaction focused at jointly 
conducting basic R&D, an interesting question could be to explore the boundaries of nature of the 
task at hand. We already mentioned, for example, the possibility to investigate the issues addressed 
with respect to consortium-level outcomes in other empirical contexts, such as alliance 
constellations. Obviously, also data on other funding schemes could be collected. A comparable 
funding scheme in the Netherlands was that of the innovation oriented research programme 
(Velzing, 2013), which was later absorbed by the top sector approach that started as from 2012. 
Similar programs in other countries obviously also could be investigated. 
 A second limitation that stems from the data used is that -even though the size of the 
dataset offers ample opportunity to study the topics focused at in this dissertation- it provides a 
rather generic view on the relation between networks and innovation. For example, being able to 
incorporate networks embedded in different technology fields offers ample opportunity to control 
for technology field differences. It is, however, also interesting to focus on each technology field 
in more detail to get a better hold on what is going on in such fields and how that relates to 
collaboration with respect to R&D and innovation. Hence, future research could focus on any one 
of the seven technology fields considered in this chapter to get a more in-depth insight regarding 
the topics covered in this dissertation within technology fields. 
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The third limitation is that Manski’s (1993) reflection problem applies to studies that focus on the 
relation between networks and innovation: it could be possible that the performance of an R&D 
consortium is the result of exogeneous effects (other consortia in a technology field also perform 
well), endogenous effects (consortia performance tends to vary across technology fields), or 
correlated effects (consortia performance tends to vary because consortia face similar institutional 
effects (Manski, 1993). Although we do use lagged models, our models do not completely 
circumvent the problem of simultaneity or unobserved environmental causes (Hasan & Bagde, 
2015). Getting more insight in the specific lag structure between R&D and innovation or specifying 
an instrumental variable that conveys influence from the environment to the consortium could 
address the reflection problem, although such data is difficult to obtain. 
 The fourth limitation of the studies reported in this dissertation is that we approach the 
relation between networks and innovation from a structuralist perspective. Although we do show 
that network structure has a profound effect in the generation of innovative outcomes by both 
R&D consortia as consortium networks, using a structuralist perspective involves making 
assumptions that have been challenged by some scholars. For example, Ghosh and Rosenkopf 
(2015) challenge the assumption that knowledge always flows through networks. These authors 
claim that frictions in interorganizational networks exist, for example due to the nature of 
knowledge and the composition of ties, which might hamper the unconditional flow of knowledge 
(Ghosh & Rosenkopf, 2015). Although this issue could partly be mitigated by incorporating tie 
strength when calculating the network measures used in this dissertation, this would still be a proxy 
for actual knowledge flows. Hence, future research should consider in more depth the role of joint 
member ties between consortia, motivations of members to share knowledge in consortia, the 
content of these ties as well as the characteristics of knowledge that flows through these ties (e.g. 
tacit vs. explicit, specific vs. general) (Aven, 2015; Daskalaki, 2010; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Wang 
& Soule, 2012). 
 A fifth limitation of the work reported in this dissertation is that the role of time in the 
relation between networks and innovation is approached rather empirical, except for Chapter 4. 
Future research should delve deeper into the processes that drive collaboration in R&D consortia 
over time. One could, for example, follow the formation and development of several R&D 
consortia from the start until the end, and link the collaboration dynamics observed to the different 
stages that have been identified in the process of research and development and innovation (Ibert 
& Müller, 2015). This could, for example, elucidate the role of joint member ties at different points 
in time. 
 The last limitation of the studies reported in this dissertation is that -even though each 
chapter builds on the premise that consortium managers and innovation policy makers should 
focus on network management- we know little about the extent to which those actors are aware of 
these networks, let alone the extent to which they manage network positions and structures. Most 
studies have considered knowledge flows in the context of R&D as involuntary. Yet, more recently 
authors have suggested that actors might need to take positive action instead, to share knowledge 
with others and spur innovation processes at both the consortium and the network level as a result 
(Ahrweiler, Pyka, & Gilbert, 2011). In this light, several authors have explicitly focused at actors 
deploying networking strategies (Bensaou, Galunic, & Jonczyk-Sédès, 2014). Others have even 
focused at more specific roles, for example the role of brokers as “network architects” (Pollock et 
al., 2004). Further investigating such targeted action in networks helps increasing our understanding 
of the strategies available to shape networks (Hallen, 2008). Hence, future research should consider 
agency in the formation and development of networks. 
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6.6 Concluding remarks 
With this dissertation, we suggest that there is value in considering the role of higher-order network 
effects in the relation between networks and innovation. Doing so provides levers to move away 
from muddling through with respect to these effects, and towards a more targeted management. 
The insights generated in this dissertation form a fruitful starting point for further research on this 
topic. As illustrated by the questions raised in the previous section -which are just some examples 
of the many interesting issues one could focus at- numerous and promising opportunities await 
those who want to embark further on the path of obtaining more insight in the relation between 
networks and innovation through conducting multi-level studies.  
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Summary 
Basic research & development (i.e. activities devoted to increasing scientific or technical knowledge 
and applying that knowledge in the creation of new and improved products or processes) is often 
seen as the first step towards the development of new technologies. Especially in the early stages 
of technological development, collaboration between industrial and academic actors is considered 
to be of key importance. In this dissertation, we focus on a specific form of organizing such joint 
research & development: R&D consortia. Based on the following three related research questions 
we explore topics related to the effects of network features on the innovative outcomes of both 
R&D consortia and consortium networks: 
1) To what extent does R&D consortium network structure affect innovative outcomes? 
2) To what extent does the network position of R&D consortia affect innovative outcomes? 
3) To what extent do network dynamics and technology field dynamics moderate the relationships explored in 
research question 1 and 2? 
The existing literature on R&D consortia has considered the prevalence of such consortia, as well 
as the role these consortia play for individual members. One of the aspects that is not explicitly 
considered in the current academic debate regarding the management of R&D consortia is that 
consortium members often are involved in multiple research collaborations simultaneously. As a 
result, R&D consortia are embedded in a larger collaborative network, and delineating to what 
extent this network affects the innovative outcomes of a consortium is important: scholars have 
often stressed that in addition to building internal capabilities, actively managing the external 
network by an organization becomes a crucial issue for effective innovation management and 
network orchestration. We contribute to this debate in two related ways. First, we focus on the 
relative effect of the complete consortium network structure compared to consortium-level 
features on the innovative outcomes of R&D consortia. Second, we compare the effect on 
innovative outcomes of the brokerage position a consortium has in the complete network structure 
with the effect on innovative outcomes of the level of closure of the consortium’s ego network. 
With respect to both effects, we are especially interested in the role of time, to tease out which 
network position is most salient for generating innovative outcomes, and when such a position 
during the innovation process is most beneficial for generating such outcomes. 
 Through funding R&D collaborations, government has an important role in the formation 
and subsequent dynamics of consortium networks geared towards technological development. One 
of the aspects related to the public funding of R&D networks that has received scant attention in 
the literature is that -despite the underlined importance of such public funding- questions regarding 
efficient network structures for generating innovation at the network-level as well as the dynamics 
of such networks merits further investigation. We seek to contribute to knowledge regarding the 
dynamics and innovativeness of complete consortium networks in two related ways. First, we focus 
on the question if differences exist in the dynamics of different technology field networks. Second, 
we focus on predicting network-level innovative outcomes using network structural features, as 
well as features of the network population and the stability of the underlying technology field. 
Similar to our approach regarding consortium-level outcomes, we are especially interested in the 
role of time, for example to detect differences in developmental paces between networks, as well 
as time lags between network structure and the generation of network-level innovative 
performance. 
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Hence, without a thorough understanding of the constraining and enabling effects of collaboration 
networks for both consortium managers and innovation policy makers, management of network 
positions and structures remains speculative and intuitive. Answering our research questions 
requires the inclusion of as many consortia and consortium networks in our study as possible. For 
this purpose, we have built a unique database that allows us to use multi-level perspectives that 
incorporate the role of time and employ a unique longitudinal dataset comprising 1,928 consortia, 
156 complete field networks, and 7 technology fields. This repository served as an important asset 
of this dissertation. The empirical chapters in this dissertation addressed the relation between 
networks and innovation in the following ways. 
 In Chapter 2, we addressed research question 1 at the level of the consortium: which 
antecedents determine the likelihood of an R&D consortium generating innovative outcomes. 
More specifically, we were interested in the role of the complete consortium network structure in 
the relationship between the consortium features geographical proximity and technological 
diversity and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes. We tested our 
hypotheses using a dataset of 1,263 Dutch R&D consortia that each were active somewhere in the 
time frame 1989-2004. We found that consortia that are embedded in networks characterized by 
mutual awareness of consortium members of what members in other consortia are doing (i.e. 
consortium networks characterized by density-based network integration), are more likely to 
generate innovative outcomes compared to consortia in networks that are characterized by other 
types of network integration. In addition, we found an inverted U-shaped relation between 
technological diversity and the likelihood of a consortium generating innovation, yet this relation 
only occurs in those networks of which the structure can be characterized by density-based 
integration. 
 Whereas Chapter 2 considered research question 1 on the role of the complete consortium 
network structure in R&D consortia in generating innovative outcomes, Chapter 3 considered the 
role of the position of R&D consortia in consortium networks over time. In the existing literature 
on the relationship between a consortium’s position in an interorganizational network and the 
likelihood of a consortium generating innovative outcomes, no consensus has emerged with respect 
to the question which network position is most advantageous. This is especially salient in the debate 
that focuses on the question whether network brokerage or closure provides the most efficient 
structure for innovation. In Chapter 3, we analysed this issue by focusing on the effect of both 
global and local network position on the likelihood of generating technological innovation. In 
addition, we considered the role of time in the salience of both effects, as we expected a link 
between stages in the process of R&D and the fruitfulness of occupying a certain network position. 
We tested our theoretical predictions with a multi-level analysis of 814 Dutch R&D consortia, each 
of which started somewhere in the time frame 1989-2004 and lasted for at least five years. Contrary 
to our expectations, we found that -although not salient across all years- global brokerage had a 
negative effect on the likelihood of generating technological innovation. We also found that local 
cohesion consistently enhanced the likelihood of innovation over time. Lastly, a time-dependent 
effect was found for the interaction between global brokerage and local cohesion, especially in the 
maiden years of consortia: here, consortia that combined being in locally embedded networks with 
a brokerage position in the complete network were more innovative compared to consortia that 
had other combinations local cohesion and global brokerage. 
 Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 considered the role of networks for the innovative outcomes of 
R&D consortia. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we moved our focus to the level of the complete 
consortium network. In Chapter 4, we started from the observation that existing literature suggests 
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a differentiated development of networks in different technology fields. However, Dutch 
innovation policy tends to approach these networks as homogeneous with respect to structure and 
in ways to ensure their viability. To explore the validity of this assumption in this policy approach 
we addressed the question if interorganizational technology field networks differ in their 
development in Chapter 4. By considering both network structural characteristics and the node set 
that comprises a network, we proposed an analytical framework that revolved around the ‘network 
state’ concept. We conceptualized this network state as a configuration of values in a five-
dimensional state space: network centralization, network density, network size, the number of 
exiting nodes, and entrants. This model of network states was used to explore the evolution of 7 
distinct technology field consortium networks over 23 years, using a latent profile analysis. This 
method allowed a mapping of all possible dynamics of a network through tracing a sequence of 
state changes over time. Our findings revealed that network dynamics unfold over sequences of 
changes in five distinct states: formation, growth, stagnation, stability and disintegration. Although 
we found a core sequence of state changes of formation, via growth, to stability, we also found 
considerable variations on, and extensions of this pathway. In addition to suggesting a terminology 
to talk about network dynamics at the complete network level, the most important findings of this 
chapter were that (1) field network dynamics are anything but homogeneous, and (2) the duration 
of states across consortium networks in different technology fields differs considerably across such 
fields. 
 In Chapter 5, our focus was on the role of knowledge in the generation of network-level 
innovative outcomes. Although several scholars have addressed the issue of explaining outcomes 
of interorganizational networks at the network level, the role of knowledge in the generation of 
these outcomes, especially in the case of publicly funded R&D networks is understudied. In 
addition, this topic is important to consider since, despite the many advantages of networks as 
flexible forms of organizing, several studies have shown that overall change in a network’s 
environment can be detrimental for network outcomes. Hence, we used our insights regarding 
technology field network dynamics from Chapter 4 for determining technology field stability and 
considered the role of such stability in the generation of network-level outcomes. Building on the 
preliminary theory of network effectiveness as suggested by Provan and Milward (1995) and Provan 
and Sebastian (1998), we developed a model in which network innovative performance is explained 
by the level of node entry, stayers and node exit, and network integration. These acted as proxies 
for mechanisms of knowledge variation, selection and retention. Using a sample of 93 R&D 
consortium networks in the Dutch context, our analysis suggested an important role of said 
predictors in explaining network innovative performance. The effect of node entry (enabling 
knowledge variation) on innovative outcomes was found to be negative in the short run. This effect 
however, switches to positive in the longer run. In addition, the effect of stayers (enabling positive 
knowledge selection) was found to be positive on the short run. Lastly, our results suggested a 
crossover interaction between network integration (enabling knowledge retention) and technology 
field stability. 
 In sum, we can say that, even though our findings are not always according to what we 
expected theoretically, networks do matter for innovation at multiple levels of analysis, and so does 
a consideration of network and technology field dynamics. With this dissertation, we suggest that 
there is value in considering the role of higher-order network effects in the relation between 
networks and innovation. Doing so provides levers to move away from muddling through with 
respect to these effects and move towards a more targeted management of networks. 
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Samenvatting 
Basisonderzoek en -ontwikkeling (activiteiten die zijn gericht op het vergroten van 
wetenschappelijke of technische kennis en de toepassing van die kennis in de creatie van nieuwe 
en verbeterde producten of processen) wordt vaak gezien als de eerste stap in de ontwikkeling van 
nieuwe technologieën. Vooral in vroege stadia van zulke technologische ontwikkeling wordt 
samenwerking tussen industriële en academische actoren als cruciaal beschouwd. In dit proefschrift 
richten we ons op een specifieke vorm van dergelijke samenwerkingen: R&D consortia. Aan de 
hand van de volgende drie gerelateerde onderzoeksvragen richten we ons op onderwerpen die 
verband houden met de effecten van netwerkkenmerken op de innovatieve resultaten van zowel 
R&D consortia als netwerken van R&D consortia: 
1) In hoeverre beïnvloedt de netwerkstructuur van R&D consortia innovatieve uitkomsten? 
2) In hoeverre beïnvloedt de netwerkpositie van R&D consortia innovatieve uitkomsten? 
3) In welke mate worden de relaties die zijn onderzocht in onderzoeksvraag 1 en 2 gemodereerd door 
netwerkdynamiek en de dynamiek van technologievelden? 
In de bestaande literatuur over R&D consortia is gekeken naar de prevalentie van dergelijke 
consortia en de rol die deze consortia spelen voor individuele leden. Één van de aspecten die niet 
expliciet in het huidige academische debat over het management van R&D consortia aan de orde 
is gesteld, is dat consortiumleden vaak gelijktijdig betrokken zijn bij meerdere consortia. Als gevolg 
hiervan zijn R&D consortia ingebed in een groter netwerk, en het is belangrijk om te bepalen in 
hoeverre dit netwerk invloed heeft op de innovatieve resultaten van een consortium: in de literatuur 
wordt vaak benadrukt dat naast het opbouwen van interne capaciteiten, het beheren van het externe 
netwerk door een organisatie een cruciaal punt is voor innovatiemanagement en het managen van 
netwerken. In deze dissertatie dragen we op twee manieren bij aan dit debat: allereerst richten we 
ons op het relatieve effect tussen de complete netwerkstructuur van het consortium en kenmerken 
van het consortium zelf op de innovatieve uitkomsten van R&D consortia. Ten tweede vergelijken 
we het effect op innovatieve uitkomsten van de positie die een consortium heeft in de complete 
netwerkstructuur met het effect op innovatieve resultaten van de positie die een consortium heeft 
in de locale netwerkstructuur. Met betrekkking tot deze effecten zijn we met name geïnteresseerd 
in de rol van tijd, om zo te kunnen bepalen welke netwerkpositie het meest belangrijk is voor het 
genereren van innovatieve resultaten, en wanneer. 
 De overheid speelt een belangrijke rol in de vorming en daaropvolgende dynamiek van 
consortiumnetwerken, met name door het verlenen van subsidies voor consortia. Één van de 
aspecten met betrekking tot de publieke financiering van consortiumnetwerken die in de literatuur 
nauwelijks aandacht heeft gekregen, is dat -ondanks het meermaals benadrukte belang van 
dergelijke publieke financiering- het niet duidelijk is wat nu efficiënte netwerkstructuren zijn voor 
het genereren van innovatie op netwerkniveau, en in hoeverre deze netwerken over de tijd 
onderhevig zijn aan verandering. In deze dissertatie leveren we twee bijdragen aan het verder 
begrijpen van de dynamiek en innovativiteit van complete consortiumnetwerken. Allereerst richten 
we ons op de vraag of er verschillen bestaan tussen de dynamiek van verschillende technologische 
veldnetwerken. Ten tweede richten we ons op het voorspellen van innovatieve resultaten op 
netwerkniveau. Dit doen we met behulp van netwerkstructurele kenmerken, kenmerken van de 
netwerkpopulatie en de stabiliteit van het onderliggende technologische veld. Net als in de 
hoofdstukken waarin we ons richten op het verklaren van innovatieve resultaten op 
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consortiumniveau zijn we in deze studies met name geïnteresseerd in de rol van tijd. Zo bekijken 
we verschillen in de ontwikkelingssnelheid van netwerken, maar ook naar verschillende 
tijdsintervallen tussen het bestaan van een zekere netwerkstructuur en de generatie van innovatieve 
prestaties op het niveau van het complete netwerk. 
 Zonder een goed begrip van de beperkende en bevorderende effecten van 
samenwerkingsnetwerken voor zowel consortiummanagers als innovatiebeleidsmakers, blijft het 
beheer van netwerkposities en structuren dus speculatief en intuïtief. Het beantwoorden van onze 
onderzoeksvragen vereist dat zoveel mogelijk consortia en consortiumnetwerken in ons onderzoek 
worden betrokken. Voor dit doel hebben we een unieke database gebouwd die ons in staat stelt 
om multi-level perspectieven te hanteren en tijdseffecten in onze analyses mee te nemen. We 
hebben hiertoe een unieke longitudinale dataset ontwikkeld die 1.928 consortia, 156 complete 
veldnetwerken en 7 technologievelden omvat. Deze database vormt een belangrijke basis binnen 
deze dissertatie. Op basis van deze dataset zijn we op de volgende manieren ingegaan op de relatie 
tussen netwerken en innovatie in de empirische hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift. 
 In hoofdstuk 2 hebben we onderzoeksvraag 1 op het niveau van het consortium behandeld: 
welke factoren bepalen de waarschijnlijkheid waarmee R&D consortia innovatieve resultaten 
genereren? Meer specifiek hebben we gekeken naar de rol van de complete 
consortiumnetwerkstructuur, en de rol die deze structuur speelt in de relatie tussen enerzijds de 
geographische nabijheid van consortiumleden en hun technologische diversiteit, en anderzijds de 
innovatieve uitkomsten van het consortium. Onze hypothesen zijn getoetst met behulp van een 
dataset van 1.263 Nederlandse R&D consortia die elk een aantal jaren actief waren ergens in de 
periode 1989-2004. Onze resultaten suggereren dat consortia die zijn ingebed in netwerken die 
gekenmerkt worden door wederzijdse bekendheid van consortiumleden met wat leden binnen 
andere consortia doen (we noemen dit op densiteit gebaseerde netwerkintegratie), meer kans 
hebben om innovatieve resultaten te genereren ten opzichte van consortia in netwerken die een 
andere vorm van netwerkintegratie kennen. Daarnaast vonden we een omgekeerde U-vormige 
relatie tussen technologische diversiteit en de waarschijnlijkheid dat een consortium innovatieve 
resultaten genereert, maar deze relatie komt alleen voor in die netwerken waarvan de structuur kan 
worden gekenmerkt door op densiteit gebaseerde netwerkintegratie. 
 Waar we ons in hoofdstuk 2 richten op onderzoeksvraag 1 voor wat betreft de rol van de 
complete netwerkstructuur in de generatie van innovatie door individuele R&D consortia, wordt 
in hoofdstuk 3 de rol van de positie over de tijd van R&D consortia in consortiumnetwerken 
besproken. In de bestaande literatuur over de relatie tussen de positie in een organisatienetwerk en 
de waarschijnlijkheid dat een consortium innovatieve uitkomsten genereert, bestaat geen consensus 
over het antwoord op de vraag welke netwerkpositie het meest voordelig is. Dit is vooral een 
prominent punt in het debat dat zich richt op de vraag of het nu het gepositioneerd zijn in 
samenhangende lokale netwerken (‘local cohesion’) of juist het gepositioneerd zijn in open globale 
netwerken (‘global brokerage’) is die de meest efficiënte positie voor innovatie biedt. In hoofdstuk 
3 hebben we dit probleem geanalyseerd door ons te richten op het effect van beide netwerkposities 
op de waarschijnlijkheid van het genereren van technologische innovatie. Daarnaast hebben 
bekeken hoe beide effecten over de tijd veranderden, omdat we een verband verwachtten tussen 
de fasen in het proces van R&D en de mate waarin het bezetten van een bepaalde netwerkpositie 
tot innovatieve uitkomsten leidt. We hebben onze theoretische voorspellingen getest met een 
multilevel analyse van 814 Nederlandse R&D consortia, die elk ergens in het tijdsbestek 1989-2004 
begonnen en minstens vijf jaar duurden. In tegenstelling tot onze theoretische verwachtingen 
wijzen onze resultaten erop dat global brokerage -hoewel niet in alle jaren- een negatief effect heeft 
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op de waarschijnlijkheid dat een consortium innovatieve resultaten levert. Ook vonden we dat local 
cohesion consistent over de jaren heen een positief effect heeft op het genereren van die 
innovatieve resultaten. Tot slot vonden we dat vooral in de eerste jaren van een consortium een 
interactie bestond tussen beide posities: consortia die een positie in een lokaal samenhangend 
netwerken combineren met een positie in een globaal open netwerk waren innovatiever in 
vergelijking met consortia die andere combinaties van beide netwerkposities hadden. 
 In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 hebben we onze focus verlegd naar het niveau van het complete 
consortiumnetwerk. Het startpunt voor hoofdstuk 4 was de observatie dat de bestaande literatuur 
een gedifferentieerde ontwikkeling van netwerken op verschillende technologische gebieden 
suggereert. Het Nederlandse innovatiebeleid benadert deze netwerken echter vaak als homogeen, 
zowel voor wat betreft de structuur als voor wat betreft manieren om de levensvatbaarheid te 
waarborgen. Om de geldigheid van deze veronderstelling in het huidige beleid te onderzoeken 
hebben we de vraag beantwoord of er verschillen zijn in netwerkdynamiek tussen netwerken die 
ingebed zijn in verschillende technologievelden. We hebben een analytisch raamwerk ontwikkeld 
dat ons in staat stelt de staat waarin een netwerk zich bevindt te kwalificeren met behulp van zowel 
netwerkstructuurkenmerken als kenmerken van de netwerkpopulatie. Deze netwerkstaat is 
geconceptualiseerd als een configuratie van waarden in een vijfdimensionale ruimte: 
netwerkcentralisatie, netwerkdichtheid, netwerkgrootte, het aantal uitgaande consortia en 
nieuwkomers. Dit model van ‘network states’ is gebruikt om de evolutie van 7 verschillende 
consortiumnetwerken over 23 jaar te onderzoeken met behulp van een latente profielanalyse. De 
voorgestelde methode maakt het mogelijk om dynamieken van een netwerk in kaart te brengen 
door een reeks van verschillende netwerkstaten over de tijd in kaart te brengen. Onze bevindingen 
lieten zien dat de dynamiek van een netwerk zich kan ontvouwen aan de hand van vijf verschillende 
netwerkstaten: vorming, groei, stagnatie, stabiliteit en desintegratie. Weliswaar vonden we een 
basissequentie van veranderingen die liep van formatie, via groei, naar stabiliteit, we vonden ook 
aanzienlijke variaties op, en uitbreidingen van deze sequentie. Niet alleen doen we met de 
gehanteerde methode een voorstel voor een terminologie waarmee gesproken kan worden over de 
dynamiek van complete netwerken, we hebben ook laten zien dat (1) de dynamiek van 
technologieveldnetwerken allesbehalve homogeen is en (2) er tussen velden aanzienlijke verschillen 
bestaan in de duur van de verschillende staten waarin consortiumnetwerken zich kunnen bevinden. 
 In hoofdstuk 5 lag onze focus op de rol van kennis bij het genereren van innovatieve 
resultaten op netwerkniveau. Hoewel verschillende academici de kwestie van het verklaren van 
uitkomsten van interorganisatorische netwerken op netwerkniveau hebben aangepakt, is de rol van 
kennis in het genereren van deze uitkomsten in het geval van publiek-private R&D netwerken niet 
inzichtelijk gemaakt. Bovendien is dit onderwerp belangrijk om bekijken omdat, ondanks de vele 
voordelen van netwerken als flexibele organisatievormen, verschillende onderzoeken hebben 
aangetoond dat verandering in de omgeving van een netwerk nadelig kan zijn voor 
netwerkresultaten. Daarom hebben we onze inzichten met betrekking tot de dynamiek van het 
technologienetwerk uit hoofdstuk 4 gebruikt voor het bepalen van technologische veldstabiliteit en 
de rol van dergelijke stabiliteit in de generatie van uitkomsten op netwerkniveau. Voortbouwend 
op de voorgestelde theorie van netwerkeffectiviteit door Provan en Milward (1995) en Provan en 
Sebastian (1998) hebben we een model ontwikkeld waarin innovatieve netwerkprestaties worden 
verklaard aan de hand van het niveau van nieuwe consortia die een netwerk binnenkomen, 
consortia die blijven, consortia die het netwerk verlaten en netwerkintegratie. Deze aspecten 
fungeerden als proxies voor mechanismen van kennisvariatie, -selectie en -retentie. Onze analyse, 
aan de hand van een steekproef van 93 R&D-consortiumnetwerken in de Nederlandse context, 
 
- 230 - 
suggereert een belangrijke rol van genoemde voorspellers in het verklaren van innovatieve 
netwerkprestaties. Het effect van nieuwe consortia die het netwerk binnenkomen (waardoor 
kennisvariatie mogelijk wordt gemaakt) op innovatieve resultaten op netwerkniveau bleek negatief 
te zijn op korte termijn. Op de langere termijn verandert dit echter in een positief effect. Daarnaast 
blijkt het effect van consortia die in het netwerk blijven (waardoor positieve kennisselectie mogelijk 
is) op de korte termijn positief. Ten slotte suggereerden onze resultaten een interactie tussen 
netwerkintegratie (waardoor kennisbehoud mogelijk is) en de stabiliteit van het onderliggende 
technologieveld. 
 Samenvattend kunnen we zeggen dat, hoewel onze bevindingen niet altijd overeenstemmen 
met wat theoretisch werd verwacht, netwerken van belang zijn voor innovatie op meerdere 
analyseniveaus, net als de dynamiek van deze netwerken en de onderliggende technologische 
velden. De resultaten van dit proefschrift suggereren dat het waardevol is om de rol van hogere 
orde netwerkeffecten in de relatie tussen netwerken en innovatie te beschouwen. Hiermee worden 
handvatten aangereikt om te bewegen van een ‘muddling through’-benadering met betrekking tot 
deze effecten naar een meer gericht management van deze netweken.  
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